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ployer in explaining the rise in earnings inequality in the United States. We first establish 
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equality. We show that the trends in earnings inequality in the administrative data from the 
Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics Program are inconsistent with other data sources 
when we do not correct for the presence of misused SSNs. After this correction to the worker 
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of the firm in these transitions, we estimate a model for log earnings with additive fixed worker 
and firm effects using all jobs held by eligible workers from 2004-2013. We construct a composite 
log earnings firm component across all jobs for a worker in a given year and a non-firm compo­
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1 Introduction
A growing body of work studies the rise in earnings inequality in the United States1 with many 
studies focus on assessing the role of the employer in explaining these trends.2 Virtually all of these 
papers use administrative data to analyze employer effects on earnings inequality. Information from 
administrative sources, unlike data collected in household surveys, is found or organic data.3 That 
is, these data come from a convenient frame neither designed nor ensured to be representative of the 
population under study. Using found data to study features of a population, in particular features 
that evolve over time like earnings inequality, requires additional effort to determine what types of 
individuals are included in the found data and how those who are excluded from the analysis affect 
the results.
In this paper, we analyze the importance of firms in explaining the evolution of earnings 
inequality in the U.S. using administrative data from the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dy­
namics (LEHD) infrastructure files of the U.S. Census Bureau. We do two important analyses 
before turning to earnings inequality. First, unlike other studies of earnings inequality that use 
administrative data, we supplement the LEHD frame with data from the Social Security Admin­
istration (SSA) to create a consistent frame of workers over time. Specifically, we identify records 
in the administrative LEHD data that are either (a) associated with an invalid SSN or (b) used 
in a manner indicating possibly fraudulent labor market activity associated with a valid SSN. We 
remove both of these types of records from our analysis and document the consequences. Second, 
we systematically compare the cross-sectional estimates of earnings inequality in our administrative 
data to estimates based on conventional household surveys and document the differences. Then, 
we link the administrative and household survey data and use the linked data to understand where 
important features of the earnings distribution diverge.
By converting the found LEHD administrative data frame on workers to a designed frame, 
we can produce reliable estimates of features of the worker population. Conversion to a designed 
frame matters because trends in inequality differ between the designed frame and the original found 
frame. While our designed frame shows a widening of the earnings distribution post-2000 that is 
consistent with findings from other data sources, the found frame does not. Instead, the found frame 
shows no growth in earnings inequality since 2000.4 We show that the workers excluded from the 
found frame to create the designed frame tend to be very low earnings individuals. In general, it is
1See Katz and Autor (1999) for a summary o f the extensive body of work that analyzed the rise in U.S. wage 
inequality from the late 1970s to the mid-1990s and the forces behind this change in the wage structure.
2In particular, see Card et al. (2013) and Song et al. (2015) . Aside from the increase in firm-specific wage premiums 
as a source of earnings inequality, other analyses have focused on skill-biased technological change (Acemoglu and 
Autor, 2011) and the rise in the returns to education (Autor, 2014) .
3The term “found data” is commonly used in the data science literature, but the first formal use is Whither Biomet­
rics Committee (2010, p. 72). Former U.S. Census Director Robert Groves coined the term “organic data” (Groves, 
2010) .
4Blackburn and Bloom (1987) made a related point when analyzing earnings inequality from 1967-1985 in CPS- 
ASEC. They noted that the patterns in earnings inequality observed in the data depended on various factors, including 
which individuals were included in the earnings distribution. More recently, Spletzer (2014) noticed a similar difference 
when comparing trends in inequality observed in the CPS vs. the LEHD data.
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the bottom of the earnings distribution that is most affected by different frame-selection criteria.
Using our designed worker frame, we analyze how the earnings distribution has changed 
over time. We include inactive workers in our analysis, defined as individuals who are eligible to 
work, but report no positive earnings. While most studies of earnings inequality limit the analysis 
to employed individuals, we highlight the importance of accounting for the mass of nonemployed 
workers when analyzing the patterns in earnings inequality.5 We show that by excluding these 
inactive workers in the analysis of earnings inequality, traditional measures of inequality like the 
Gini coefficient actually show a decline in earnings inequality during the Great Recession as workers, 
mostly from the bottom 80% of the earnings distribution, moved into nonemployment.6 While we 
do not receive a direct report of the labor-force participation status of these inactive workers from 
the administrative records, about 30% of them have reported positive earnings within the last four 
years, indicating that many have had some recent attachment to the labor market.
With both active and inactive workers in our analysis sample, we decompose the year-to- 
year changes in the earnings distribution into flows of workers across five employment outcomes 
from 2004-2013: (i) ineligibility, (ii) nonemployment, (iii) employment with annual earnings in the 
bottom 20% of the earnings distribution, (iv) employment in the middle 60%, and (v) employment in 
the top 20%. From this decomposition we find that mobility, both upward and downward, generally 
occurs between neighboring parts of the inactivity/earnings distribution. Specifically, inactive 
workers are most likely to transition into employment at the bottom of the earnings distribution, 
and rarely do employed workers jump from the bottom of the earnings distribution to the top. 
Furthermore, worker flows explain almost all of the changes in the earnings distribution in the last 
decade, with the average real earnings of workers in the bottom, middle and top of the earnings 
distribution remaining fairly constant.
The Great Recession had a very large impact on these flows, with over nine million workers 
moving into nonemployment and almost four million workers falling from the middle of the earnings 
distribution to the bottom. While gross outflows from inactivity increased during the recovery, the 
flows have not been large enough to noticeably reduce the large pool of inactive workers accumulated 
during the early years of the Great Recession. Furthermore, overall mobility declined, with workers 
more likely to remain in their current employment state.
To understand the role of the firm in moving workers to the various parts of the earnings 
distribution, we decompose the above flows by worker and firm types. Specifically, we estimate the
5Numerous studies have documented that workers face large earnings losses upon job loss (Jacobson et al., 1993; 
Stevens, 1997) , and that layoffs are highly counter-cyclical (Hall, 2005) . However, while there are studies that allow 
the probability of experiencing unemployment spells to differ across income groups (Castaneda et al., 1998) and some 
that explicitly take into account the effect of job loss when estimating models of earnings dynamics (Altonji et al., 
2013) , there is no consensus in the literature on the best method for incorporating inactive workers into a study of 
earnings inequality.
6While many studies have documented a rise in earnings inequality during recessions (for example, Castaneda 
et al., 1998) , other studies have noted that this relationship may not always hold. In particular, Barlevy and Tsiddon 
(2006) note that the cyclical variation in earnings inequality may also be connected to long-run trends in inequality. 
More recently, Piketty and Saez (2013) focus on the affect of business cycles on the top of the income distribution, 
where transitions into unemployment are less of an issue.
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statistical model developed in Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) , AKM hereafter, to decompose 
annual earnings into firm and non-firm components. Then, we characterize the firm component 
by its position in the overall distribution of firm components. For the person side of the analysis, 
we consider only the AKM worker effect and the estimated effect of the skill-related regressors. 
We label this component the skill type. Using the firm-type/skill-type dichotomy, we classify 
workers by their skill-type location in the earnings distribution and by their employer's location 
in the firm-component distribution. We examine the mobility patterns and earnings changes for 
different skill-types of workers employed at different pay-types of firms. We find that while the 
difference between working at a bottom- or middle-paying firm is relatively small, the gains from 
working at a top-paying firm are large. In particular, workers benefit from working at a top-paying 
firm in two ways. First, workers employed at a top-paying firm earn more than similar workers 
employed at bottom- and middle-paying firms. Second, workers at top-paying firms experience a 
higher probability of moving up the earnings distribution in the following year. Thus, top-paying 
firms are associated with increases in both the probability of upward mobility for a worker and the 
probability of remaining at the top of the earnings distribution.
Related Literature
This paper contributes to two main strands of literature on earnings inequality. The first documents 
the trends in earnings inequality. The second analyzes the sources of earnings inequality, with a 
particular emphasis on understanding the role of firms.
Trends in Earnings Inequality There is a large body of work that documents the trends in 
inequality and tries to identify the sources of these changes. Many of these early studies analyzed 
the public-use micro-data from the Current Population Survey (CPS). These studies documented a 
dramatic rise in wage-rate and earnings inequality that started in the late 1970s and continued until 
the mid-1990s.7 This widening of the earnings distribution, while still present, has slowed since the 
mid-1990s. Much of the focus of this literature has shifted towards understanding the polarization 
of the wage rate distribution.8 Piketty and Saez (2003) directed the attention of researchers to 
analyzing the change in the share of income received by the top 1%.
More recent studies also use administrative data to study earnings inequality. Unlike data 
collected from household surveys, administrative earnings data are generally free from measurement 
error and top-coding (Abowd and Stinson, 2013) , but often lack direct information on labor supply, 
which makes the distinction between earnings and wage-rate analyses salient. In the U.S., given 
the absence of information on hours worked on most administrative records, the focus has shifted 
from wage rates to earnings or income.9 Kopczuk et al. (2010) use micro-data from the Social
7See, for example, Katz and Murphy (1992) , Levy and Murnane (1992) , Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) , and 
Katz and Autor (1999) .
8See Autor et al. (2008) and Acemoglu and Autor (2011) for a summary of more recent work on wage polarization. 
These studies usually define the “wage rate” as the earnings of full-time, full-year workers.
9Researchers have also used administrative data from other countries to study earnings inequality. Baker and
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Security Administration (SSA) with information on taxable social security earnings to analyze 
the evolution of earnings inequality and mobility from 1937 to 2004.10 They find that earnings 
inequality over this period is U-shaped, decreasing until about 1953, then increasing thereafter.11 
Finally, Spletzer (2014) analyzes the trends in earnings equality in the LEHD data. The trend in 
earnings inequality depends on the workers included in the sample for analysis. Specifically, he 
shows that quarterly earnings inequality has been increasing among workers who are very attached 
to the labor market.12 However, annual earnings inequality has not changed since around 2000 when 
Spletzer (2014) includes all workers age 15 and older in his analysis sample, a result consistent with 
our findings when we use the data on all available jobs, but inconsistent with our findings when we 
correct the estimation frame to exclude job records associated with what we call ineligible workers.
With the availability of all these data sources for studying earnings inequality, Spletzer (2014) 
also analyzes how the patterns in inequality vary across data sources. While he conducts detailed 
comparison across several sources, we focus on the comparison between Current Population Survey’s 
Annual Social and Economic Supplement (CPS-ASEC) and the LEHD data.13 In particular, he 
compares the evolution of the ratio of the 90th to the 10th percentile in CPS-ASEC and in LEHD. 
When comparing these two sources, Spletzer documents different patterns in the 90/10 ratio across 
the two that are very similar to our findings. In particular, the 90/10 ratio in CPS-ASEC has been 
increasing over the last 15 years, while the 90/10 ratio in LEHD has remained relatively flat. While 
Spletzer (2014) identifies that it is differences in the evolution of the bottom half of the earnings 
distribution causing this discrepancy, he does not further analyze the differences in the sample of 
workers covered by CPS-ASEC (a designed frame) and those covered by LEHD (a found frame), 
as we do.14
The Role of Firms in Earnings Inequality To evaluate the role of firms in the rise in 
inequality, many papers estimate a variation of the statistical model presented in AKM .15 The data
Solon (2003) use longitudinal income tax records to decompose the growth in earnings inequality in Canada into its 
permanent and transitory components. They find that both of these components are important.
10Kopczuk et al. (2010) use several data sources from SSA for their analysis. See section II.B of their paper for the 
precise details.
11Guvenen et al. (2014) also use micro-data from SSA; however, their earnings measure comes from W-2 forms (box 
1) submitted directly by the employers. They focus on earnings risk changes during recessions; in their results, the 
trend in earnings inequality, which can be computed from their reported earnings percentiles, shows a small decline 
in earnings inequality during the 1990s until about 2000. Since 2000, earnings inequality has been on the rise. See 
Table A.3 of their Appendix A for the percentiles of the earnings distribution.
12To proxy for full-time workers, Spletzer (2014) only includes full-quarter workers: individuals with at least three 
consecutive quarters of positive earnings, for whom the interior quarter is studied.
13Spletzer (2014) also compares LEHD data to the data from the outgoing rotation group contained in the CPS 
basic monthly files and the IRS data used in Saez (2015) .
14Spletzer (2014) notes that the scope of coverage of CPS-ASEC is previous year income from all jobs for all persons 
aged 15 and over currently residing in the household. To get comparable estimates from LEHD, he computes annual 
earnings from all jobs for all workers aged 15 and over. While we impose no age restriction on our found frame, the 
results in Spletzer (2014) are very comparable. Further, it is interesting to note that just imposing an age restriction, 
as is done in many studies, is not sufficient to reconcile the differences in earnings inequality trends observed in 
CPS-ASEC and LEHD when using the underlying LEHD data without adjustments to their frame.
15A number of papers in this volume use or analyze the AKM decomposition. Freeman et al. (forthcoming) directly 
apply the AKM method to the LEHD data, using the all-workers frame we discuss below. Card et al. (forthcoming)
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requirements that allow for the identification of separate worker and firm fixed effects-longitudinal 
links in both dimensions with sufficient network connectivity-almost always restrict such studies 
to administrative data. Card et al. (2013) applied this statistical technique to administrative data 
from Germany. Their analysis focused on full-time, full-year male employees. Their estimates 
suggest that, for this group of workers, the rise in German wage-rate inequality was in part due 
to the increase in the dispersion in wage premiums paid by firms. Song et al. (2015) take a 
nonparametric approach to measurement of the firm's contribution to the rise in earnings inequality. 
Using SSA earnings data from the W-2 tax information forms from 1978-2012, they decompose the 
rise in earnings inequality into the part attributed to rising dispersion between firms in the average 
earnings they pay their employees and the part attributed to rising earnings dispersion among 
workers within a firm. They find that virtually all of the rise in earnings inequality is accounted 
for by an increase in the dispersion in the average earnings paid by firms. In their data, earnings 
differences among workers at the same firm have remained fairly constant over this period.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the Unemployment 
Insurance (UI) based individual- and job-level data we use in our analysis and discusses the creation 
of our all-workers and eligible-workers frames. Section 3 presents and compares inequality trends 
in found versus designed data. This section also briefly discusses the results of comparing our 
analysis frames to data from the Current Population Survey and the American Community Survey. 
Section 4 analyzes the evolution of the earnings distribution over time and presents a worker 
flow decomposition of the year-to-year change in the earnings distribution. Section 5 analyzes 
the importance of firms in understanding these changes in the earnings distribution. Section 6 
concludes.
2 Data Sources and Methods
The empirical work in this paper uses three different sources of earnings information. The pri­
mary data source is the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) infrastructure files, 
developed and maintained by the U.S. Census Bureau.16 We also use two household surveys: the 
Current Population Survey (CPS) and the American Community Survey (ACS). From these three 
data sources, we create two annual person-level earnings files covering the period 1990-2013. We 
construct the first file using the LEHD data and the second file using repeated cross-sectional CPS 
and ACS microdata.
In the LEHD data infrastructure, a “job ” is the statutory employment of a worker by a 
statutory employer as defined by the Unemployment Insurance (UI) system in a given state. Man­
develop a full economic model that interprets AKM in the equilibrium, and apply that model to data from Portugal. 
Van Reenen et al. (forthcoming) use AKM worker and firm effects to augment their analysis of German employers. 
Haltiwanger et al. (forthcoming) use the LEHD data in the all-workers frame, relying on observable firm characteristics 
rather than the AKM decomposition to study the employer’s contribution. Juhn et al. (forthcoming) measure earnings 
volatility from the LEHD data, using the all-workers frame and requiring two consecutive years of positive earnings 
to study whether firm revenue shocks are transmitted to workers.
16 See Abowd et al. (2009) for a detailed summary of the construction of the LEHD infrastructure.
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dated reporting of Ul-covered wage and salary payments between one statutory employer and one 
statutory employee is governed by the state’s UI system. Reporting covers private employers, state 
and local government. There are no self-employment earnings unless the proprietor drew a salary, 
which is indistinguishable from other employees in this case.
The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) supplied federal jobs data, included from 
2000Q1 forward. The OPM data were edited as part of the LEHD infrastructure processing to 
produce records containing quarterly earnings reports comparable to those reported directly in the 
UI wage and salary payments. As part of this processing, pseudo-UI account numbers were created 
using the observed combinations of duty station state and agency/sub-element.17 The result is a 
set of state-level employer identifiers conceptually similar to those found on the UI data for private 
firms.
Due to national security regulations, which suppress certain jobs from the ones released by 
OPM to the public and other agencies, the coverage of the OPM extract varies by agency. Under­
coverage is particularly severe for the Department of Defense (including the Air Force, Army, and 
Navy), Department of Justice, Department of State, and the Department of Treasury. Although 
the federal jobs data are typically not included as part of the state-based UI system, going forward 
in this paper, when we say “UI-covered” employment, we mean “statutory employment” as defined 
by the UI system or a statutory federal employee.
2.1 Date Regimes
States and the federal government joined the partnership that supplies input data to the LEHD 
program at different dates. When a state or the federal government joined, the data custodians 
were asked to produce historical data for as many quarters in the past, back to 1990Q1, as could 
be reasonably recovered from their information storage systems. As a result, the date that a 
data-supplying entity joined the partnership is not the same as the first quarter in which that 
entity’s data appear in the system. The start date for any state or the federal government depends 
primarily on the amount of historical data the state or federal government could recover at the time 
it joined. This potential ignorability (in the sense of Rubin (1987) or Imbens and Rubin (2015)) 
of the start data for a segment of the LEHD data is the basis for our methods of constructing 
nationally representative estimates back to the early 1990s.18
To understand how state entrance into the LEHD program affects the trends in earnings 
inequality, we analyze four regimes that correspond to different epochs of data availability:
• Regime 1: 1990-2013 [19% of 2012Q1 QCEW private employment]
(AK CO MD ID IL IN KS LA MO WA WI);
• Regime 1 and 2: 1995-2013 [68%]
17See h ttps://w w w .opm .gov /policy -data -oversigh t/data-ana lysis-docu m en tation /data -policy -gu idance / 
reporting-gu idance/part-a-hum an-resources.pdf for a list of agency codes.
18See Abowd and Vilhuber (2011) for a description of how these modeling assumptions were used to construct 
national gross worker and job flow estimates.
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Figure 1: LEHD Infrastructure Data as Received and by Date Regimes
—  Regimes
—  As Received
a y  ^  ,a N vP- ,0-' ,a ' .ca N ^  ,a ' ,a N ,a '
V  'Y  'Y  'Y  'Y  'Y  'Y  'Y  'Y  V  'Y  'Y
Notes: The figure shows the coverage of the LEHD infrastructure data expressed as the percent of 2012Q1 private 
QCEW employment as received (green line) and by date regime (red line). OPM data for federal workers are not 
shown in this figure, but are available beginning in 2000Q1.
(+  AZ CA FL GA MN NC NY OR MT PA RI SD TX W Y);
• Regime 1, 2, and 3: 1998-2013 [85%]
(+  CT HI K Y MI ND NJ NM NV SC TN VA W V);
• Regime 1, 2, 3, and 4: 2004-2013 [100%]
(+  AL AR DC DE IA MA MS NE NH OH OK UT VT).
The number in brackets represents the percentage of private employment as reported in the BLS 
Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) in 2012Q1 for the regimes listed. The 
construction of the different date regimes is shown graphically in Figure 1. Appendix Table A.1 
presents a detailed tabulation of the coverage of each date regime.
We did not create a separate date regime when the OPM data begin in 2000Q1 for two 
reasons. First, the proportion of reported federal jobs in 2000Q1 is small, no more than four 
percent of 2012Q1 UI covered employment in a state and, on average, less than one percent, 
except for DC, where the proportion of OPM jobs is about nineteen percent. Second, although the 
proportion of OPM jobs in DC is high, jobs in DC are part of regime four, which does not begin 
until 2004Q1.
2.2 Job and Person Sampling Frames
By 2004Q1 the LEHD data represent the complete universe of statutory jobs in the U.S.: all fifty 
states, the District of Columbia, and the federal government are reporting regularly. Before this 
date, LEHD data provide a complete frame for the states in each date regime (excluding the federal
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government before 2000Q1). After this date, the LEHD data, in theory, provide a complete frame 
for the national population of UI covered jobs (including federal employees). Studying job-level 
inequality, the task for which having a complete job frame is well suited, as a proxy for person-level 
inequality may be misleading due to the time-varying many-to-one assignment of jobs to workers. 
The number of employers per worker varies over the business cycle. Lower-earning workers tend 
to have more employers, complicating the interpretation of job-level results.19 Therefore, when 
studying inequality, it is preferable to have a person frame that covers a known population of 
interest, such as all persons legally eligible to work in the United States. For our analyses, we use 
two different approaches to creating frames of jobs and workers. The first approach relies only on 
the employer-employee links present in the UI data. This method captures all reported jobs. The 
second approach uses the Census Bureau’s edited version of the Social Security Administration’s 
master SSN database (the “Numident” ), capturing all reported employment-eligible workers but 
removing jobs associated with ineligible workers, as we elaborate below.
LEHD earnings records are reported quarterly by the employing firm. These records contain 
a nine-digit person identifier, typically assumed to be a Social Security Number. However, at the 
time the report is received by the state UI office, the nine-digit person identifiers are not verified, 
resulting in records both with and without a valid SSN. Using the Numident, we ascertain if each 
earnings record is associated with a valid SSN. Records not associated with a valid SSN may 
have an alternate, valid person identifier, such as an IRS-issued Taxpayer Identification Number; 
nevertheless, we can only distinguish between valid and invalid SSNs. If the SSN is valid, we have 
access to demographic characteristics, such as sex and birth date, from the Numident and other 
Census sources. We also have an employment history from the UI wage records. If the SSN is not 
valid, we only have access to the employment history.
Our first frame, the “all-workers frame,” contains earnings for all jobs reported on the UI 
data for each date regime in the relevant years from 1990-2013, as noted in Figure 1.
Our second frame, the “eligible-workers frame” is also delineated by these date regimes, but 
includes jobs only for the subset of the all-workers frame that meets the following criteria:
• has a valid SSN on the Numident;
• appears in the frame every year from 1990 to 2013 in which that individual is between the 
ages of 18 and 70, inclusive;
• the year of the recorded data is greater than or equal to the SSN year of issue, and less than 
or equal to the year of death (if available); and
• has an SSN that was associated with fewer than 12 jobs during the data year.
An eligible worker is labeled as “active” in the labor market in a given year when UI earnings 
are positive, and “inactive” otherwise. The valid SSN, age-range, date of death, number of jobs,
19 See Hirsch and Husain (2013) and the references therein for a summary of the literature on the cyclicality of 
multiple job-holding. The authors find that the multiple job-holding rate is pro-cyclical, declining during recessions 
because of the increased slackness in the labor market.
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and active worker restrictions remove about 7% of the worker-year records found in the all-workers 
frame.
The purpose of the eligible-workers frame is twofold. The Numident allows us to consistently 
identify a set of persons legally eligible to work each year, while at the same time implicitly removing 
earning records from our analysis sample that are not associated with individuals in the covered 
population. However, we also go a step further, and remove earnings records with a valid SSN 
where the available data strongly suggest that the SSN is not being used by the original owner.20 
These two types of suspect nine-digit person identifiers— invalid SSNs that do not match to the 
Census Numident and valid SSNs apparently being used by multiple persons and/or for whom the 
age of the person issued the SSN is inconsistent with labor-market activity— we call “immigrant 
candidates.”
Table 1 presents basic counts of persons and jobs in the eligible-workers frame and in the 
immigrant candidate file. While we present some analysis of the immigrant candidate jobs in 
Appendix A , we do not have sufficient information to convert the collection of these jobs into an 
inter-temporally consistent frame for this population of individuals. We have no plausible means 
of determining how many immigrant candidates are using each SSN in this collection of UI wage 
records.
Even accounting for the increasing coverage of each date regime, there is a clear, strong 
upward trend in the number of immigrant-candidate records until the Great Recession, and a 
strong downward trend thereafter. Because there are data in the system for each of these records, 
the associated nine-digit person identifier represents at least one worker, but may represent many. 
A great deal of supplemental research would be required to estimate the relation between how many 
jobs are reported for a “worker” in the immigrant-candidate records and the number of individuals 
employed. Even more research would be required to estimate their characteristics. We do not 
attempt such research here. We note that when we use the all-workers frame, each associated 
nine-digit person identifier counts as one individual, but there is no adjustment for being inactive; 
that is, we do not assume zero earnings when this “worker” has no reported earnings. When we use 
the eligible-workers frame, all immigrant-candidate records are excluded. Eligible inactive workers 
are assumed to have zero earnings when there is no reported activity in any job.
Appendix A contains additional detailed analyses of the construction of the eligible-workers 
frame. In particular, Appendix Figure A.1 plots the count of earnings records excluded from 
the eligible-workers frame each year, disaggregated by earnings records each year associated with 
individuals who have invalid SSNs, who are either too young or too old, and/or who report working 
12 or more jobs in a year. Detailed counts are reported in Appendix Table A.2.
20The use of SSNs not originally issued to the person using the SSN has been documented and studied by Brown 
et al. (2013) and others.
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Table 1: Observations per Year for Eligible Workers and Immigrant Candidates
E lig ib le  W o rk e rs  Im m ig ra n t C a n d id a tes
Y ear P erson s In a ctiv e A c t iv e J o b s A c t iv e J o b s
1990 190,814,228 167,224,366 23,589,862 34,936,872 1,585,988 2,173,054
1991 192,605,253 169,444,287 23,160,966 33,446,875 1,503,127 2,029,041
1992 194,341,714 171,098,747 23,242,967 33,588,257 1,485,173 2,024,225
1993 196,043,096 172,414,178 23,628,918 34,733,064 1,590,507 2,227,908
1994 197,726,878 173,562,792 24,164,086 36,705,168 1,737,988 2,546,460
1995 199,524,643 116,578,567 82,946,076 128,077,314 6,666,437 9,875,811
1996 201,276,549 117,660,582 83,615,967 129,681,393 6,725,830 10,144,571
1997 203,229,484 117,863,679 85,365,805 134,003,889 6,925,825 10,560,373
1998 205,266,723 94,856,664 110,410,059 173,778,794 8,919,168 13,680,138
1999 207,478,545 94,930,531 112,548,014 178,813,085 9,473,798 14,850,424
2000 209,895,465 94,701,668 115,193,797 184,243,425 9,975,102 15,909,402
2001 212,479,460 96,709,036 115,770,424 178,433,884 9,703,887 15,142,444
2002 214,891,408 99,804,179 115,087,229 172,249,424 9,109,574 13,646,946
2003 217,298,533 102,254,299 115,044,234 169,454,044 8,715,459 13,105,529
2004 219,763,469 83,200,954 136,562,515 202,935,084 10,218,971 15,254,789
2005 222,160,089 83,819,319 138,340,770 207,737,171 10,577,475 16,109,360
2006 224,721,578 84,357,718 140,363,860 212,227,031 10,943,861 16,830,576
2007 227,553,012 85,518,594 142,034,418 213,889,946 10,818,763 16,464,027
2008 230,355,015 88,245,425 142,109,590 206,906,286 9,845,415 14,509,746
2009 232,813,313 94,864,949 137,948,364 188,220,068 8,358,069 11,701,711
2010 234,304,705 96,959,047 137,345,658 188,740,259 7,919,195 11,019,697
2011 235,429,997 96,619,700 138,810,297 193,351,447 7,813,411 10,942,606
2012 236,484,312 96,068,987 140,415,325 197,879,809 8,254,250 11,556,277
2013 237,816,938 96,151,327 141,665,611 202,277,055 9,310,868 13,216,695
Notes: The table presents counts of the number of persons and jobs in the eligible-workers frame and in the 
immigrant candidates file. The sum of these two components is the all-workers frame. The persons in the 
eligible-workers frame are disaggregated into those who report positive earnings (Active) and those who do not 
(Inactive). The frame is complete and covers the entire U.S. from 2004 forward.
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2.3 Earnings Definitions and Coverage
In this section we define our earnings measures for both the all-workers and the eligible-workers 
frames. Our primary measure of earnings is based on annual UI job-level earnings reports. We 
adjust nominal earnings to real earnings using the Consumer Price Index (CPI-U), with 2000 as 
the base year. Let be the real earnings for worker i employed at firm j  in year t. Person-level 
annual earnings sum all jobs for each worker in each year:
eit =  yijt. (1)
j
Using eit, we estimate total annual earnings for the eligible-workers frame in year t using:
EtEW =  E  eit, (2)
i\(i,t)eEWt
where EW t is the set of workers in the eligible-workers frame in year t. For the period 2004-2013, 
when our frames contain data for the entire U.S., the eligible-workers frame is approximately 90% 
of wage and salary compensation as defined in the National Income and Product Accounts.21
2.4 Estimation of the Earnings/Inactivity Distribution
We begin by calculating deciles of eligible-workers person-level earnings, eit, pooled across the years 
2004-2013. Using these deciles, we create three earnings bins as shown in Table 2. The bins are 
designed to capture the bottom, middle, and top of the earnings distribution over the entire ten- 
year period. For example, the first two columns in Table 2 show the results for bin 2, workers in the 
bottom 20% of the earnings distribution.22 Workers in this bin have a minimum annual earnings 
value of $2, a maximum value of $6,600, and a mean log earnings in real 2000 dollars of $7.473 
(implied geometric mean real earnings $1,760).
The low mean log earnings in bins 2 and 3 suggests that a large proportion of workers in 
these bins are employed for only part of the year. In Table 3 we present information about the 
labor-force activity of workers in each of the three earnings bins. Each row in the table (except the 
residual category “All Other” ) represents a specific combination of quarters worked and number of 
quarters in the longest job, truncated at a maximum of six quarters. The number of quarters in 
the longest job takes on values from one to six. A five-quarter longest job is active in either the 
fourth quarter of the previous year or the first quarter of the subsequent year, while a six-quarter 
longest job is active in both. Thus a six-quarter active job is active at the beginning of a calendar 
year, the end of a calendar year, and all quarters in the middle. The most prevalent pattern in 
each earnings category is listed first, followed by the next most prevalent, and continuing until the 
table contains the patterns for approximately 80% of the workers in a typical year.
21Appendix A provides a detailed analysis of the earnings coverage for each of our frames in comparison with BEA 
National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) annual wages and salary estimates.
22Bin 1 is reserved for eligible but inactive workers, who are not included in the summaries described in Table 2.
11
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics by Real Earnings Bins
E arn in gs B in s  (eu )
2: Bottom  20% 3: Middle 60%  4: Top 20%
Minimum 0.693 ($2) 8.795 ($6,600) 10.750 ($46,800)
Mean 7.473 ($1,760) 9.938 ($20,700) 11.240 ($75,810)
Maximum 8.795 ($6,600) 10.750 ($46,800) 16.140 ($10,230,000)
Notes: The table presents statistics on real earnings for three categories of workers: (i) Bin 2: bottom 20% of the 
pooled annual-earnings distribution of eligible workers from 2004-2013, (ii) Bin 3 : the middle 60%, and (iii) Bin 4: 
the top 20%. The rows show the minimum, mean, and maximum log earnings, log(eit), of each bin. The 
exponentiated values (implied geometric means) are listed in parentheses. All earnings are in real 2000 dollars 
(adjusted using CPI-U). Note that the minimum and maximum values of each bin are rounded to four significant 
digits.
The dominant labor-force attachment pattern varies substantially across bins: 31% of the 
workers in the bottom 20% of the earnings distribution work only one quarter. In contrast, for 
workers in the top 20% of the earnings distribution, the most common labor force status is employ­
ment with at least one firm for the entire year. Although there are almost certainly large differences 
in average wages for workers at the bottom, middle and top of the earnings distribution, one of the 
primary reasons average annual earnings for workers in the bottom earnings category are so low is 
they are employed for only a small portion of the year.
Finally, we combine the earnings bins discussed above with the active/inactive status infor­
mation available for the eligible-workers frame to create four mutually exclusive earnings/inactivity 
categories:
1. eligible to work, but no reported UI earnings (inactive);
2. working and in the bottom 20% of the overall UI earnings distribution;
3. working and in the middle 60% of the overall UI earnings distribution; and
4. working and in the top 20% of the overall UI earnings distribution.
We analyze these four bins comprehensively in Sections 4 and 5, when we study the dynamics of 
earnings distribution changes and the role of the firm.
3 Inequality Trends in the LEHD Infrastructure Data (1990-2013)
The determination of an appropriate frame for studying changes in earnings inequality led us to 
analyze our eligible-workers frame, which is the complete population for the United States during 
the critical period from 2004-2013. The results in this section, and the rest of the paper, relate 
exclusively to the eligible-workers frame. Where we have also analyzed comparable data for the 
all-workers frame, we reference results in Appendix B .
We begin by examining the evolution of the percentiles of the earnings distribution. To
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Table 3: Labor-Force Activity of Workers in Each Earnings Bin
Q u a rters  L on g est W ork ers J o b s E arn ings
W o rk e d  J o b Counts P ct All P ct Bin (Avg) (Avg)
Bottom  20% of Earnings Distribution
i i 8,543,957 6.1% 30.6% 1.066 $1,366
2 2 5,806,138 4.2% 20.8% 1.213 $2,824
4 6 2,893,038 2.1% 10.4% 1.251 $4,227
3 3 2,591,936 1.9% 9.3% 1.263 $3,726
3 2 2,467,851 1.8% 8.8% 2.297 $3,480
All Other 5,608,961 4.0% 20.1% 2.306 $3,472
Middle 60% of Earnings Distribution
4 6 52,012,001 37.3% 62.1% 1.212 $26,110
4 5 8,869,511 6.4% 10.6% 1.602 $22,410
4 3 7,105,740 5.1% 8.5% 2.592 $20,570
All Other 15,748,549 11.3% 18.8% 1.786 $16,626
Top 20% o f Earnings Distribution
4 6 22,653,328 16.2% 81.2% 1.181 $88,450
All Other 5,258,632 3.8% 18.8% 1.756 $91,630
Notes: Each row in the table represents a specific combination of quarters worked and number of quarters in the 
longest job. The number of quarters in the longest job takes on values from one to six. A five-quarter longest job is 
active in either the fourth quarter of the previous year or the first quarter of the subsequent year, while a 
six-quarter longest job is active in both. The most prevalent pattern in each earnings bin is listed first with the next 
most prevalent second, continuing until the table contains the patterns for approximately 80% of the workers in a 
typical year. All Other is the residual category. The counts are averages per year from the eligible-workers frame. 
The full table of counts is available in Appendix Table A .4.
understand how state entry into the LEHD partnership might affect the earnings distribution 
over time, we estimate percentiles of the earnings distribution for workers in each of the four date 
regimes by year. Figure 2 plots the 10th, 20th, 50th, 80th, 90th, and 95th percentiles of the cumulative 
earnings distribution by date regime. The cumulative distribution contains data for all regimes less 
than or equal to the sampling regime shown in the legend.
Notice that differences in the 10th, 20th, and 50th percentiles are virtually indistinguishable 
across date regimes. Above the median, however, there is some variation in the 80th, 90th, and 95th 
percentiles across date regimes. In particular, the inclusion of data from high earnings and populous 
states, like CA and NY, in date regime 2 increases the estimated quantile values, especially for the 
95th percentile. However, once these states have entered, the effect of the states entering in regimes 
3 and 4 is much less pronounced. The level differences in the percentiles are relatively minor, 
especially after 1995 (regime 2). The trends in inequality are very similar across date regimes. We 
conclude that the date of state entry does not appear to significantly affect earnings inequality 
measures, especially after 1995.23
23Appendix Figure B.1 plots the same percentiles comparing the two worker frames for all available years, equivalent 
to the regime 4 cumulative distribution in Figure 2. That comparison indicates that the levels of all percentiles are 
greater in every year in the eligible-worker frame, as compared to the all-worker frame, but the trends are nearly 
identical. For both frames, there is no evidence of differences that are due to the dates in which states entered the 
frames, except for the jump associated with the entry of CA and NY in regime 2. Appendix Figure B.2 plots the ratio 
of the 90th percentile to the 10th percentile for each date regime using the all-workers frame. The figure confirms 
that there are some differences in the levels of these curves but the trend analysis is largely unchanged. The fact that
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Figure 2: Percentiles of the Earnings Distribution for Eligible Workers by Date Regime
P95 Regime 1 
Regime 2 
Regime 3 
Regime 4 
P90 Regime 1 
Regime 2 
Regime 3 
Regime 4 
P80 Regime 1 
Regime 2 
Regime 3 
Regime 4 
P50 Regime 1 
Regime 2 
Regime 3 
Regime 4 
P20 Regime 1 
Regime 2 
Regime 3 
Regime 4 
P10 Regime 1 
Regime 2 
Regime 3 
Regime 4
Notes: The figure plots the 10th, 20th, 50th, 80th, 90th, and 95th percentiles of the earnings distribution of eligible 
workers by date regime and year. The cumulative distribution plots the data for all regimes less than or equal to 
the indicated regime. For example, “P95 Regime 2” indicates the 95th percentile for all states in regimes 1 and 2.
We next turn to the evolution of earnings inequality over the past 23 years. Figure 3 presents 
the following measures of earnings inequality: (i) the ratio of the 99th and the 1st percentiles (99/1 
ratio, and so forth), (ii) the ratio of the 95th and the 5th percentiles, (iii) the ratio of the 90th and 
the 10th percentiles, (iv) the ratio of the 80th and the 20th percentiles, and (v) the variance of log 
earnings.24 These measures are all reported relative to their value in 2000.25 After 2000, there is 
a persistent increase in earnings inequality according to all measures. On average, the 99/1 ratio 
is 15.4% higher; the 95/5 ratio is 13.6% higher; and the 90/10 ratio is 11.4% higher than in 2000. 
Much of the rise in earnings inequality occurs during the Great Recession and persists into the 
recovery. For example, the 90/10 ratio was on average 6.7% higher from 2001-2007 than in 2000. 
Then, during the Great Recession, the 90/10 ratio was 15.1% higher from 2008-2009 than in 2000. 
This increase does not peak until 2010, resulting in inequality being 17.8% higher from 2010-2013 
than in 2000. Except for the 99/1 ratio, post-2000 trends do not appear in the all-workers frame.26
the earnings distribution is unaffected by state entry is very strong evidence that the date of entry of a state into the 
LEHD infrastructure can be modeled as ignorably missing (Rubin, 1987; Imbens and Rubin, 2015) .
24We also analyze how state entry into the LEHD data affects these measures of earnings inequality. Appendix 
Figure B.2 plots the 90/10 ratio across date regimes. There are only minor differences across these regimes. Thus, the 
date of state entry does not affect the analysis of earnings inequality. Therefore, in the main discussion, we present 
results from the overall distribution where we include data from all available states in a given year.
25For a comparison of the levels of these ratios across the two frames, see Appendix Figures B.5a, B .5b, B.6a, and 
B.6b.
26The statistics quoted in this paragraph are summarized in Appendix Table B.2, where they are also compared to 
ratios obtained when the all-workers frame is used. Removing the immigrant candidates from the frame materially 
alters the estimated trends in earnings inequality. While there is a similar decline in earnings inequality from 1995 to 
2000 in both frames, post-2000, the trends in earnings inequality among eligible workers diverge from those observed 
among all workers. Appendix Table B.2 shows that, on average, while the 99/1 ratio was 15.4% higher post-2000
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Figure 3: Selected Inequality Measures 1990-2013, Relative to 2000
—  P99 to P1 P95 to P5 P90 to P10 P80 to P20 Variance
Notes: Subplot (a) presents measures of earnings inequality for all workers in all states relative to 2000 from 
1990-2013. Subplot (b) presents measures of earnings inequality for eligible workers in all states relative to 2000 
from 1990-2013. The measures of earnings inequality considered are (i) P99 to P 1 : the ratio of the 99th to the 1st 
percentile; (ii) P95 to P 5 : the ratio of the 95th to the 5th percentile; (iii) P90 to P10 : the ratio of the 90th to the 
10th percentile; (iv) P80 to P20 the ratio of the 80th to the 20th percentile; and (v) Variance: the variance of log 
annual earnings. Results are based on the eligible-workers frame from the LEHD infrastructure files.
Figure 4 presents changes in the top and bottom halves of the earnings distribution by 
decomposing the ratios around the median.27 At the top of the distribution, we compute the 
ratio of the 99th to the 50th percentile (99/50 ratio, and so forth), the ratio of the 95th to the 
50th percentile, the ratio of the 90th to the 50th percentile, and the ratio of the 80th to the 50th 
percentile. At the bottom, we analyze the ratio of the 50th to the 1st percentile, the ratio of the 
50th to the 5th percentile, the ratio of the 50th to the 10th percentile, and the ratio of the 50th to 
the 20th percentile. These ratios are all reported relative to the their value in 20 00.28 The top and 
the bottom of the earnings distribution have evolved quite differently. Since 2000, the ratios of the 
top percentiles to the median have been increasing very gradually, as shown in Figure 4a. However, 
this increase at the top has been small compared to the rise in inequality at the bottom of the 
earnings distribution as shown in Figure 4b. The ratios of the median to the bottom percentiles 
have been increasing dramatically, indicating earnings growth at the bottom of the distribution has 
not kept up with earnings growth at the median. The bottom of the earnings distribution is more 
cyclically sensitive with much of the rise in inequality occurring during the Great Recession.29
in the eligible-workers frame compared to only 5.0% higher in the all-workers frame, none of the other post-2000 
inequality measures are rising in the all-workers frame.
27For example, decomposing the 90/10 ratio in year t (relative to 2000) around the median:
90th /  902ooo / 9 0 f  5 0 f  \ I f  902hooo 502hooo
10th /  102hooo 50‘ h  ^ 10‘ h 502hoo  ^ 1 02^
90th /  90|hoo\ / 5 0 f  /  502ooo 4 
5 0 f /  502hoo  ^ 10‘ h /  102hoo
28For a comparison of the levels of these ratios across the two frames, see the bottom four subplots in Appendix 
Figures B.5 and B.6.
29These conclusions are materially different in the all-workers frame, which shows modest changes in inequality of 
roughly equal magnitudes at the top and bottom of the distribution. See Appendix Figures B.4a and B.4b.
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Figure 4: Selected Inequality Measures for the Top and Bottom of the Earnings Distribution 1990­
2013, Relative to 2000
(a) Eligible Workers - Top (b) Eligible Workers - Bottom
Notes: Subplots (a) and (b) decompose the 99/1 ratio, the 95/5 ratio, the 90/10 ratio, and the 80/20 for eligible 
workers in all states relative to 2000 from 1990-2013 relative to the median. Subplot (a) plots the following ratios for 
the top half of the earnings distribution: (i) P99 to P50 : the ratio of the 99th to the 50th percentile; (ii) P95 to P50 : 
the ratio of the 95th to the 50th percentile; (iii) P90 to P50: the ratio of the 90th to the 50th percentile; and 
(iv) P80 to P50 the ratio of the 80th to the 50th percentile. Subplot (b) plots the following ratios for the bottom 
half of the earnings distribution: (i) P50 to P 1 : the ratio of the 50th to the 1st percentile; (ii) P50 to P 5 : the ratio 
of the 50th to the 5th percentile; (iii) P50 to P10: the ratio of the 50th to the 10th percentile; and (iv) P50 to P20 
the ratio of the 50th to the 20th percentile. The estimates are based on the eligible-workers frame from the LEHD 
infrastructure files. See Appendix Figure B.4 for comparable data using the all-worker frame.
To summarize, earnings inequality has been on the rise since 2000 and spiked during the Great 
Recession. This conclusion depends materially on our use of the eligible-workers frame. Direct use 
of the all-workers frame-that is, using all the job records in the LEHD infrastructure files- produces 
earnings inequality measures and trends that appear not to change from 2000 through the Great 
Recession to 2013. Constructing the eligible-workers frame by excluding immigrant candidate 
records shifts the earnings distribution of eligible workers to the right of the earnings distribution 
of all workers. While this shift in the earnings distribution is not particularly surprising, the 
resulting change in the trends in earnings inequality between the two frames is. When studying 
changes in earnings inequality over time, especially when using administrative data, the choice of 
worker frame matters substantially.
3.1 Comparison of LEHD Data to the CPS and ACS
To understand the differences between analyses using respondent-provided earnings data in large- 
scale household surveys and those using administrative data on earnings in the unemployment 
insurance system, we constructed detailed analysis samples from the Current Population Survey- 
Annual Social and Economic Supplement (CPS-ASEC, 1990-2004) and the American Community 
Survey (ACS, 2000-2013). We also linked the LEHD earnings data to the ACS data at the individual 
record level (2005-2013). We used the linked data to study differences between individuals found 
only in the ACS data and those found in both sources.30 The details of the data construction can
30Because the ACS is a sample survey while the LEHD data are essentially the population over this period, we 
cannot distinguish between individuals found only in the LEHD data who should have linked to the ACS and those
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be found in Appendix C.1. The details of the data linkage can be found in Appendix C.3.
In the household survey data, we defined “covered workers” to be individuals who worked in 
a job that should have appeared in the LEHD data. Table 4 show that the estimated percentile 
values of the earnings distribution tend to be greater for covered workers than for all workers in 
the household survey data.31 For percentiles at or above the median, the values from the LEHD 
eligible-workers frame are close to the ones from the covered workers in household surveys. Below 
the median, however, the differences are greater, with the percentiles estimated from the household 
surveys being much greater than the percentiles estimated from the LEHD eligible-workers frame. 
For example, earnings associated with the 10th percentile in the CPS/ACS data are close to the 
20th percentile in the LEHD data.32 We conclude that the differences between survey-reported 
and administrative earnings data at or above the median are minimal, but that, below the median, 
household surveys capture earnings that are not captured by the administrative data.33
Table 4: Average Percentiles of the Earnings Distribution from Household Surveys vs. LEHD
P ercen tile s
F ram e 5 th 10th 20th 50th 80th 90th 95th
CPS/ACS: Covered Workers 
LEHD: Eligible Workers
3,419
1,005
6,412
2,527
11,703
6,463
26,345
21,762
49,059
45,343
67,872
64,021
89,323
86,108
Difference: HHLD Survey — UI 
Ratio of HHLD Survey to  UI
2,414
3.4027
3,884
2.5370
5,240
1.8108
4,583
1.2106
3,716
1.0819
3,850
1.0601
3,215
1.0373
Notes: The first row presents the average percentile values from the earnings distribution of covered workers in the 
combined CPS/ACS data from 1995-2013. The second row presents the average percentile values from the earnings 
distribution of eligible workers in all states from 1995-2013. The third row computes the difference between the 
average percentiles in the household surveys and the same ones computed from the LEHD eligible-workers frame. 
The last row computes the ratio of each percentile from the covered workers in the household surveys to the LEHD 
eligible- workers frame.
Figures 5a and 5b show that the trends in earnings inequality in the household survey data 
are consistent with our findings from the eligible-worker frame in the LEHD data, and inconsistent 
with the findings from the all-worker frame. This conclusion also holds for the analysis of trends 
in the top and bottom separately.34 The pattern of inequality ratios around the Great Recession is 
also similar to the one found in the eligible-workers frame, and dissimilar to the the analysis based 
on the all-workers frame.35 Additional results and discussion are in Appendix C.2.
who were not sampled by the ACS. For this reason, we don’t study the records of those in the LEHD-only group.
31 Also compare Appendix Figure C.1 with Appendix Figure B.1.
32See also Appendix Figure C.2.
33This conclusion is not sensitive to using the eligible-workers frame. There are many more very low earnings 
records among the immigrant candidates, which would only exacerbate the differences below the median.
34See Appendix Figures C.3a and C.3c.
35See Appendix Table C.1.
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Figure 5: Selected Inequality Measures 1990-2013, Relative to 2000 (CPS/ACS)
O  P95 to P5 O  P90 to P10 -Q P80 to P20 Variance
(a) All Workers from Household Surveys (b) Covered Workers from Household Surveys
Notes: Subplot (a) presents measures of earnings inequality for all workers in CPS/ACS relative to 2000 from 
1990-2013. Subplot (b) presents measures of earnings inequality for covered workers in CPS/ACS relative to 2000 
from 1990-2013. The measures of earnings inequality considered are (i) P95 to P 5 : the ratio of the 95th to the 5th 
percentile; (ii) P90 to P10 : the ratio of the 90th to the 10th percentile; (iii) P80 to P20 the ratio of the 80th to the 
20th percentile; and (iv) Variance: the variance of log annual earnings.
To better understand the discrepancies at the bottom of the earnings distribution, we ana­
lyzed linked ACS and LEHD individual records. We find that 85% of the individuals we expect 
to find in both the ACS and LEHD data are present in both with positive earnings. The other 
15% are not found in the LEHD data, and, therefore, have zero administrative earnings.36 The 
result suggests that survey respondents are giving answers that imply that their job should be cov­
ered in the administrative data, but there are not corresponding administrative records to match 
the survey-reported income. The reported income of these individuals appears to be the reason 
for the discrepancy between the survey and administrative data at the bottom of the earnings 
distribution.37 Additional results and discussion are in Appendix C.3.
Our analysis of the trends in earnings inequality using the various samples of workers in 
the CPS/ACS and the two worker frames in the LEHD data shows that, whether the data were 
designed or found, an understanding of contributions of individuals included or excluded from the 
sample is essential. Conclusions regarding fundamental trends in inequality depend upon these 
decisions.
3.2 Effects of Inactivity on Earnings Inequality
We used our household survey to confirm that the trends in the estimated employment-to-population 
ratio produced directly from the micro-data match those of the official estimates. In particular, the 
employment-to-population ratio fell during the Great Recession, and had not recovered through 
2013.38
We document that around 30 million eligible workers per year had no earnings in the current
36See Appendix Table C.2.
37See Appendix Figure C.5 and discussion.
38See Appendix Figure D.1.
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year but positive earnings in at least one of the past four years.39 Their treatment materially 
affects the distribution of earnings in any given year. It also materially affects the cyclical features 
of inequality measures such as the Gini coefficient.40 Additional results and discussion are in 
Appendix D.2.
Although it is unclear which of the adjusted inequality measures correctly weights the inactive 
workers, it is worthwhile to consider adjusted measures that count at least some of the zero-earning 
workers as part of any general analysis of changes in earnings inequality.
4 Decomposing Changes in the Earnings Distribution
4.1 Evolution of the Earnings/Inactivity Distribution
Beginning in 2004 our eligible-workers frame is complete, including all states, DC, and the federal 
government. The adventitious timing of the start of the complete-data period presents us with 
the opportunity to study the evolution of the earnings distribution and the dynamics of non­
employment during three distinct epochs of labor market conditions. According to the NBER, 
the Great Recession began in December 2007 and ended in June 2009. Applying this definition 
to annual data we have a pre-recession epoch spanning 2004-2007, a recession epoch running from 
2008-2009, and a post-recession epoch beginning in 2010 and ending in 2013.
As we did in Section 2.4, we simplify the earnings distribution by assigning each active 
worker to one of three earnings categories (bottom, middle and top) and assign inactive, but 
eligible workers to a fourth category. Using the estimated annual earnings/inactivity distributions, 
we start by comparing the distribution in 2005 with the distribution in 2004, repeating this process 
for each subsequent year until 2013. Each year, the earnings/inactivity distribution may change 
relative to the previous year. The extent of this change depends on the number of workers entering 
and exiting the eligible-workers frame; the number of workers moving between earnings/inactivity 
categories; and changes in average earnings within each category.41
From 2004 through 2013 there is relatively strong growth in the number of eligible workers, 
averaging about 1% per year through 2009, declining to about half that rate after 2009, although 
growth within each category is uneven. For example, the largest growth in the number of workers 
occurs in the among those eligible to work but inactive (i.e., no earnings in the indicated year), 
a category with a growth rate almost twice that of any other group. The growth rate of workers 
in the bottom and middle earnings categories is less than half the overall growth rate. When we 
examine total earnings, most of the growth is found in the top 20% of the earnings distribution, 
with relatively little growth in the bottom 80%. Given that average earnings are falling for the
39See Appendix Table D.1.
40See Appendix Figures D.2-D.5.
41The distribution of eligible workers across the four earnings/inactivity categories by year is shown in Appendix 
Table E.1. The table also shows the total earnings per year, average earnings per year (total earnings/eligible 
workers with positive earnings). The last panel shows the cumulative change over the entire period for each of the 
three previous panels.
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Figure 6: Share of Total Earnings in each Earnings Category
—  Bin 2: Bottom 20% —  Bin 3: Middle 60% —  Bin 4: Top 20%
Notes: The figure plots the share of total earnings in each earnings category by year for the following categories:
(i) Bin 2 : the bottom 20% of the earnings distribution in blue, (ii) Bin 3 : the middle 60% of the earnings 
distribution in red, and (iii) Bin 4: the top 20% of the earnings distribution in green.
bottom 80% of workers, it should not be surprising that total earnings for this group fails to keep 
pace with the growth in the number of workers. The situation for workers at the top, however, 
is much brighter: the top 20% of workers have relatively strong earnings growth of 4.4% over the 
period, resulting in growth in total earnings (12.2%) that outpaces the growth in the number of 
workers (7.8%).
The relatively high growth in both the number of eligible workers and average earnings in 
the top 20% of the earnings distribution has a strong effect on the distribution of total earnings. 
Figure 6 shows the share of total earnings attributed to each earnings category by year. We see 
a large amount of earnings inequality: earnings for the top 20% of workers are greater than both 
the bottom and middle combined, with the relative share of the top increasing almost continuously 
except for a brief pause in 2008 during the height of the Great Recession. We can also see the 
declining share of income accruing to the middle 60% of workers. Although the number of workers 
in the middle recovered after the Great Recession, average earnings continued to decline while 
higher growth in the number of workers at the bottom and top resulted in a declining share of 
earnings for workers in the middle 60% of the earnings distribution.
4.2 Earnings/Inactivity Distribution: Decomposition of the Changes
In the previous section we discussed the changing structure of the earnings/inactivity distribution 
around the time of the Great Recession. Several key facts stand out. First, there is enormous 
growth in the number of eligible workers with no reported earnings from 83,200,954 in 2004 to 
96,959,047 in 2010, and still 96,151,327 in 2013. Second, average earnings stagnate (bottom 20%) 
or decline (middle 60%) for active workers. Third, the growth in the share of earnings accruing to
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the top 20% results from growth in the number of workers and average earnings in that category.42
In order to better understand these changes, we turn our focus to the flows of workers 
moving between active and inactive status as well as between different earnings categories. When 
interpreting these results, we implicitly assume average earnings within each category are stable 
between 2004-2013. Although changes in average earnings have a role to play, the data suggest that 
we focus on the worker flows because the percentage change in the number of workers dominates 
the change in average earnings for each category.43
Starting in 2005, each year we calculate the change in the number of workers between the 
current and the previous year for the four earnings/inactivity categories. The year-to-year change 
in the number of workers in a specific category is driven by changes in the number of workers 
entering (inflows) and the number of workers leaving (outflows). Appendix Section E.1 provides 
the derivation of the flow accounting that we summarize here.
Figure 7 shows the change in the number of workers for each earnings/inactivity category 
by year. The data used to calculate the year-to-year differences can be found in the first panel 
of Appendix Table E.1. Each line in the graph represents the year-to-year change in the number 
of workers for one of the four earnings/inactivity categories. For example, in 2009 there were 
94,864,949 eligible workers with no reported UI earnings while in 2008 there were only 88,245,425 
workers in the same category, resulting in an increase of 6,619,524 workers. This increase in the 
number of eligible but inactive workers occurred during the height of the Great Recession and dwarfs 
the change in any other period, even the relatively large increases in the preceding and subsequent 
years. The area between the inactive line (blue) and the x-axis represents the cumulative increase in 
the number of eligible workers with no earnings over the entire period of 12,950,373. We can clearly 
see that the recovery has largely failed to reduce the number of eligible workers with no earnings 
through 2013. In contrast, the middle 60% (green line) faced a large reduction in numbers during 
the Great Recession, but, unlike the inactive category, the number of workers in the middle has 
returned to pre-recession levels, as reflected by the area between middle 60% line and the x-axis.
Table 5 presents an overview of the flow analysis, flows we will decompose further using the 
transition count matrix. The Count (t — 1), Count (t), and Net Change columns are shown in 
Appendix Table E.1 and Figure 7. They are reproduced here for comparison with sums of the 
transition counts. The stayers (i.e., c22) are also included, and while they do not directly affect 
the net change in the flows, they represent the number of workers who remain in a given category 
for at least two years-giving an indication of the earnings stability of the typical worker. The 
outflows, inflows, and net change columns show the results of using Appendix equation E-1. The 
difference between the inflows and the outflows equals the net change, which should also equal 
the difference in counts between the current and the previous period. For example, returning to
42 See Appendix Table E.1.
43When examining only the flows, we also implicitly assume average earnings are the same for each flow. Although 
this assumption is false it does not affect trends, since average earnings for a given flow are typically stable over time. 
It does, however, affect the scale or magnitude of each flow relative to another flow. Additional earnings change 
results and discussion, including the average earnings for each flow, are shown in Appendix E .
21
Figure 7: Year-to-Year Change in the Number of Workers in Each Earnings Bin
—  Bin 1: Inactivity —  Bin 2: Bottom 20% —  Bin 3: Middle 60% —  Bin 4: Top 20%
Notes: The estimates are based on the authors’ calculations using year-to-year changes in the distribution of 
inactive and active workers among the activity/earnings bins.
the eligible workers with no earnings in 2009, we can see that the inflows were 16,166,420 and the 
outflows were 9,546,896. The large increase in the number of workers in this category was due 
primarily to a large increase in the inflows relative to the previous year and a small decrease in the 
number of outflows. That is, a relatively large number of workers who had a job in the previous 
year were unable to find an employer in the current year, while a relatively small number of workers 
without a job in the previous year were able to find one in the current year or moved out of the 
eligible-workers frame.
The table also shows a relatively large increase in the number of eligible workers with no 
earnings for at least two years over the entire period (stayers in the “Eligible, but no Reported 
UI Earnings” Panel). The change in the number of stayers equals the difference between the 
inflows in the previous period (the candidates to become stayers) minus the outflows in the current 
period. For example, in 2008 there were 13,271,459 eligible workers with at least one year without 
reported earnings (inflows), and 9,546,896 of these workers transitioned to another category in 2009 
(outflows), resulting in an increase in the stayers between 2008 and 2009 of 3,724,563 workers. The 
stayers are useful for understanding the short term (two-year) volatility differences between each 
of the categories. For example, the bottom 20% of the UI earnings distribution has relatively few 
stayers compared to the middle and the top, consistent with the results presented earlier that most 
of these jobs are of relatively short duration. The results also imply that a large number of workers 
in the bottom 20% of the earnings distribution only stay there for a year or two before moving to 
another category, frequently inactivity.
Table 6 presents demographic characteristics for the 24 possible year-to-year transitions, 
excluding workers not eligible to work in both year t — 1 and year t. The transitions labeled 0 
represent workers moving into or out of the eligible-workers frame. The workers moving into the 
eligible-worker frame are typically young and predominately non-white, while the workers leaving 
the eligible workforce are typically older (60 plus years of age) and predominately white. One
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Table 5: Flows into and out of Each Earnings Category
Y ear
C o u n t
t -  1
C o u n t
t
N et
C h an g e S tayers O u tflow s In flow s
N e t
C h an g e
Exit from  and Entry into Eligible W orker Status (Flows into and out of the Frame)
2005 — — — — 2,887,568 5,284,188 2,396,620
2006 — — — — 2,940,260 5,501,749 2,561,489
2007 — — — — 2,961,960 5,793,394 2,831,434
2008 — — — — 3,048,753 5,850,756 2,802,003
2009 — — — — 3,175,258 5,633,556 2,458,298
2010 — — — — 3,189,382 4,680,774 1,491,392
2011 — — — — 3,299,529 4,424,821 1,125,292
2012 — — — — 3,296,122 4,350,437 1,054,315
2013 — — — — 2,924,738 4,257,364 1,332,626
Eligible, but no Reported UI Earnings
2005 83,200,954 83,819,319 618,365 71,931,565 11,269,389 11,887,754 618,365
2006 83,819,319 84,357,718 538,399 72,513,714 11,305,605 11,844,004 538,399
2007 84,357,718 85,518,594 1,160,876 73,295,146 11,062,572 12,223,448 1,160,876
2008 85,518,594 88,245,425 2,726,831 74,973,966 10,544,628 13,271,459 2,726,831
2009 88,245,425 94,864,949 6,619,524 78,698,529 9,546,896 16,166,420 6,619,524
2010 94,864,949 96,959,047 2,094,098 82,548,100 12,316,849 14,410,947 2,094,098
2011 96,959,047 96,619,700 -339,347 83,573,226 13,385,821 13,046,474 -339,347
2012 96,619,700 96,068,987 -550,713 83,628,961 12,990,739 12,440,026 -550,713
2013 96,068,987 96,151,327 82,340 83,990,110 12,078,877 12,161,217 82,340
Bottom  20% of the Overall UI Earnings Distribution
2005 27,062,314 27,376,301 313,987 12,712,348 14,349,966 14,663,953 313,987
2006 27,376,301 27,598,826 222,525 12,919,731 14,456,570 14,679,095 222,525
2007 27,598,826 27,800,774 201,948 13,055,172 14,543,654 14,745,602 201,948
2008 27,800,774 28,120,283 319,509 13,270,031 14,530,743 14,850,252 319,509
2009 28,120,283 28,119,169 -1,114 13,215,490 14,904,793 14,903,679 -1,114
2010 28,119,169 28,154,014 34,845 13,057,840 15,061,329 15,096,174 34,845
2011 28,154,014 28,498,111 344,097 13,227,239 14,926,775 15,270,872 344,097
2012 28,498,111 28,269,636 -228,475 13,415,083 15,083,028 14,854,553 -228,475
2013 28,269,636 28,119,381 -150,255 13,437,328 14,832,308 14,682,053 -150,255
Middle 60% of the Overall UI Earnings Distribution
2005 82,821,341 84,079,363 1,258,022 69,752,528 13,068,813 14,326,835 1,258,022
2006 84,079,363 84,946,369 867,006 70,696,052 13,383,311 14,250,317 867,006
2007 84,946,369 85,576,064 629,695 71,377,690 13,568,679 14,198,374 629,695
2008 85,576,064 85,548,690 -27,374 71,739,593 13,836,471 13,809,097 -27,374
2009 85,548,690 81,894,162 -3,654,528 69,594,276 15,954,414 12,299,886 -3,654,528
2010 81,894,162 81,314,722 -579,440 67,945,643 13,948,519 13,369,079 -579,440
2011 81,314,722 82,538,961 1,224,239 68,441,704 12,873,018 14,097,257 1,224,239
2012 82,538,961 83,930,862 1,391,901 69,837,520 12,701,441 14,093,342 1,391,901
2013 83,930,862 84,707,469 776,607 71,114,783 12,816,079 13,592,686 776,607
Top 20% of the Overall UI Earnings Distribution
2005 26,678,860 26,885,106 206,246 22,942,722 3,736,138 3,942,384 206,246
2006 26,885,106 27,818,665 933,559 23,460,710 3,424,396 4,357,955 933,559
2007 27,818,665 28,657,580 838,915 24,260,307 3,558,358 4,397,273 838,915
2008 28,657,580 28,440,617 -216,963 24,629,289 4,028,291 3,811,328 -216,963
2009 28,440,617 27,935,033 -505,584 24,138,725 4,301,892 3,796,308 -505,584
2010 27,935,033 27,876,922 -58,111 24,278,404 3,656,629 3,598,518 -58,111
2011 27,876,922 27,773,225 -103,697 24,365,840 3,511,082 3,407,385 -103,697
2012 27,773,225 28,214,827 441,602 24,551,484 3,221,741 3,663,343 441,602
2013 28,214,827 28,838,761 623,934 25,057,962 3,156,865 3,780,799 623,934
Notes: The estimates are based on the authors’ calculations using transitions into and out of the eligible-workers 
frame used to construct the earnings distributions, including inactive workers, and transitions between the earnings 
categories.
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Table 6: Demographic Characteristics of Workers by Transition Type
B o rn
T ran sition s A g e M a le W h ite U S
Origin Destination Flow (A vg ) (Share) ( Share) ( Share)
Inactivity 0_1 21 0.521 0.221 0.710
Ineligibility Bottom  20% 0_2 19 0.481 0.336 0.886Middle 60% m3 21 0.560 0.328 0.730
Top 20% 0_4 33 0.791 0.279 0.127
Ineligibility 1.0 68 0.493 0.743 0.795
Inactivity 1_1 48 0.504 0.585 0.690
Inactivity Bottom  20% 1.2 35 0.478 0.520 0.825
Middle 60% 1.3 38 0.580 0.582 0.765
Top 20% 1_4 44 0.730 0.701 0.737
Ineligibility 2.0 64 0.525 0.784 0.888
Inactivity 2.1 39 0.484 0.576 0.831
Bottom  20% Bottom  20% 2.2 34 0.421 0.566 0.891
Middle 60% m3 33 0.464 0.556 0.850
Top 20% 2_4 41 0.667 0.680 0.778
Ineligibility 3.0 66 0.560 0.785 0.858
Inactivity 3.1 45 0.548 0.659 0.806
Middle 60% Bottom  20% m2 39 0.468 0.604 0.846
Middle 60% m3 41 0.465 0.659 0.844
Top 20% 3_4 41 0.608 0.723 0.842
Ineligibility 4.0 68 0.768 0.861 0.855
Inactivity 4.1 51 0.699 0.771 0.821
Top 20% Bottom  20% m2 51 0.659 0.759 0.859
Middle 60% m3 46 0.626 0.751 0.861
Top 20% 4-4 47 0.667 0.776 0.855
Notes: The estimates are based on the authors’ calculations using characteristics of workers who transition into 
and out of the eligible-workers frame used to construct the earnings distributions, including inactive workers, and 
transitions between the earnings categories.
interesting transition group is the 0_4 (workers not eligible in t — 1 who transition to the top 20% 
of the earnings distribution in t). These workers are predominately older than other newly eligible 
workers, male, non-white, and overwhelmingly not born in the U.S. The remaining transitions 
have roughly similar characteristics, although older male workers are generally more prevalent in 
transitions associated with bin 4 (the top 20%), while female workers are more likely to be associated 
with transitions with bin 2 (the bottom 20%).
Next, we decompose the inflows and outflows further by using the transition matrix of counts. 
Figures 8 through 12 show the outflows and inflows for each earnings/inactivity category and the 
relevant transition counts by year. In particular, each year, an individual can be in one of the 
following five employment states:
0. Ineligibility: did not meet the requirements to be in the eligible-workers frame
1. Inactivity: part of the eligible-workers frame, but did not report positive UI earnings
2. Bottom 20%: annual UI earnings in the bottom 20% of the earnings distribution
3. Middle 60%: annual UI earnings in the middle 60% of the earnings distribution
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We remind the reader that the cutoffs for the real earnings distribution bins are based on the pooled 
years 2004-2013, and do not change over time. It is possible for substantially more or less than 
20% of current earners to be in the top 20% bin, for example, in any given year.
The first subplot in each figure shows the gross outflows (blue line) and the gross inflows 
(red line) into an earnings/inactivity category. The difference between the two lines is the net 
inflows presented in the last column of Table 5. The second subplot shows the transitions to other 
categories associated with the gross outflows line in the first graph. Note that the sum of each series 
in the second subplot is equal to the gross outflows line in the first subplot. The third subplot shows 
the transition counts associated with gross inflows. Similarly, the sum of each of the series in the 
third subplot is equal to the gross inflows line in the first subplot.
Figure 8 plots the counts of workers moving out of the eligible-workers frame and those 
moving into the frame. Notice that gross inflows into eligibility are always greater than gross 
outflows from eligibility. Thus, net inflows into eligibility are always positive, but decline and 
fail to recover after the Great Recession. This decline is primarily due to a decrease of inflows 
into eligibility, although there is a small increase in outflows as well. Notice that the outflows 
from eligibility come primarily from inactivity. Recall that inactive individuals are part of the 
eligible-workers frame but have no reported earnings. The first row of the second panel in Table 6 
shows that inactive workers moving to ineligibility (1-0) tend to be older with an average age of 
68. The inflows into eligibility tend to be young workers around the age of 20 moving into either 
inactivity or the bottom 20% of the earnings distribution. The exception are individuals moving 
into the top 20% of the earnings distribution (0_4), who tend to be older (average age is 33 years 
old), male (79.1% are male), and foreign born (12.7% are born in the U.S.). Prior to the Great 
Recession, on average, 38.3% of workers moving into eligibility went into inactivity and 49.1% went 
into the bottom of the earnings distribution. This flipped during the Great Recession, with 47.5% 
of newly eligible workers moving into inactivity and 43.4% moving into the bottom of the earnings 
distribution.
Figure 9 plots the flows into and out of inactivity. Net inflows are generally close to zero, 
except during the Great Recession when they became very positive. This spike in net inflows into 
inactivity was driven by both a large increase in inflows and a substantial decline in outflows. The 
increase in inflows is seen for every category except for the top of the distribution. The decrease in 
outflows during the Great Recession is primarily due to a reduction in workers moving to jobs in the 
bottom and middle of the earnings distribution, however these flows return to their pre-recession 
levels fairly quickly. The net result is a roughly symmetric increase in gross outflows and decrease 
in gross inflows. Without either a very large relative increase in gross outflows or a relatively large 
decrease in gross inflows, little progress can be made towards reducing the almost 13 million person 
increase in the number of eligible workers with no reported earnings during the Great Recession.
Figure 10 plots the flows into and out of the bottom 20% of the earnings distribution. 
Compared to some of the other categories, the counts for the bottom 20% are relatively stable.
4. Top 20%: annual UI earnings in the top 20% of the earnings distribution
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Figure 8: Flows into and out of the Eligible-Workers Frame
—  Gross Outflows
—  Gross Inflows
—  1_0: Outflows from Inactivity
—  2_0: Outflows from Bottom 20%
—  3_0: Outflows from Middle 60%
—  4_0: Outflows from Top 20%
—  0_1: Inflows to Inactivity
—  0_2: Inflows to Bottom 20%
—  0_3: Inflows to Middle 60%
—  0_4: Inflows to Top 40%
Notes: The estimates are based on the authors’ calculations using transitions into and out of the eligible-workers 
frame used to construct the earnings distributions, including inactive workers, and transitions between the earnings 
categories.
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Figure 9: Flows into and out of Inactivity
—  Gross Outflows
—  Gross Inflows
—  1_0: Outflows to Ineligibility
—  1_2: Outflows to Bottom 20%
—  1_3: Outflows to Middle 60%
—  1_4: Outflows to Top 20%
0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
0_1: Inflows from Ineligibility 
2_1: Inflows from Bottom 20% 
3_1: Inflows from Middle 60% 
4_1: Inflows from Top 20%
Notes: Estimates are based on the authors’ calculations using transitions into and out of the eligible-workers frame 
used to construct the earnings distributions, including inactive workers, and transitions between the earnings 
categories.
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Figure 10: Flows into and out of the Bottom 20% of the Earnings Distribution
Gross Outflows 
Gross Inflows
9,000,000
6. 750.000
4. 500.000
2.250.000 
0
—  2_0: Outflows to Ineligibility
—  2_1: Outflows to Inactivity
—  2_3: Outflows to Middle 60%
—  2_4: Outflows to Top 20%
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
0_2: Inflows from Ineligibility 
1_2: Inflows from Inactivity 
3_2: Inflows from Middle 60% 
4_2: Inflows from Top 20%
Notes: The estimates are based on the authors’ calculations using transitions into and out of the eligible-workers 
frame used to construct the earnings distributions, including inactive workers, and transitions between the earnings 
categories.
The transitions show large changes occurring during the Great Recession. Outflows increased to 
nonemployment, while outflows to the middle of the earnings distribution fell (fewer workers moving 
up). At the same time inflows from nonemployment decreased and inflows from the middle of the 
distribution increased. Workers who moved to nonemployment are being replaced (not at the job 
level, but in terms of earnings) with workers from the middle of the distribution.
Figure 11 shows the flows into and out of the middle 60% of the earnings distribution. There 
is a large decrease in net inflows in 2009. This is largely due to an increase in the outflows of 
workers to the bottom 20% and nonemployment and a decrease in workers moving up from the 
bottom 20%. Although net inflows turn positive again after the Great Recession, these inflows are 
not large enough to halt the decreasing share of earnings accruing to workers in the middle 60%. 
There has also been a decline in workers moving from the middle to the top 20%, which peaked in 
2007, implying a decrease in upward earnings mobility. A decrease in workers moving from the top 
to the bottom is also present, implying a decrease in downward earnings mobility. Post-recession, 
workers in the middle are more likely to stay in the middle and workers at the top are more likely 
to stay at the top.
Figure 12 plots the flows into and out of the top 20% of the earnings distribution. Notice 
that there is a strong net inflow of workers to the top 20% prior to the Great Recession and a
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Figure 11: Flows into and out of the Middle 60% of the Earnings Distribution
18,000,000
16,000,000
14.000.  000
12.000.  000
10,000,000
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
9,000,000
6. 750.000
4 . 500.000
2.250.000 
0
—  3_0: Outflows to ineligibility
—  3_1: Outflows to inactivity
—  3_2: Outflows to Bottom 20%
—  3_4: Outflows to Top 20%
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
9,000,000
6. 750.000
4 . 500.000
2.250.000 
0
—  0_3:
—  1_3:
—  2_3:
—  4_3:
inflows from ineligibility 
inflows from inactivity 
inflows from Bottom 20% 
inflows from Top 20%
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Notes: The estimates are based on the authors’ calculations using transitions into and out of the eligible-workers 
frame used to construct the earnings distributions, including inactive workers, and transitions between the earnings 
categories.
29
Figure 12: Flows into and out of the Top 20% of the Earnings Distribution
Gross Outflows 
Gross Inflows
4. 500.000
3.375.000
2.250.000
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0
—  4_0: Outflows to Ineligibility
—  4_1: Outflows to Inactivity
—  4_2: Outflows to Bottom 20%
—  4_3: Outflows to Middle 60%
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—  0_4:
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—  3_4:
Inflows from Ineligibility 
Inflows from Inactivity 
Inflows from Bottom 20% 
Inflows from Middle 60%
Notes: The estimates are based on the authors’ calculations using transitions into and out of the eligible-workers 
frame used to construct the earnings distributions, including inactive workers, and transitions between the earnings 
categories.
decrease during the recession. Although net inflows turn positive again in 2012, they do not return 
to the heights seen prior to the Great Recession. Workers at the top are relatively disconnected 
from the rest of the earnings distribution. The only substantial flows are to and from the middle, 
but the magnitudes of both of these flows appear to be declining post recession.44
Overall, mobility occurs most often between neighboring parts of the earnings/inactivity 
distribution. It is relatively rare to jump more than one earnings/inactivity category. For example, 
moving from the bottom to the top is a relatively rare event, while moving from the bottom to the 
middle is a common transition.45
44The disconnect is likely even greater than it may appear, especially for workers at the very top of the earnings 
distribution. Most of the workers moving from the bottom 20% to the top 20% and vice-versa have earnings near 
the minimum value of the top earnings bin, suggesting that most of the transitions may be associated with small 
earnings changes than one might infer from the average earnings in each bin.
45 Appendix Figures E.1-E.3 repeat the analysis shown in Figures 10-12 using earnings changes instead of counts. 
The conclusions are essentially unchanged.
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5 Firm Differences in Worker Earnings and Mobility
5.1 The Worker-Firm Earnings Decomposition
Having established that the eligible-workers frame is more likely to be representative of the entire 
U.S. labor market than uncorrected administrative record frames, and having established that it 
is complete and suitable for studying changes in the entire earnings distribution, including the 
movements into and out of activity, we now turn to the role of the employer as a source of earnings 
inequality. We use the statistical approach introduced to the labor economics literature in AKM .
To understand the role of firms in the rise in earnings inequality we estimate the following 
AKM model for the eligible-worker sample:
ln yijt =  XuP +  di +  +  eijt, (3)
where yijt is real annual earnings for worker i =  1, ..., 200,665, 944, employed at firm j  =  1, 
..., 14,645, 104 in year t =  2004, ..., 2013.46 On the right hand side we include 9i, the fixed 
person effect; , the fixed firm effect; and the vector xit, which includes a constant, demographic 
characteristics interacted with actual labor-force experience, labor-force attachment variables, date- 
regime variables, and aggregate labor market conditions.
During the process of converting job-level firm-effect estimates to person-level firm-effect 
estimates, we move back and forth between dollars (levels) and logarithms as appropriate. We 
estimate equation (3) in semi-logarithmic form due to the approximately lognormal conditional 
distribution of the dependent variable. However, a semi-log specification returns estimated firm 
effects showing the log points of earnings attributable to the employer (approximately proportions 
for small effects). In order to combine the estimated job-level firm effects for workers who have 
multiple employers during the year into a single person-level firm effect the relative firm effects 
must be converted to dollar values. For example, suppose we have a worker who earns $10,000 at 
job 1 and $50,000 at job 2, with fixed firm effects of 0.2 and 0.1, respectively, in logs. Although the 
estimated firm effect is twice as large in job 1, the earnings are only 20% of the earnings in job 2. 
To account for the earnings differences across jobs, we convert the estimated firm effects to dollars, 
aggregate the dollar amounts, and then convert the dollar value of the person and firm components 
back to logs.
First, we isolate the real dollar value of the firm component of earnings for a given job in a 
given year. Specifically, for individual i, working at firm j  in year t, the firm component of earnings 
yij t is defined as:
yijrtm =  yijt-  exp ( ln yijt-  j . (4) 46
46This is a slight abuse of notation. Two billion person-firm-year observations were used in the estimation from 
826 million jobs held by 201 million persons at 14.7 million firms. Unlike the standard AKM approach of using only 
the employer with the highest earnings per worker per year, we use all jobs. The i,j,t subscripting is standing in for 
a more complicated notation to indicate multiple employers in a particular year. The model is fit to the 2004-2013 
period, where the eligible-worker frame is complete for the entire U.S. labor market. See Appendix E.2 for further 
details.
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We define the non-firm component of earnings yijt as the residual from the above equation:
y iT "™  =  yijt -  (5)
Aggregating across jobs for each worker gives a decomposition of total annual earnings into 
two person-level components:
E y«t = E  yfijtm + E  yiir firi"
j j j
, total _ firm "on-firmyit yit + yit * (6)
The person-level log firm component is recovered by taking the difference between the log of person- 
level earnings and the log of the non-firm component:
ln yfitrm =  ln ytotal -  ln y"0"-firm. (7)
Continuing the example above, the total earnings for the hypothetical worker are $60,000. 
After applying equations (4) , (5) , and (6) the estimated dollar value of the firm component across 
all jobs is $6,571 and the estimated non-firm component is $53,429. Applying equation (7) results 
in a log firm component of 0.116. Conceptually, the resulting person-level firm component is very 
similar to taking the earnings-weighted average of the log firm components.
We also extract a component of log earnings that we can associate with the worker's skill 
type. This component consists of the constant, which has been standardized to a year with average 
unemployment, and full-year full-time work, the estimated effects associated with labor force ex­
perience, and the estimated person effect. Thus the skill component can represent the log earnings 
associated with the annual wage rate for a worker with a given person effect and labor experience.47
We calculated both dollar and log estimates of the firm and non-firm earnings components. 
We calculated only the log component for estimating the skill type. We used the skill component, 
which is logarithmic, to classify workers by bottom 20%, middle 60% and top 20% of the skill 
distribution. When referencing the discrete distribution of the skill component, we refer to skill 
types. When referencing the value, we refer to the skill component of log earnings.
We used the log firm and log non-firm components to similarly classify firms and the non-firm 
contribution to earnings in bottom, middle and top bins. When referencing the discrete distribution 
of the firm component, we refer to firm types. We do not classify the cells of the discrete distribution 
of the non-firm component of earnings. In all cases, distributions were estimated using the pooled 
person-level observations over the 2004-2013 period. See Table 7 for the minimum, maximum, and 
average log values of all three components.
Our approach has two main benefits. First, all workers at a firm with only one job during
47We included all the effects labeled actual labor-force experience in Appendix Table E.4 using the coefficients in 
Appendix Table E.5.
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Table 7: Statistics for Firm, Non-Firm and Skill Bins
F ir m -T y p e  B in s
L o g  F irm 2 : Bottom 20% 3 : Middle 60% 4 : Top 20%
Minimum -0.945 -0.374 0.556
Mean -0.716 0.113 0.807
Maximum -0.374 0.556 13.190
N o n -F ir m -T y p e  B in s
L o g  N o n -F irm 2 : Bottom 20% 3 : Middle 60% 4 : Top 20%
Minimum -4.499 8.922 10.480
Mean 7.708 9.803 10.980
Maximum 8.922 10.480 19.590
S k ill-T y p e  B in s
L o g  Skill 2 : Bottom 20% 3 : Middle 60% 4 : Top 20%
Minimum -16.960 6.255 7.203
Mean 5.898 6.695 7.679
Maximum 6.255 7.203 17.460
Notes: The estimates are based on the authors’ calculations using the decomposition of person-level log earnings 
into firm non-firm components that sum to log total earnings. Firm-type and non-firm-type bins are formed for 
each component separately using the logarithmic scale. The skill component, also on a logarithmic scale, uses only 
the constant, person effect and actual labor-force experience effects as the basis for the skill-type bins. Distributions 
are based on the pooled person-level observations for the eligible-workers frame from 2004-2013. Statistics are 
rounded to four significant digits.
the year are placed in the same firm-type bin. Second, the total earnings of the worker do not 
affect the firm-type bin assignment. Third, classifying the workers by their skill bin, rather than 
the non-firm bin, controls for the state of the labor market and labor force attachment as well as 
eliminating the influence of the AKM residual. Using the log values of each component also allows 
us to study all possible mixes of worker skill types. If we had used the dollar-value bin assignments, 
the highest-paid workers would have dominated the top and bottom categories for each estimated 
component. For example, a worker with a very small log firm effect, but high earnings, would likely 
dominate a low earning worker with a large log firm effect.
Comparing the earnings bins in Table 2 with the firm and non-firm component bins in 
Table 7, notice that, except for a relatively small number of extreme values, the distribution of 
log earnings and log non-firm earnings component are similar within bin. This result is due to the 
small relative magnitude of the log firm component.48 In spite of their relatively small magnitude 
in logs, the firm components can have a substantial effect, conditional on the size of the non-firm 
component of earnings. The log firm component is about -0.716 for the typical firm in the bottom 
of the firm compensation distribution, 0.113 in the middle and 0.807 at the top. All statistics 
are worker duration-weighted averages, implying that a worker at the middle-type firm receives 
about 11% more than would be expected given the worker’s characteristics. In comparison, the
48The non-firm component here includes the constant, person effect 0i, index (xit/3), and eijt. The estimated 
constant is equal to 6.01, and the average value of the person effect and residual, across all observations in the 
estimation sample, are both zero. The average experience component is 0.57, the labor force attachment component 
is 2.24, and the aggregate labor market conditions component is -0.045.
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difference between the average log earnings value and the average log non-firm earnings component 
for workers in the middle is 0.135 (=  9.938 — 9.803), which is very similar to the 0.113 estimated for 
the worker duration-weighted average log firm component. Although this comparison is not a true 
worker-level comparison, it should be similar given that most workers are in the same non-firm-type 
and overall-earnings bins.
There is some evidence of worker sorting. Taking the difference between the average log 
earnings for each overall-earnings bin (Table 2) and the average log non-firm components for the 
same non-firm bin (Table 2) shows that workers at the bottom of the overall-earnings distribution 
and the bottom of the non-firm component distribution tend to work in lower-paying firms (7.473 — 
7.708 =  —0.235) compared with workers at the top (11.236 — 10.976 =  0.260).
Consider the magnitude of the average firm effect for each firm type and its potential effect on 
workers in different parts of the non-firm component distribution. For example, the typical worker at 
the bottom of the non-firm component distribution has average log earnings of 7.708. If this worker 
were employed at a firm in the middle of the firm component distribution, his log earnings would 
be greater by about 0.113, which is not enough to move him to the middle of the overall-earnings 
distribution (7.708 +  0.113 =  7.821 <  9.938). Even if this worker were able to transition to a firm 
at the top of the firm component distribution, ceteris paribus, his log earnings would be greater 
by 0.694 (=  0.807 — 0.113) log points. The resulting log earnings of 8.515 (=  7.708 +  0.807) would 
still not be large enough to move the worker to the middle overall-earnings bin. In comparison, for 
a worker in the top of the non-firm component distribution, moving from a middle to a top firm, 
results in an earnings increase large enough for the worker to transition from the middle to the top 
of the overall-earnings distribution (10.976 +  0.807 =  11.783 >  11.236). Although the relative effect 
is the same, the dollar value of the effect of working at a high paying firm increases the greater is 
a worker's non-firm component of earnings.
Table 6 shows characteristics of workers associated with each of the 24 possible earnings 
and inactivity transitions. Given that the overwhelming majority of workers are in the same bin 
in the overall earning and non-firm component distributions, the characteristics of the workers in 
each corresponding non-firm component bin will largely be the same. In Table 8 we show the 
characteristics of firms across each of the three firm-type categories. There are clear differences 
in the industry distribution by where the firm lies in the firm component distribution. Low- 
paying firms are highly concentrated in “Trade, Transportation, & Utilities” and “Leisure and 
Hospitality,” with over 50% of workers at low paying firms in these two industries. Firms in the 
middle of the pay distribution are not nearly as concentrated by industry, but nevertheless workers 
in these firms are prevalent in “Trade, Transportation, & Utilities,” “Education and Health,” and 
“Manufacturing.” Somewhat surprisingly, except for “Leisure and Hospitality” and “Finance,” the 
distribution of workers in high-paying firms across industries is relatively diffuse. Most industries 
have a substantial number of workers in high-paying firms, implying that, except for “Leisure and 
Hospitality,” it isn’t necessary to change industries to work at a high-paying firm. As found in other 
studies, low-paying firms tend to be both younger and smaller than high-paying firms (Haltiwanger
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Table 8: Firm Characteristics by Position in the Firm Component Distribution
C h a ra c ter is t ic B o t to m M id d le T op
Industry Distribution (Percent)
Natural Resources/Mining 0.012 0.011 0.023
Construction 0.012 0.060 0.075
Manufacturing 0.014 0.104 0.178
Trade, Trans, & Utilities 0.246 0.211 0.140
Information 0.017 0.016 0.050
Finance 0.017 0.057 0.119
Prof. and Bus. Services 0.118 0.123 0.212
Education and Health 0.209 0.276 0.074
Leisure and Hospitality 0.290 0.070 0.006
Other Services 0.048 0.031 0.021
State/Local Government 0.017 0.041 0.062
Federal Government 0.000 0.001 0.041
Firm Age
Mean 20.988 22.700 24.760
Standard Deviation 9.670 9.419 9.882
P25 10 13 17
Median 24 27 29
P75 32 32 33
Firm Size
P10 6 8 11
P25 26 40 118
Median 330 502 2,359
P75 9,433 9,088 20,991
P90 73,330 68,535 64,448
Notes: All statistics are calculated at the worker-year-job level with the value for each job weighted by (yijt/e it) 
when forming the averages. N  =  2, 014, 000, 000. A firm is defined by the state-level unemployment insurance 
account number, called an SEIN in LEHD data. Firm age (measured in years) and firm size are based on the 
national firm definitions used in other LEHD data products like the Quarterly Workforce Indicators. (See 
Haltiwanger et al. (2012)).
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et al., 2012, Figure 7).
In this section we use the AKM decomposition to explore how the three types of workers (bottom, 
middle and top of the skill-type distribution) sort into the three types of firms (bottom, middle 
and top of the firm-type distribution). The results for each worker type are presented separately. 
Tables 9, 10 and 11 present outcomes for workers in the bottom, middle and top bins of the skill-type 
distribution, respectively.
The tables were created as follows. Bin types are based on the previous year’s data; i.e., year 
t — 1 classifications. Beginning in 2004 and ending in 2012, for every year that an eligible worker 
has positive earnings a single observation is added to one of the three tables. The appropriate table 
classification for each observation is determined by the skill type of the worker for that year, which 
can vary over time as workers accumulate experience. Within each skill type, the earnings record 
is further classified based on the firm type, resulting in each earnings observation being classified 
into one of nine possible cells.49 Within each of the skill-type x firm-type cells, we break down the 
results by the three possible overall-earnings outcomes (bottom, middle and top). There are, thus, 
twenty-seven cells for which we present information on the number of workers, average earnings for 
the previous year (t — 1), and average earnings for the current year (t) by flow type.50
To fix ideas, we will take a detailed look at two rows in Table 9. To be recorded in this table, 
the person must have been in the bottom (lowest) bin of the skill-type distribution in the previous 
year; i.e., t — 1.
Consider the first row of the table. This row is in the panel labeled “Bottom Firm,” indicating 
that this person is employed at a firm in the bottom bin of the firm-type distribution in t—1. Persons 
in this row are also in the bottom bin of the overall-earnings distribution in year t — 1, and 0.0782 is 
the share of such persons relative to those in the middle or top of the overall-earnings distribution. 
The flow labeled “2_0” is the movement from the bottom of the overall-earnings distribution (bin 
2) to the ineligible (bin 0); that is, this is the flow out of the frame for persons at the bottom 
of the overall-earnings distribution. There were, on average, 39,565 such persons each previous 
year (t — 1). They represent 0.7% of the flows from bin 2 of the overall-earnings distribution for 
low-skill workers in bottom-paying firms. Average earnings in t — 1 were $1,921 of which —$2, 285 
are attributed to the firm component of our decomposition and $4,207 are attributed to the non­
firm component of our decomposition. There were no earnings in the current year (t), because the 
person has moved out of the frame in t.
Next consider the row labeled “Middle” in the “All Earnings” column in the “Middle Firm” 
panel with a “3_3” flow. All persons in this row were, once again, at the bottom of the skill
49The estimated AKM firm effects do not vary during the period, the value of the firm effect used in the firm- 
type bins depends upon all employers during the year, and actual earnings. Hence, these effects do change values 
even when workers do not change employers. Of course, the AKM firm effect changes when an individual changes 
employers as well.
50The earnings observation we used for classification are labeled “previous year” in the tables.
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component distribution in year t — 1. Of all such persons, 60% are employed by a firm in the 
middle of the firm-type distribution. Of all persons at the bottom of the skill-type distribution and 
in the middle of the firm-type distribution in year t — 1, the proportion 0.608 were in the middle 
of the overall-earnings distribution. Among such persons, the “3_3” row shows those who remain 
in the middle of the overall-earnings distribution in the current year, t, of which there were, on 
average, 8,507,780 in the 9 pairs of years for which the table was constructed. Those who stayed 
in the middle of the overall-earnings distribution represented 82.4% of all persons who were in the 
middle of the overall-earnings distribution, in the low-skill bin, and in a middle-paying firm in year 
t — 1, on average. In year t — 1, their earnings averaged $17,361 of which $2,337 are attributed to 
the firm component of our decomposition and $15,024 are attributed to the non-firm component of 
our decomposition. In the current year, year t, average earnings were $18,013 of which $2,619 are 
associated with the firm component and $15,394 are associated with the non-firm component.
We use these tables to investigate worker sorting directly by looking at the interaction of 
the skill and firm type for each worker-year-earnings observation. If there were no sorting, the 
distribution of earnings observations across firm types would be similar for all three tables, because 
outcomes would be unaffected by which part of the skill-type distribution an individual occupied, 
given his place in the overall-earnings distribution. This hypothesis is clearly not supported by the 
data, and forms the basis of our major conclusion that the influence of the firm operates through 
channels that are, at least in part, different from the channels that intermediate the skill-type effect. 
For example, again using Table 9 showing the bottom of the skill-type distribution, about 27% of 
the earnings observations are in firms at the bottom of the firm-type distribution, 60% are in firms 
of the middle type, and only 13% are in top firms. By comparison, Tables 10 and 11 show that 
persons in the middle and top of the skill-type distributions are much less likely to be employed 
at firms in the bottom type (17% and 21%, respectively), and much more likely to be employed at 
top firms (21% and 25%, respectively).
Focusing on each skill type, we start with the earnings observations for low-skill types in 
Table 9. For workers at the bottom of the skill-type distribution, working at a higher-paying firm 
has two advantages: higher earnings than otherwise and a greater chance of moving to a higher bin in 
the overall-earnings distribution. For example, a worker at the bottom of the skill-type and overall­
earnings distributions has a probability of moving to the middle of the overall-earnings distribution 
of 16.8% at a low-paying firm, 24.2% at a middle-paying firm, and 23.3% at a high paying firm. 
Prior to the 2_3 transition, the average low-skill worker at a low, middle, and high-paying firm 
earns $3,398, $3,726, and $3,749, respectively.51 After the transition, the average low-skill worker 
at a low, middle, and high-paying firm earns $10,487, $11,739, and $15,047, respectively. Most of 
the additional increase in earnings for workers employed at a top-paying employer in the previous 
year is due to working at a top paying employer in the next year.
51Notice that the non-firm component of earnings declines as we move up the firm-type distribution. Although 
it is unclear exactly which covariate is primarily responsible for this decline, weeks worked perhaps, the impact of 
working at a higher-paying firm would be much greater if the person component of earnings were the same across 
firm types.
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Table 9: Earnings Associated with Flows by Firm Bin for Low-Skill Persons
A ll
E arn ings Share F low
A v e ra g e
C ou n t P ercen t
P r e v io u s  Y ear C u rre n t Y ear
Total Firm
Non­
Firm Total Firm
Non­
Firm
Bottom  Firm  (27 % )
2_0 39,565 0.7% 1,921 -2,285 4,207 — — —
2.1 1,102,440 18.9% 1,014 -1,039 2,053 — — —
Bottom 0.782 2.2 3,713,490 63.6% 2,282 -2,492 4,774 2,562 -2,262 4,824
2.3 978,706 16.8% 3,398 -3,236 6,634 10,487 -3,913 14,400
2.4 1,326 0.0% 1,977 -4,694 6,672 80,726 25,927 54,800
3_0 5,655 0.3% 10,686 -10,132 20,818 — — —
3.1 32,834 2.0% 10,298 -9,484 19,782 — — —
Middle 0.217 3.2 380,336 23.5% 9,359 -8,313 17,673 3,771 -3,133 6,904
3.3 1,194,533 73.9% 12,342 -10,417 22,760 13,660 -8,628 22,289
3.4 2,705 0.2% 31,037 -32,962 63,999 58,165 -34,136 92,301
4_0 20 0.3% 100,000 -130,000 230,000 — — —
4.1 160 2.1% 66,408 -85,919 152,326 — — —
Top 0.001 4.2 362 4.6% 180,230 -163,472 343,702 2,486 -6,377 8,863
4.3 2,151 27.6% 59,430 -67,891 127,321 33,563 -33,499 67,062
4.4 5,106 65.5% 66,745 -74,157 140,902 67,457 -64,741 132,199
Middle Firm (60% )
2.0 65,494 1.0% 2,447 2 2,445 — — —
2.1 1,428,036 22.1% 1,749 1 1,748 — — —
Bottom 0.381 2_2 3,411,867 52.7% 2,781 -209 2,990 2,719 -505 3,225
2.3 1,566,180 24.2% 3,726 -167 3,893 11,739 438 11,302
2_4 2,684 0.0% 2,981 252 2,729 69,808 27,963 41,845
3.0 46,878 0.5% 12,749 1,501 11,249 — — —
3.1 310,560 3.0% 11,957 1,722 10,235 — — —
Middle 0.608 3_2 1,396,266 13.5% 11,989 725 11,263 3,367 -386 3,752
3.3 8,507,780 82.4% 17,361 2,337 15,024 18,013 2,619 15,394
3_4 60,049 0.6% 35,329 7,277 28,052 55,148 13,567 41,580
4.0 289 0.2% 73,365 14,053 59,313 — — —
4.1 1,586 0.9% 72,382 12,255 60,128 — — —
Top 0.011 4_2 5,942 3.2% 67,356 7,642 59,714 1,985 -454 2,439
4.3 47,624 25.7% 55,476 10,714 44,761 34,993 6,711 28,282
4_4 130,216 70.1% 62,989 12,797 50,193 63,549 13,399 50,150
Top Firm (13% )
2.0 8,510 1.7% 2,456 1,367 1,089 — — —
2.1 176,522 34.3% 2,131 1,203 928 — — —
Bottom 0.143 2.2 207,481 40.4% 2,979 1,642 1,336 2,711 920 1,791
2.3 119,756 23.3% 3,749 2,039 1,710 15,047 6,912 8,135
2.4 1,650 0.3% 3,051 1,820 1,232 109,852 63,556 46,296
3.0 12,848 0.5% 18,789 10,749 8,040 — — —
3.1 128,415 4.6% 16,324 9,505 6,820 — — —
Middle 0.771 3.2 209,939 7.6% 17,926 9,809 8,117 2,911 914 1,997
3.3 2,351,400 84.6% 24,984 13,686 11,297 25,168 13,437 11,731
3.4 76,365 2.7% 36,786 21,709 15,077 56,997 33,932 23,065
4.0 677 0.2% 88,542 65,161 23,381 — — —
4.1 4,682 1.5% 93,519 62,575 30,944 — — —
Top 0.087 4.2 11,856 3.8% 82,512 49,460 33,051 1,976 377 1,599
4.3 63,883 20.4% 59,192 36,042 23,151 33,313 19,085 14,228
4.4 232,083 74.1% 72,919 47,838 25,081 73,785 48,162 25,624
Notes: Estimates are based on the authors’ calculations using the nine paired years from 2004-2005 to 2012-2013. 
The first year in the pair is the “previous year” in the table, and the second year in the pair is the “current year.” 
Bins associated with the flows are “0” inflow/outflow from the eligible-workers frame, “1” inactive but eligible, “2” 
bottom of the overall-earnings distribution, “3” middle of the overall-earnings distribution, and “4” top of the 
overall-earnings distribution. “Average count” is the average number of persons in the row during the year labeled 
“previous year” (t — 1). Pct is the percent distribution of transitions for all persons who started the year in the same 
overall-earnings distribution bin. For “Previous Year” a n d “Current Year,” “Total” is the average real earnings in 
2000 dollars, “Firm” is the average real earnings associated with the firm component in our decomposition, and 
“Non-Firm” is the average real earnings associated with the non-firm component in our decomposition.
Table 10 supports a similar conclusion. Middle-skilled workers in the bottom of the overall­
earnings distribution also have a greater chance of moving to the middle of the earnings distribution 
the higher the firm-type for which they work. When they transition, their current-year earnings 
will also be greater the higher is the firm-type for which they work. The vast majority (62%) 
of workers in the middle of the skill-type distribution are employed at middle-paying firms. The 
next most prevalent outcomes for such workers are employment at top- and bottom-paying firms, 
21% and 17% respectively. However, in spite of the majority of earnings observations being in 
the middle of the overall-earnings distribution, average earnings differ substantially across firm 
types. A middle-skill worker in the middle (bin 3) of the overall-earnings distribution who stays 
in bin 3 of the overall distribution (a “3_3” flow) at a bottom-type firm has t — 1 earnings of 
$15,820, a middle-skill worker in a middle-type firm has t — 1 earnings of $24,165, and a middle- 
skill worker at a top firm has earnings of $31,965. Most of the difference is due to a larger firm 
effect, although the non-firm component declines as a middle-skill person is found in increasing firm 
types, giving back some of the gains. Another benefit of finding employment at a high-paying firm 
is a greater probability of moving to the top of the earnings distribution. For middle-skill workers 
in the middle bin of the overall-earnings distribution in the previous year, the relevant comparisons 
are as follows. The estimated probability of a 3_4 transition for workers in a low-paying firm is 
0.6%. The estimated probability of the same transition for workers in a middle-paying firm is 2.6%. 
Finally, the estimated probability of a transition to the top of the overall-earnings distribution for 
middle-skill workers in a top-paying firm is 11.8%.
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Table 10: Earnings Associated with Flows by Firm Bin for Middle-Skill Persons
A ll
E arn ings Share F low
A v e ra g e
C o u n t P ercen t
P r e v io u s  Y ear C u rre n t Y ear
Total Firm
N on­
Firm Total Firm
Non­
Firm
Bottom  Firm  (17 % )
2.0 36,376 0.6% 2,766 -4,188 6,953 — — —
2.1 1,413,148 21.9% 1,828 -1,999 3,827 — — —
Bottom 0.444 2.2 3,101,345 48.1% 2,774 -3,688 6,462 3,056 -3,388 6,444
2.3 1,894,531 29.4% 3,540 -3,808 7,348 11,709 -6,015 17,725
2.4 6,629 0.1% 2,514 -4,166 6,680 71,419 15,598 55,821
3.0 31,137 0.4% 12,442 -11,801 24,242 — — —
3.1 212,893 2.7% 11,397 -10,634 22,031 — — —
Middle 0.547 3.2 983,862 12.4% 10,788 -10,662 21,450 3,785 -3,651 7,436
3.3 6,669,365 84.0% 15,820 -14,127 29,946 16,803 -12,701 29,505
3.4 45,779 0.6% 33,527 -32,569 66,096 57,183 -33,647 90,830
4.0 195 0.2% 69,394 -89,283 158,677 — — —
Top 0.008 4.1 1,370 1.1% 74,112 139,818 213,929 _ _ _
4.2 1,950 1.6% 68,735 -88,619 157,355 2,844 -5,364 8,209
4.3 30,542 24.9% 56,942 -59,886 116,828 35,086 -31,411 66,497
4_4 88,637 72.2% 63,707 -64,986 128,693 64,695 -60,302 124,997
Middle Firm (62% )
2.0 44,834 0.7% 3,037 27 3,010 — — —
2_1 1,917,160 28.5% 2,653 10 2,642 — — —
Bottom 0.130 2.2 2,264,104 33.6% 3,077 -231 3,308 2,992 -803 3,795
2.3 2,485,434 36.9% 3,706 -149 3,855 14,551 398 14,152
2.4 19,469 0.3% 3,366 427 2,939 63,885 21,915 41,969
3.0 124,637 0.3% 19,293 1,958 17,335 — — —
3_1 1,502,717 3.6% 15,071 2,193 12,877 — — —
Middle 0.802 3.2 2,535,882 6.1% 15,344 1,061 14,283 3,442 -487 3,929
3.3 36,185,391 87.4% 24,165 3,268 20,897 24,688 3,412 21,276
3.4 1,075,334 2.6% 37,532 8,695 28,837 54,207 14,489 39,719
4.0 4,246 0.1% 64,346 14,661 49,686 — — —
4_1 20,143 0.6% 69,334 12,984 56,350 — — —
Top 0.068 4.2 32,524 0.9% 64,867 13,923 50,943 2,927 -123 3,050
4.3 812,972 23.2% 54,592 12,472 42,120 36,813 8,389 28,424
4.4 2,636,922 75.2% 61,625 14,644 46,981 62,511 15,362 47,149
Top Firm (21% )
2.0 7,309 1.2% 3,258 1,763 1,495 — — —
2.1 243,227 38.9% 3,027 1,642 1,385 — — —
Bottom 0.036 2.2 156,614 25.1% 3,382 1,834 1,548 3,114 625 2,489
2.3 201,902 32.3% 3,825 2,020 1,804 19,512 7,872 11,640
2.4 15,593 2.5% 3,681 2,053 1,628 64,011 35,748 28,263
3.0 27,268 0.3% 25,229 13,304 11,925 — — —
3.1 520,030 5.5% 20,967 11,452 9,514 — — —
Middle 0.547 3.2 350,961 3.7% 22,339 11,765 10,573 3,224 715 2,509
3.3 7,391,254 78.7% 31,965 16,295 15,670 32,082 15,736 16,346
3.4 1,107,423 11.8% 38,199 20,579 17,620 55,738 30,184 25,553
4.0 9,556 0.1% 70,452 41,322 29,130 — — —
4.1 70,437 1.0% 70,076 42,343 27,733 — — —
Top 0.417 4.2 61,125 0.9% 72,097 41,507 30,590 2,881 939 1,942
4.3 899,132 12.6% 57,986 31,890 26,095 35,291 18,151 17,140
4.4 6,115,576 85.5% 67,457 38,800 28,656 68,906 39,504 29,402
Notes: Estimates are based on the authors’ calculations using the nine paired years from 2004-2005 to 2012-2013. 
The first year in the pair is the “previous year” in the table, and the second year in the pair is the “current year.” 
Bins associated with the flows are “0” inflow/outflow from the eligible-workers frame, “1” inactive but eligible, “2” 
bottom of the overall-earnings distribution, “3” middle of the overall-earnings distribution, and “4” top of the 
overall-earnings distribution. “Average count” is the average number of persons in the row during the year labeled 
“previous year” (t — 1). Pct is the percent distribution of transitions for all persons who started the year in the same 
overall-earnings distribution bin. For “Previous Year” and0“Current Year,” “Total” is the average real earnings in 
2000 dollars, “Firm” is the average real earnings associated with the firm component in our decomposition, and 
“Non-Firm” is the average real earnings associated with the non-firm component in our decomposition.
Table 11: Earnings Associated with Flows by Firm Bin for High-Skill Persons
A ll
E arn ings Share F low
A v e ra g e
C ou n t P ercen t
P r e v io u s  Y ear C u rre n t Y ear
Total Firm
Non­
Firm Total Firm
Non­
Firm
Bottom  Firm  (21 % )
2_0 10,534 1.8% 2,773 -8,174 10,948 — — —
2.1 280,788 46.7% 2,249 -3,701 5,950 — — —
Bottom 0.104 2.2 176,404 29.3% 2,907 -11,164 14,071 2,982 -10,511 13,493
2.3 128,775 21.4% 3,591 -7,554 11,145 15,617 -20,775 36,391
2.4 5247 0.9% 2,815 -7,587 10,402 94,017 -43,216 137,233
3_0 19,797 0.5% 20,605 -33,443 54,048 — — —
3.1 160,196 4.2% 18,005 -23,558 41,563 — — —
Middle 0.655 3.2 129,284 3.4% 17,280 -29,586 46,865 3,576 -7,467 11,043
3.3 3,287,634 87.0% 27,830 -35,576 63,405 28,061 -34,972 63,033
3.4 181,857 4.8% 38,233 -46,714 84,946 57,343 -64,656 121,999
4_0 4,283 0.3% 94,022 -135,507 229,529 — — —
4.1 13,507 1.0% 95,299 -176,061 271,360 — — —
Top 0.241 4.2 6,970 0.5% 78,069 -144,049 222,118 3,081 -6,682 9,763
4.3 159,557 11.5% 59,330 -78,709 138,039 36,446 -43,579 80,024
4.4 1,205,661 86.7% 80,717 -112,912 193,629 81,938 -110,686 192,624
Middle Firm (54% )
2.0 9,555 1.7% 3,485 58 3,427 — — —
2.1 324,938 57.2% 3,172 40 3,132 — — —
Bottom 0.038 2_2 101,070 17.8% 3,231 -99 3,330 3,150 -770 3,921
2.3 117,605 20.7% 3,745 -40 3,785 19,859 -1,244 21,103
2_4 14,650 2.6% 3,638 441 3,198 76,591 14,464 62,127
3.0 30,029 0.5% 25,036 572 24,463 — — —
3.1 463,428 8.2% 20,864 1,649 19,215 — — —
Middle 0.378 3_2 150,873 2.7% 22,473 308 22,165 3,521 -658 4,179
3.3 4,210,520 74.1% 33,479 -1,789 35,268 33,621 -2,337 35,958
3_4 826,287 14.5% 37,799 3,338 34,461 59,210 6,969 52,240
4.0 23,563 0.3% 113,825 18,140 95,686 — — —
4.1 99,260 1.1% 94,122 17,584 76,539 — — —
Top 0.585 4_2 35,671 0.4% 79,444 11,857 67,587 3,374 -192 3,566
4.3 769,334 8.7% 62,012 7,288 54,724 35,502 2,761 32,741
4_4 7,870,823 89.5% 92,507 15,835 76,673 93,962 16,259 77,703
Top Firm (25% )
2.0 1,600 1.8% 3,762 2,079 1,683 — — —
2.1 49,575 56.4% 3,674 2,003 1,671 — — —
Bottom 0.012 2.2 13,208 15.0% 3,763 2,175 1,588 3,462 1,162 2,300
2.3 16,128 18.4% 3,986 2,174 1,812 21,346 6,827 14,519
2.4 7,364 8.4% 3,888 2,123 1,765 94,733 48,125 46,608
3.0 6,924 1.0% 23,484 12,755 10,729 — — —
3.1 172,259 25.1% 22,641 12,565 10,076 — — —
Middle 0.097 3.2 26,117 3.8% 23,274 12,578 10,696 3,412 633 2,779
3.3 257,654 37.5% 28,736 15,256 13,480 28,673 12,434 16,239
3.4 224,480 32.7% 32,774 17,590 15,184 76,747 39,976 36,771
4.0 12,289 0.2% 171,799 97,735 74,064 — — —
4.1 129,640 2.0% 145,870 87,655 58,215 — — —
Top 0.891 4.2 24,092 0.4% 130,394 74,667 55,727 3,317 928 2,389
4.3 260,123 4.1% 90,264 50,200 40,064 30,378 14,237 16,141
4.4 5,902,247 93.3% 143,296 82,412 60,884 147,043 83,785 63,257
Notes: Estimates are based on the authors’ calculations using the nine paired years from 2004-2005 to 2012-2013. 
The first year in the pair is the “previous year” in the table, and the second year in the pair is the “current year.” 
Bins associated with the flows are “0” inflow/outflow from the eligible-workers frame, “1” inactive but eligible, “2” 
bottom of the overall-earnings distribution, “3” middle of the overall-earnings distribution, and “4” top of the 
overall-earnings distribution. “Average count” is the average number of persons in the row during the year labeled 
“previous year” (t — 1). Pct is the percent distribution of transitions for all persons who started the year in the same 
overall-earnings distribution bin. For “Previous Year” and “Current Year,” “Total” is the average real earnings in 
2000 dollars, “Firm” is the average real earnings associated with the firm component in our decomposition, and 
“Non-Firm” is the average real earnings associated with the non-firm component in our decomposition.
Table 11 shows that most of the high-skill workers are also in the top of the overall-earnings 
distribution, since the top bin of the overall-earnings distribution shows shares of 0.241, 0.585 and 
0.891 for low, middle and top-type firms, respectively. There is also a substantial minority in 
the middle of the overall-earnings distribution. Since transitions to the top of the overall-earnings 
distribution (3_4) are more likely at top-paying firms (32.7%) as compared to low- or middle-paying 
firms (4.8% and 14/5%, respectively), we note that once again working at such a firm offers an 
advantage distinct from the worker's skill-type. In the high-skill category, the earnings differences 
between working at a middle- compared to a bottom-type firm after making a 3_4 transition are 
relatively small, but the earnings gains from working at a top-paying firm are very large. While 
working at a top-paying firm is clearly preferred and the gains are large, a typical worker in any 
part of the skill distribution would also have a strong preference for working at a middle-paying 
rather than a bottom-paying firm. Although the dollar gains may be relatively small, the difference 
in the earnings for bottom- and middle-paying firms is significant. For example, 78% of the low-skill 
persons employed at a bottom-paying firm are at the bottom of the overall-earnings distribution, 
while only 38% of the the low-skill persons employed at a middle-paying firm are at the bottom of the 
overall-earnings distribution. Overall earnings within the bottom bin are not dramatically different 
in this case, but workers in the middle bin of the overall-earnings distribution have noticeably 
higher earnings at a middle-paying firm ($17,361) vs. a bottom-paying firm ($12,342). Somewhat 
surprisingly, there are a relatively large number of top-skill workers at bottom- and middle-type 
firms. On average, these workers, especially in the middle, are employed at worse-paying firms than 
middle skill-type workers.52
Table 12 analyzes the earnings of individuals who do not move in the earnings distribution 
between consecutive years by firm and skill type. This table allows us to analyze the potential 
effects of redistributing the skill types across firm types or redistributing the firm types across skill 
types. For the bottom and middle skill types, there is almost no advantage to being employed in 
a higher paying firm type, given their place in the earnings distribution. For example, a bottom- 
skill person in the top 20% of the earnings distribution earns $66,745 in a bottom-paying firm and 
$72,919 in a top-paying firm. But for a top-skill person, there is a big advantage to employment in a 
top-paying firm, $80,717 as compared to $143,736 when in the top 20% of the earnings distribution. 
The skill pay premium for all firms is approximately the same when considering a bottom-skill as 
opposed to a middle-skill worker. For example, $12,342 vs. $15,820 for bottom firm and $17,361 
vs. $24,165 for a middle firm. This is also the case for considering a middle-skill vs. top-skill 
worker, except for the top-paying firms, where that premium is much greater than for middle or 
low-paying firms-$67,457 vs. $143,296 for the top-paying firm as compared to $61,625 vs. $92,507 
for the middle-paying firm.
52 See Appendix Section E.3 for an analysis of the changes in earnings inequality using only the firm-type and non­
firm-type distributions. Some anomalies appear in that analysis that do not appear when we use only the skill-type 
to characterize worker differences. We thank a referee for suggesting this modification.
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Table 12: Within Firm-Type and Skill-Type Inequality
B o t to m  Skill M id d le  Skill T o p  Skill
F low Earnings Ratio Earnings Ratio Earnings Ratio
2_2 2,282 0.185 2,774 0.175 2,907 0.104
B o t to m  F irm 3_3 12,342 — 15,820 — 27,830 —
4_4 66,745 5.408 63,707 4.027 80,717 2.900
2_2 2,781 0.160 3,077 0.127 3,231 0.097
M id d le  F irm 3_3 17,361 — 24,165 — 33,479 —
4_4 62,989 3.628 61,625 2.550 92,507 2.763
2_2 2,979 0.119 3,382 0.106 3,763 0.131
T o p  F irm 3_3 24,984 — 31,965 — 28,736 —
4_4 72,919 2.919 67,457 2.110 143,296 4.987
Notes: Estimates are based on the authors’ calculations using only individuals who do not change cells in the 
overall-earnings distribution between years t — 1 and t. The column labeled “Flow: indicates the bin in the 
overall-earnings distribution that the individual occupied. For example, 2_2 means the individual was in the bottom 
20% of the income distribution in both years. The column labeled “Earnings” is the average earnings for the 
indicated firm type, skill type and flow cell. The column labeled “Ratio” is the ratio of the earnings in the indicated 
row to the earnings in the 3_3 cell of the same firm and skill type.
6 Conclusion
We use administrative earnings data from the LEHD infrastructure files to analyze the role of 
the employer in explaining the rise in earnings inequality in the U.S. from 2004-2013. In order 
to demonstrate the importance of carefully selecting the frame and defining the earnings universe 
under study, we supplement these earnings data with information from a variety of sources, which 
we analyze to establish the validity of our final analysis of change in the earnings distribution.
We use SSA-supplied data to identify both invalid SSNs and the fraudulent use of valid SSNs. 
This allows us to transform the found jobs data in the all-workers frame into the designed eligible- 
workers frame that references a consistent population over time. When comparing the evolution of 
the ratios of top-to-bottom percentiles of the earnings distribution between the two worker frames, 
we find that while both frames show a decrease in earnings inequality in the late-1990s, their 
patterns diverge starting in 2000. The found frame of all workers shows little to no change in the 
earnings inequality since 2000. On the other hand, upon removing the immigrant candidates, the 
designed frame of eligible workers shows a rise in inequality starting in 2000 that is robust across 
several measures of earnings inequality. This difference highlights the need to be mindful of the 
sample of workers used when interpreting results from studies of earnings inequality. Furthermore, 
we compare these inequality results to ones from CPS/ACS. We find that the trends in earnings 
inequality observed among the eligible workers in the LEHD data are very similar to those observed 
among the workers expected to be covered under UI in CPS/ACS.
Our results also suggest that, unlike in previous recessions, substantial numbers of persons 
employed prior to the Great Recession did not return to employment even five or more years after 
the start of that recession. While previous research focused primarily on employed persons or 
persons in the labor force, the large and persistent decrease in the employment-to-population ratio
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for all workers and for covered workers only, during and after the Great Recession, argues strongly 
for an expansion of inequality measures to include at least some inactive but eligible workers. Using 
our eligible-workers frame, we have shown that such persons are attached to the labor force, as 
evidenced by their dynamic employment histories, but the exclusion of their inactive periods from 
earnings inequality measures understates the degradation at the bottom of the distribution.
Using our designed frame, we assess the role firms play in the rise in earnings inequality. We 
decomposed earnings in to firm and non-firm component. Using a part of the non-firm component 
that relates only to measured and unmeasured individual characteristics and controls for differences 
in labor-force attachment and macroeconomic conditions, we characterize the individuals as low-, 
medium- or high-skill types. Using the firm component, we characterize the firms as low-, medium- 
or high-paying firm types. Using the model for changes in the earnings distribution that we con­
structed for the eligible-workers frame, we analyzed the role played by the position of the worker 
in the skill-type and firm-type distributions. We show that a typical worker of any skill type would 
benefit from working at a middle-paying firm relative to a low-paying firm, but it is the workers 
of any skill type employed at high-paying firms who benefit the most. These individuals not only 
make higher earnings, they also experience an increase in the probability of moving up the earnings 
distribution in the following year. While we make no structural claim for this relation between 
the firm type and placement in the overall-earnings distribution, it is clear that the influence of 
firms works through channels that are not the same as those through which the effects of individual 
differences operate.
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ONLINE APPENDIX
A Additional Data Source and Methods Tables and Figures
In Section 2 we discussed the construction of our eligible-workers frame. Here we provide further 
details on which workers are excluded from the all-workers frame to arrive at the eligible-workers 
frame and how this impacts the earnings coverage of LEHD when compared to NIPA.
A.1 All-Workers Frame
The all-workers frame contains earnings for all jobs reported on the UI data for each date regime 
in the relevant years from 1990-2013, as noted in Figure 1 and summarized in Table A.1 below.
Using the person level earnings, eit, an estimate of annual earnings for the all-workers frame 
in year t is calculated as follows:
= E  eit,
ieAWt
where AWt is the set of workers in the all-workers frame in year t.
A-1
Table A.1: LEHD Regimes
C o u n t S ta te
F irst
Y Y Y Y Q
L ast
Y Y Y Y Q E n try  O rd er
P c t  2012Q 1 
Q C E W  E m p
Regime 1 - 1990Q1 to 2013Q4 - 19.35% of 2012Q1 Q C E W  Employment
1 Maryland 1985Q2 2014Q3 1 1.83%
2 Alaska 1990Q1 2014Q3 2 0.22%
3 Colorado 1990Q1 2014Q3 3 1.70%
4 Idaho 1990Q1 2014Q3 4 0.45%
5 Illinois 1990Q1 2014Q3 5 4.38%
6 Indiana 1990Q1 2014Q3 6 2.19%
7 Kansas 1990Q1 2013Q4 7 0.98%
8 Louisiana 1990Q1 2014Q2 8 1.41%
9 Missouri 1990Q1 2014Q3 9 1.99%
10 Washington 1990Q1 2014Q3 10 2.12%
11 Wisconsin 1990Q1 2014Q3 11 2.08%
Regime 2 - 1995Q1 to 2013Q4 - 48.28% of 2012Q1 Q C E W  Employment
12 North Carolina 1991Q1 2014Q3 1 2.92%
13 Oregon 1991Q1 2014Q3 2 1.23%
14 Pennsylvania 1991Q1 2014Q3 3 4.44%
15 California 1991Q3 2014Q3 4 11.37%
16 Arizona 1992Q1 2014Q3 5 1.85%
17 Wyoming 1992Q1 2014Q3 6 0.19%
18 Florida 1992Q4 2014Q2 7 5.78%
19 Montana 1993Q1 2014Q3 8 0.31%
20 Georgia 1994Q1 2014Q3 9 2.90%
21 South Dakota 1994Q1 2014Q2 10 0.30%
22 Minnesota 1994Q3 2014Q3 11 2.05%
23 New York 1995Q1 2014Q3 12 6.49%
24 Rhode Island 1995Q1 2014Q3 13 0.35%
25 Texas 1995Q1 2014Q3 14 8.10%
Regime 3 - 1998Q1 to 2013Q4 - 17.66% of 2012Q1 Q C E W  Employment
26 New Mexico 1995Q3 2014Q3 1 0.55%
27 Hawaii 1995Q4 2014Q3 2 0.44%
28 Connecticut 1996Q1 2014Q3 3 1.26%
29 Maine 1996Q1 2014Q3 4 0.43%
30 New Jersey 1996Q1 2014Q3 5 2.87%
31 Kentucky 1996Q4 2014Q3 6 1.32%
32 West Virginia 1997Q1 2014Q3 7 0.52%
33 Michigan 1998Q1 2014Q3 8 3.04%
34 Nevada 1998Q1 2014Q3 9 0.89%
35 North Dakota 1998Q1 2014Q3 10 0.31%
36 South Carolina 1998Q1 2014Q3 11 1.35%
37 Tennessee 1998Q1 2014Q3 12 2.03%
38 Virginia 1998Q1 2014Q2 13 2.65%
Regime 4 - 2004Q1 to 2013Q4 - 14.71% of 2012Q1 Q C E W  Employment
39 Delaware 1998Q3 2014Q3 1 0.31%
40 Iowa 1998Q4 2014Q3 2 1.12%
41 Nebraska 1999Q1 2014Q3 3 0.69%
42 Utah 1999Q1 2014Q3 4 0.91%
43 Ohio 2000Q1 2014Q3 5 3.93%
44 Oklahoma 2000Q1 2014Q3 6 1.11%
45 Vermont 2000Q1 2014Q3 7 0.22%
46 Alabama 2001Q1 2014Q3 8 1.34%
47 Massachusetts 2002Q1 2014Q2 9 2.55%
48 District of Columbia 2002Q2 2014Q3 10 0.43%
49 Arkansas 2002Q3 2014Q3 11 0.86%
50 New Hampshire 2003Q1 2014Q2 12 0.47%
51 Mississippi 2003Q3 2014Q3 13 0.77%
Notes: This table presents information on the states that make up each date regime. Each panel gives the first and 
last quarter of data available, the entry order, and the employment coverage (percent of 2012Q1 private QCEW 
employment) of each state in the regime. OPM data for federal workers is not shown in this table, but is available 
beginning in 2000Q1.
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Figure A.1: Immigrant Candidates -  Excluded Earnings Records
—  Invalid SSN —  Age<5 —  5<=Age<13 —  13<=Age<18 —  Age>70 —  # Jobs>12 —  Other
Notes: This figure presents the count of earnings records excluded from the eligible-workers frame each year, 
disaggregated by the different eligibility requirements the record failed to meet: (i) Invalid SSN are records that are 
only on the UI; (ii) Age<5  are records where the SNN is valid, but the age of the worker is less than 5; (iii) 
5<Age<13  are records where the worker is between 5 and 13 years old; (iv) 13<Age<18  are records where the 
worker is between 13 and 18 years old; (v) Age>70  are records where the worker is more than 70 years old; (vi) 
#Jobs> 12 are records where the worker has more than 12 jobs a year; and (vii) Other are records that fail to meet 
the other eligibility requirements, such as the year is greater than or equal to the SSN year of issue and less than 
year of death (when available).
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Table A.2: Immigrant Candidates -  Excluded Earnings Records
Y ear T ota l
Invalid
SS N A g e  < 5 5 > A g e < 1 3 1 3 < A g e < 1 8 A g e > 7 0 # J o b s > 1 2 O th er
1990 2,173,054 131,768 92,173 115,966 1,383,852 302,791 61,336 85,168
1991 2,029,041 156,980 96,503 110,535 1,228,937 300,232 53,311 82,543
1992 2,024,225 161,800 99,380 111,528 1,199,329 310,526 55,873 85,789
1993 2,227,908 204,299 123,925 122,587 1,294,809 333,303 59,024 89,961
1994 2,546,460 228,963 145,038 136,015 1,500,927 363,506 74,634 97,377
1995 9,875,811 1,240,177 939,315 676,532 4,536,074 1,695,371 337,545 450,797
1996 10,144,571 1,282,244 1,020,460 731,340 4,625,974 1,649,645 377,807 457,101
1997 10,560,373 1,318,787 1,051,685 773,013 4,802,606 1,737,019 408,080 469,183
1998 13,680,138 1,579,419 1,227,565 942,868 6,460,058 2,308,455 571,745 590,028
1999 14,850,424 1,801,636 1,328,052 1,059,582 6,864,218 2,559,284 617,195 620,457
2000 15,909,402 2,087,866 1,441,233 1,147,779 7,084,996 2,826,633 671,695 649,200
2001 15,142,444 2,313,768 1,354,067 1,109,587 6,313,180 2,864,144 565,342 622,356
2002 13,646,946 2,030,273 1,168,828 988,866 5,573,020 2,784,977 519,677 581,305
2003 13,105,529 2,260,426 1,059,202 965,151 4,979,593 2,776,405 493,455 571,297
2004 15,254,789 2,628,435 1,099,414 1,087,743 5,976,072 3,254,876 561,150 647,099
2005 16,109,360 2,881,580 1,030,810 1,240,576 6,271,025 3,383,095 626,426 675,848
2006 16,830,576 3,071,079 959,130 1,332,606 6,513,877 3,564,841 686,925 702,118
2007 16,464,027 3,109,359 860,258 1,254,957 6,233,964 3,605,470 712,999 687,020
2008 14,509,746 2,909,378 683,388 1,081,938 5,135,680 3,478,821 564,086 656,455
2009 11,701,711 2,484,829 471,798 884,181 3,620,311 3,240,941 390,427 609,224
2010 11,019,697 2,328,456 382,395 816,592 3,283,378 3,210,027 402,839 596,010
2011 10,942,606 2,307,310 315,743 767,636 3,269,325 3,224,106 450,244 608,242
2012 11,556,277 2,822,199 240,123 742,658 3,386,957 3,282,004 449,498 632,838
2013 13,216,695 4,157,518 178,979 671,775 3,622,084 3,409,276 492,710 684,353
Notes: The first column presents of the total number of earnings records excluded from the eligible-workers frame 
each year. The remaining columns disaggregate this count by the different eligibility requirements the record failed 
to meet: (i) Invalid SSN are records that are only on the UI; (ii) Age<5 are records where the SNN is valid, but 
the age of the worker is less than 5; (iii) 5<Age<13 are records where the worker is between 5 and 13 years old; (iv) 
13<Age<18 are records where the worker is between 13 and 18 years old; (v) Age>70 are records where the worker 
is more than 70 years old; (vi) #Jobs> 12 are records where the worker has more than 12 jobs a year; and (vii) 
Other are records that fail to meet the other eligibility requirements, such as the year is greater than or equal to the 
SSN year of issue and less than year of death (when available). The frame is complete from 2004 forward.
A.2 Comparison to NIPA
The BEA NIPA estimates are based primarily on the BLS Quarterly Census of Employment and 
Wages (QCEW ), an alternative source of employment and earnings with similar coverage as the 
UI based job level data used in this paper. A firm typically files a QCEW firm-level report in 
conjunction with the UI job-level data each quarter. The QCEW report is sent to BLS where 
it undergoes edits and imputations before the final statistics are released.53 These data are then 
used by BEA as the primary input when estimating the wage and salary component of the NIPA 
tables.54
Table A.3 presents a comparison of our estimates of annual earnings with the BEA NIPA 
data. Figure A.2 plots this comparison. Our estimates of total annual earnings using the all-workers 
frame vary from 16.5% of NIPA wage and salary estimates in 1990, the beginning of LEHD date 
regime 1; to 60.1% in 1995, the beginning of date regime 2; to 76.4% in 1998, the beginning of 
date regime 3; to 90.6% in 2004, the beginning of date regime 4. Once LEHD data are complete 
in 2004, the two series track almost exactly. By 2013 the all-workers estimate is about 91.7% of
53See http://www.bls.gov/opub/hom/pdf/homch5.pdf for more information
54The BLS QCEW estimates account for about 95% of the BEA wage and salary component of the NIPA tables. 
See http://www.bea.gov/faq/index.cfm?faq_id=104 for more information.
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the NIPA wage and salary estimates. The eligible-workers estimates follow a similar pattern as the 
all-workers estimates, with about two percentage points lower coverage relative to the all-workers 
frame after 2004.
The coverage of both the all-workers and eligible-workers frames is very low relative to the 
NIPA estimates in the early 1990s but increases dramatically in 1995 once the historical data for 
the more populous states (CA, FL, NY, and TX) have entered the LEHD infrastructure files. When 
the frame is complete (date regime 4), there is an apparent coverage gap of about eight to nine 
percentage points for the all-workers frame and ten to 11 percentage points for the eligible-workers 
frame. About half of this gap is due to differences between the statutory-employer population for 
UI wage records and the NIPA definition of wage and salary income. When comparing frames 
with similar coverage definitions (UI wage records vs. QCEW), our results suggest that the gap 
between the two frames is about four to five percentage points for the all-workers frame and five 
to six percentage points for the eligible-workers frame.
Table A.3: Earnings Measures-National Income and Product Accounts versus LEHD Data
Y ear
N IP A  W a ge  
an d  Salary
L E H D
T ota l
E lig ib le
W ork ers
Im m ig ra n t
C a n d id a te s
1990 3,611.6 594.7 587.4 7.3
1991 3,558.4 593.2 585.7 7.5
1992 3,639.8 611.2 603.8 7.4
1993 3,669.6 609.3 601.6 7.7
1994 3,760.7 642.6 633.9 8.7
1995 3,862.1 2,319.3 2,279.7 39.6
1996 3,969.2 2,336.3 2,294.5 41.8
1997 4,159.4 2,494.2 2,448.4 45.8
1998 4,417.6 3,374.6 3,312.9 61.7
1999 4,607.8 3,539.3 3,469.8 69.5
2000 4,825.9 3,770.5 3,694.7 75.8
2001 4,817.3 3,785.9 3,707.7 78.2
2002 4,782.5 3,743.2 3,666.4 76.8
2003 4,808.3 3,739.8 3,663.8 76.0
2004 4,942.6 4,478.7 4,387.3 91.4
2005 5,018.8 4,565.8 4,469.3 96.5
2006 5,174.0 4,716.5 4,613.0 103.5
2007 5,312.4 4,842.3 4,736.2 106.1
2008 5,224.3 4,767.6 4,667.3 100.3
2009 5,018.6 4,579.8 4,489.4 90.4
2010 5,037.6 4,593.4 4,503.7 89.7
2011 5,078.9 4,630.1 4,539.8 90.3
2012 5,197.7 4,750.8 4,652.5 98.3
2013 5,257.9 4,822.0 4,706.0 116.0
Notes: This table compares total earnings as measured in the BEA NIPA to earnings computed from LEHD. 
LEHD Total presents total annual earnings for the all-workers frame. This total is decomposed into earnings 
attributed to workers included in the eligible-workers frame (Eligible Workers) and to workers who are not included 
(.Immigrant Candidates). Units are in billions of real (2000) dollars, converted using CPI-U. The frame is complete 
from 2004 forward.
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Figure A.2: NIPA
Notes: This figure compares total earnings as measured in BEA NIPA (blue line) to earnings computed from 
LEHD using all workers (red line).
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A.3 Estimation of the Earnings/Inactivity Distribution
Table A.4: Labor Force Activity of Workers in Each Earnings Bin
Q u a rters
W o rk e d
L on g est
J o b
W ork ers
Counts Percent
J o b s
(A vg)
E arn ings
(Avg)
Bottom  20% of Earnings Distribution
1 1 8,543,957 30.6% 1.066 $1,366
2 1 1,883,159 6.7% 1.996 $2,187
2 2 5,806,138 20.8% 1.213 $2,824
3 1 520,324 1.9% 2.594 $3,029
3 2 2,467,851 8.8% 2.297 $3,480
3 3 2,591,936 9.3% 1.263 $3,726
4 1 58,758 0.2% 4.542 $3,480
4 2 949,367 3.4% 3.429 $4,274
4 3 932,150 3.3% 2.602 $4,544
4 4 187,115 0.7% 1.716 $4,161
4 5 1,078,088 3.9% 1.440 $4,178
4 6 2,893,038 10.4% 1.251 $4,227
Middle 60% of Earnings Distribution
1 1 853,497 1.0% 1.051 $13,637
2 1 489,513 0.6% 1.643 $14,924
2 2 2,697,567 3.2% 1.176 $14,375
3 1 680,994 0.8% 1.475 $19,879
3 2 2,409,536 2.9% 2.119 $15,891
3 3 4,976,450 5.9% 1.233 $17,446
4 1 52,620 0.1% 3.726 $17,579
4 2 2,746,891 3.3% 3.287 $17,604
4 3 7,105,740 8.5% 2.592 $20,563
4 4 841,481 1.0% 2.109 $19,230
4 5 8,869,511 10.6% 1.602 $22,405
4 6 52,012,001 62.1% 1.212 $26,107
Top 20% o f Earnings Distribution
1 1 75,101 0.3% 1.038 $146,574
2 1 34,381 0.1% 1.361 $138,531
2 2 112,925 0.4% 1.096 $102,246
3 1 94,047 0.3% 1.178 $92,110
3 2 171,999 0.6% 1.605 $95,079
3 3 434,213 1.6% 1.128 $89,432
4 1 7,589 0.0% 2.608 $90,693
4 2 312,325 1.1% 2.752 $84,965
4 3 1,383,555 5.0% 2.323 $87,727
4 4 139,347 0.5% 1.993 $90,280
4 5 2,493,150 8.9% 1.500 $92,054
4 6 22,653,328 81.2% 1.181 $88,447
Notes: Each row in the table represents a specific combination of quarters worked and number of quarters in the 
longest job. A five quarter longest job is active in either the fourth quarter of the previous year or the first quarter 
of the subsequent year, while a six quarter longest job is active in both . The number of quarters in the longest job 
takes on values from one to six. The counts are averages per year.
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B Inequality Trends in the LEHD All-Workers Frame (1990-2013)
In Section 3 we discussed the trends in earnings inequality observed in the eligible-workers frame. 
Here, we detail the inequality trends in the all-workers frame, and analyze how they differ from the 
trends observed in the eligible-workers frame.
With a better understanding of how the exclusion of specific workers affects the distribution of 
earnings, we then turn our attention to earnings inequality. We analyze how various measurements 
of the gap between the top and bottom of the earnings distribution have changed over time and 
how the trends change as we move from the all-workers to the eligible-workers frame.
Figure B.1 plots selected percentiles for the two worker frames: the solid lines are the per­
centiles computed from the all-workers frame, while the dotted lines are the percentiles computed 
from the eligible-workers frame. Comparing the solid and dotted lines in Figure B.1, it is clear that 
the main consequence of shifting the frame from all workers to eligible workers is an increase in the 
percentile values, particularly at the bottom of the earnings distribution.
Figure B.1: Percentiles of the Earnings Distribution by Worker Frame
*  EW P95
—  AW P95
*  EW P90
—  AW P90
♦  EW P80
—  AW P80
♦  EW P50
—  AW P50
♦  EW P20
—  AW P20
*  EW P10
—  AW P10
Notes: This figure plots the 10th, 20th, 50th, 80th, 90th, and 95th percentiles of the earnings distribution by worker 
frame and year. The solid lines are the percentiles of the earnings distribution of all workers (AW) by year. The 
dotted lines are the percentiles of the earnings distribution of eligible workers (EW) by year.
Figure B.2 plots the ratio of the 90th percentile to the 10th percentile for each date regime 
using the all-workers frame. The figure confirms that there are some differences in the levels of 
these curves but the trend analysis is largely unchanged.
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Figure B.2: Ratio of the 90th to the 10th Percentile of the Earnings Distribution
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Regime 2 
Regime 3 
Regime 4
Notes: This figure plots the ratio of the 90th to the 10th percentile for all workers by date regime.
To see this more clearly, Table B.1 presents the average percentile values from 1995-2013 
for both the all-workers and the eligible-workers frames, and the last row computes their ratio 
(eligible workers to all workers). First, notice that the ratio is always above one, meaning that 
each percentile computed from the eligible-workers frame is greater than the equivalent percentile 
computed from the all-workers frame. Removing the immigrant candidates from the all-workers 
frame to construct the eligible-workers frame eliminates an unknown number of individuals who 
make very low earnings and, thus, tend to be at the bottom of the all-workers earnings distribution. 
For example, in 2006, immigrant candidates held about 8% of all jobs, but only contributed about 
2% to total earnings. Furthermore, average earnings for immigrant candidates were about $6,150 
in 2006 as compared with $32,865 for eligible workers. Thus, the removal of these low-earnings 
workers from the all-workers frame makes the ratio of EW  to AW percentiles in Table B.1 higher 
towards the bottom of the earnings distribution. Specifically, notice that the 1st percentile in the 
eligible-workers earnings distribution is, on average, about 32% greater than the 1st percentile in 
the all-workers earnings distribution; the 5th percentile is about 41% greater, the 10th percentile is 
about 36% greater, and the 20th percentile is about 26% greater. From the median onwards, while 
the absolute differences in the percentile values are large, the relative differences are not as stark, 
with the percentiles in the eligible-workers earnings distribution being about 2% to 8% greater than 
the corresponding percentile in the all-workers earnings distribution. Finally, notice that regardless 
of the worker frame used, there is a large number of workers with very low earnings in LEHD, with 
the average 10th percentile at only $1,858 in the all-workers frame and $2,527 in the eligible-workers 
frame.
Table B.1: Average Percentiles of the Earnings Distribution by Worker Frame (1995-2013)
F ram e 1st 5th 10th 20th
P ercen tile s
50th 80th 90th 95th 99th
All Workers 100 713 1,858 5,141 20,093 43,741 62,277 84,012 173,847
Eligible Workers 132 1,005 2,527 6,463 21,762 45,343 64,021 86,108 178,304
Ratio of EW to AW 1.3195 1.4088 1.3605 1.2572 1.0831 1.0366 1.0280 1.0249 1.0256
Notes: The first row presents the average percentile values from the earnings distribution of all workers in all 
states from 1995-2013. The second row presents the average percentile values from the earnings distribution of 
eligible workers in all states from 1995-2013. The last row computes the ratio of each percentile from the 
eligible-workers frame to all-workers frame.
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Starting with the all-workers frame in Figure B.3, notice that all the measures show a decline 
in earnings inequality from 1995 to 2000. This can also be seen in Table B.2. The first row presents 
the average of each ratio from 1995-1999. Notice that they are all above one, meaning that earnings 
inequality was greater in the late 1990s than in 2000. Then, after 2000, except for the 99/1 ratio, 
which has a slight upward trend, all other measures of earnings inequality remain relatively stable. 
The second row of Table B.2 presents the average of each ratio (relative to 2000) from 2001-2013. 
Notice that aside from the 99/1 ratio, which on average increased by about 5% after 2000, the other 
measures have remained around their 2000 levels. Thus, aside from differences at the very top or 
the very bottom of the earnings distribution, earnings inequality among all workers has apparently 
seen little or no change over the last 10 years.
Figure B.3: Selected Inequality Measures 1990-2013, Relative to 2000 (All Workers)
—  P99 to P1 P95 to P5 P90 to P10 P80 to P20 Variance
Notes: Subplot (a) presents measures of earnings inequality for all workers in all states relative to 2000 from 
1990-2013. Subplot (b) presents measures of earnings inequality for eligible workers in all states relative to 2000 
from 1990-2013. The measures of earnings inequality considered are (i) P99 to P 1 : the ratio of the 99th to the 1st 
percentile; (ii) P95 to P 5 : the ratio of the 95th to the 5th percentile; (iii) P90 to P10 : the ratio of the 90th to the 
10th percentile; (iv) P80 to P20 the ratio of the 80th to the 20th percentile; and (v) Variance: the variance of log 
annual earnings.
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Table B.2: Inequality Measures Relative to 2000 by Worker Frame
99th/1st
In eq u a lity  M ea su res
95th/5th 90th/10th 80th/20th Variance
All Workers
P re-2 0 0 0 1.038 1.099 1.092 1.075 1.036
P ost-2 0 0 0 1.050 1.010 1.004 0.983 1.004
Pre-GR 1.001 1.003 1.005 0.992 1.001
GR 1.059 1.009 1.005 0.978 1.006
Post-G R 1.131 1.022 1.002 0.968 1.007
Eligible Workers
P re-2 0 0 0 1.085 1.119 1.103 1.080 1.047
P ost-2 0 0 0 1.154 1.136 1.114 1.064 1.054
Pre-GR 1.063 1.075 1.067 1.039 1.031
GR 1.209 1.181 1.151 1.084 1.073
Post-G R 1.286 1.222 1.178 1.099 1.086
N otes: The first panel presents measures of earnings inequality for all workers in all states relative to 2000, while 
the second panel presents the same measures for eligible workers. The measures of earnings inequality considered 
are (i) 99th/1st: the ratio of the 99th to the 1st percentile; (ii) 95th/5th: the ratio of the 95th to the 5th percentile; 
(iii) 90th/10th: the ratio of the 90th to the 10th percentile; (iv) 80th/20th the ratio of the 80th to the 20th 
percentile; and (v) Variance: the variance of log annual earnings. The values in the table are averages before and 
after 2000: (i) pre-2000: 1995-1999; and (ii) post-2000: 2001-2013. The post-2000 years are further subdivided into 
three periods: (i) pre-GR: 2001-2007; (ii) GR: 2008-2009; and (iii) post-GR 2010-2013.
Figure B.4: Selected Inequality Measures for the Top and Bottom of the Earnings Distribution 
1990-2013, Relative to 2000 (All Workers)
(a) All Workers - Top (b) All Workers - Bottom
N otes: Subplots (a) and (b) decompose the 99/1 ratio, the 95/5 ratio, the 90/10 ratio, and the 80/20 for eligible 
workers in all states relative to 2000 from 1990-2013 relative to the median. Subplot (a) plots the following ratios for 
the top half of the earnings distribution: (i) P99 to P50 : the ratio of the 99th to the 50th percentile; (ii) P95 to P50 : 
the ratio of the 95th to the 50th percentile; (iii) P90 to P50 : the ratio of the 90th to the 50th percentile; and 
(iv) P80 to P50 the ratio of the 80th to the 50th percentile. Subplot (b) plots the following ratios for the bottom half 
of the earnings distribution: (i) P50 to P 1 : the ratio of the 50th to the 1st percentile; (ii) P50 to P 5 : the ratio of the 
50th to the 5th percentile; (iii) P50 to P10 : the ratio of the 50th to the 10th percentile; and (iv) P50 to P20 the ratio 
of the 50th to the 20th percentile. The estimates are based on the all-workers frame from the LEHD infrastructure 
files.
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Figure B.5: Percentile Ratios of the Earnings Distribution by Worker Frame
—  All Workers Eligible Workers
(a) Ratio of 99th to 1st (b) Ratio of 95th to 5th
(c) Ratio of 99th to 50th (d) Ratio of 95th to 50th
(e) Ratio of 50th to 1st (f) Ratio of 50th to 5th
Notes: This figure plots ratios of top and bottom percentiles for all workers (solid lines) and for eligible workers 
(dotted lines). Subplot (a) plots the ratio of the 99th to the 1st percentile by worker frame. This ratio is decomposed 
into the ratio of the 99th to the 50th percentile in subplot (c) and the ratio of the 50th to the 1st percentile in subplot 
(e). Subplot (b) plots the ratio of the 95th to the 15th percentile by worker frame. This ratio is decomposed into the 
ratio of the 95th to the 50th percentile in subplot (d) and the ratio of the 50th to the 5th percentile in subplot (f).
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Figure B.6: Percentile Ratios of the Earnings Distribution by Worker Frame
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—  All Workers Eligible Workers
(a) Ratio of 90th to 10th (b) Ratio of 80th to 20th
3.25
3.15
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2.95
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All Workers Eligible Workers All Workers Eligible Workers
(c) Ratio of 90th to 50th (d) Ratio of 80th to 50th
All Workers Eligible Workers All Workers Eligible Workers
(e) Ratio of 50th to 10th (f) Ratio of 50th to 20th
Notes: This figure plots ratios of top and bottom percentiles for all workers (solid lines) and for eligible workers 
(dotted lines). Subplot (a) plots the ratio o f the 90th to the 10th percentile by worker frame. This ratio is decomposed 
into the ratio of the 90th to the 50th percentile in subplot (c) and the ratio of the 50th to the 10th percentile in 
subplot (e). Subplot (b) plots the ratio of the 80th to the 20th percentile by worker frame. This ratio is decomposed 
into the ratio of the 80th to the 50th percentile in subplot (d) and the ratio o f the 50th to the 20th percentile in 
subplot (f).
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C Comparison with Household Surveys
In Section 3, we discussed the trends in earnings inequality based on our analysis of the eligible- 
workers frame, which we constructed using the LEHD infrastructure data and supplementary infor­
mation from the Census Bureau’s enhanced version of SSA’s Numident file. Section 3.1 discussed 
the highlights of the comparison of our data to the Current Population Survey and the American 
Community Survey. To put our inequality measures in the context of a broader literature, we com­
pare results based on the administrative data frame discussed in main text with similar measures 
constructed using household survey data.55
C.1 Household Survey Data
To create our household survey analysis file, we use the following records from the Current Pop­
ulation Survey-Annual Social and Economic Supplement (March) and the American Community 
Survey:
• Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement (CPS-ASEC): all per­
sons from survey years 1990-2004
• American Community Survey (ACS): all persons from survey years 2000 to 2013
In the CPS-ASEC, the respondent is surveyed in March and reports earnings for the previous 
calendar year. We date the earnings accordingly. However, in the ACS the respondent reports 
earnings for the past 12 months and the survey is in the field continuously throughout the year. 
Our approach in this case is to date the earnings with the calendar year containing the majority 
of the months covered by the response, with ties going to the more recent year. As in the LEHD 
data, nominal earnings are deflated to real 2000 dollars using the CPI-U. In all cases, we used the 
internal (confidential) versions of the CPS-ASEC and ACS. None of the household survey data are 
topcoded. We did not replace the Census Bureau’s edit and imputation routines with our own. We 
used the allocated values in the files.
Similar to the workers in LEHD, we consider two samples of individuals from the household 
surveys. The first includes all individuals. The second isolates workers whose employment should be 
covered under Unemployment Insurance (including federal employees) and who should, therefore, 
appear in the LEHD administrative data. We designate a survey respondent as a “covered worker” 
if he or she meets the following conditions:
• Person interviewed is not living in group quarters
• Individual is employed at a private firm, the local/state/federal government, or is self­
employed in an incorporated firm
• Labor earnings are positive
• Individual is between 18 and 70 years old, inclusive.
The last two restrictions combined are included to match the earnings and age restrictions used to 
identify active eligible workers in the LEHD data.
Finally, in most of the results to follow, we do not report results separately for CPS-ASEC and 
ACS individuals. Instead, in the overlapping years (2000-2003), we interpolate estimates computed 
from the CPS-ASEC and the ACS to create a single time series using the method in Abowd and 
Vilhuber (2011) .
55 See Spletzer (2014) for a very similar comparison.
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C.2 Comparison of Aggregate Summaries
We start by analyzing how the earnings distribution in household surveys compares to the one 
computed from administrative records. In the household survey data, the estimated percentile 
values tend to be greater for covered workers than for all workers. Figure C.1 presents the percentiles 
of the earnings distribution for all and covered workers in the CPS/ACS. Comparing these values to 
the ones estimated from the LEHD data, shown in Figure B.1, notice that for percentiles above the 
median, the values from the eligible-workers frame are fairly close to the ones from the household 
surveys. Below the median, however, the differences are greater, with the percentiles estimated 
from the household surveys being much greater than the percentiles estimated from LEHD. For 
example, notice that earnings associated with the 10th percentile in the CPS/ACS data are close 
to the 20th percentile in LEHD.
Figure C.1: Percentiles of the Earnings Distribution for All and Covered Workers by Year
CW P95 
ALL P95 
CW P90 
ALL P90 
CW P80 
ALL P80 
CW P50 
ALL P50 
CW P20 
ALL P20 
CW P10 
ALL P10
Notes: This figure plots the 10th, 20th, 50th, 80th, 90th, and 95th percentiles of the earnings distribution for all 
workers (ALL) and for covered workers (CW) in the CPS-ASEC (1990-2003) and the ACS (2000-2013) surveys by 
year. Covered workers include respondents whose employment relation should be covered as a statutory employee 
under state UI or as a federal employee, and therefore appear in the LEHD data.
To see these differences in percentiles more clearly, Figure C.2 plots the ratio of the percentiles 
of the earnings distribution measured using the LEHD eligible-workers frame to the same percentiles 
measured from the covered workers in the combined CPS/ACS data. First, notice that all the ratios 
in Figure C.2 are below one, meaning that the percentiles estimated from the household surveys are 
always greater than the corresponding percentiles estimated from the administrative data. However, 
the magnitude of this difference varies greatly across the percentiles of the earnings distribution. 
Specifically, notice that the relative differences in the 95th, 90th, and 80th percentiles are very small 
compared to the relative differences in the 5th, 10th, and 20th percentiles.
In the main text, Table 4 presents averages of the percentiles from 1995 to 2013 for CPS/ACS 
and LEHD. Notice that on average the earnings associated with the 80th, 90th, and 95th percentiles 
are about $3,500 less in the LEHD data than in CPS/ACS data. Further, as can be seen in
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Figure C.2, this gap is decreasing over time, such that in 2013 the difference in the 95th percentile 
is only $264. In the bottom half of the earnings distribution, however, a CPS/ACS covered worker 
earns about $4,000 more than an LEHD worker at the same point in the earnings distribution. While 
this absolute difference may not seem that large, relatively, a CPS/ACS worker at the 10th percentile 
is making 2.54 times more than his LEHD counterpart, and 3.40 times more for a CPS/ACS worker 
in the 5th percentile. This means that the survey data include more low-earning jobs that are not 
statutory employment relationships, or are not reported as such to state UI systems. Lastly, notice 
that the percentiles in LEHD increase faster than their CPS/ACS counterparts since all the ratios 
exhibit an upward trend, especially after the Great Recession.
Figure C.2: Ratio of UI Earnings to Household Survey Reported Earnings by Percentile
0 .6 0 0 0
0 .4 0 0 0
0 .2 0 0 0
P95: UI to HHLD Survey 
P90: UI to HHLD Survey 
P80: UI to HHLD Survey 
P50: UI to HHLD Survey 
P20: UI to HHLD Survey 
P10: UI to HHLD Survey 
P5: UI to HHLD Survey
0 .0 0 0 0
N otes: This figure presents the ratio of earnings for eligible workers in LEHD to the earnings reported by covered 
workers in CPS/ACS for the 5th, 10th, 20th, 50th, 80th, 90th, and 95th percentile.
To see whether differences in the earnings distribution between workers in CPS/ACS and 
eligible workers in the LEHD data translate into differences in trends in inequality, we compute 
various measures of earnings inequality in CPS/ACS and compare them to their LEHD counter­
parts. In particular, we compute the 95/5, 90/10, and 80/20 ratios, and the variance of log annual 
earnings. We plot their time series in Figures 5a and 5b for all workers and covered workers, respec­
tively. Both the all-workers and the covered-workers samples show a decline in earnings inequality 
during the late 1990s that reverses after 2000. However, in the all-workers sample, the magnitude 
of this increase in inequality in the post-2000 period strongly depends on the measure considered. 
For example, from 2000 to 2013, the 95/5 ratio increased by 66% from 36.30 to 60.26, while the 
90/10 ratio increased by 42% from 12.95 to 18.35. On the other hand, the 80/20 ratio increased 
by 26% from 4.64 to 5.86, while the variance of log earnings increased by only 5% from 1.23 to 
1.26. Thus, while the measures are all trending upwards after 2000 in the all-workers sample, it 
is unclear whether this increase has been large or small. In the covered-workers sample, earning 
inequality has also been increasing after 2000, however the magnitude of this increase is relatively 
consistent across the different measures of earnings inequality. The 95/5 ratio increased by 32% 
from 2000 to 2013, while the 90/10 ratio increased by 26%. The 80/20 ratio and the variance in log 
earnings increased less over this period, by about 13% and 14%, respectively. On the other hand, 
notice that the decline in inequality in the 1990s is very similar across the various measures and 
samples.
These trends in earnings inequality are very similar to the ones observed among eligible
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workers in the LEHD data. Specifically, comparing the time series of earnings inequality for covered 
workers in CPS/ACS (Figure 5b) to the one for eligible workers in LEHD (Figure 3) , notice that 
the general patterns are very similar. Both of these figures show a decline in inequality during the 
1990s and a steady increase in inequality after 2000. The magnitude of this increase is also similar 
between the covered workers in CPS/ACS and the eligible workers in the LEHD data. Compare the 
second panel of Table C.1 to the second panel of Table B.2. The second row in both tables shows 
the average of the 95/5 ratio, the 90/10, ratio, the 80/20 ratio, and the variance of log earnings 
(relative to 2000) after 2000. Both the covered workers in CPS/ACS and the eligible workers in 
LEHD saw an increase in the 95/5 ratio and the 90/10 ratio above 10%, and an increase in the 
80/20 ratio and the variance of log earnings around 5-6%. Furthermore, most of this increase 
occurred during or after the Great Recession.
Table C.1: Inequality Measures Relative to 2000 for Workers in Household Surveys
95th/5th
Inequality Measures
90th/10th 80th/20th Variance
AH Workers
Pre-2000 1.126 1.118 1.041 1.099
Post-2000 1.406 1.273 1.174 1.001
Pre-GR 1.280 1.171 1.099 0.976
GR 1.429 1.331 1.231 0.998
Post-GR 1.616 1.422 1.278 1.047
Covered Workers
Pre-2000 1.156 1.122 1.035 1.082
Post-2000 1.168 1.129 1.056 1.064
Pre-GR 1.106 1.071 1.016 1.040
GR 1.135 1.147 1.060 1.044
Post-GR 1.293 1.221 1.125 1.117
Notes: The first panel presents measures of earnings inequality for all workers in CPS/ACS, while the second 
panel presents the same measures for covered workers. The measures of earnings inequality considered are (i)
95th/5th: the ratio of the 95th to the 5th percentile; (ii) 90th/10th: the ratio of the 90th to the 10th percentile; (iii) 
80th/20th the ratio of the 80th to the 20th percentile; and (iv) Variance: the variance of log annual earnings. The 
values in the table are averages before and after 2000: (i) pre-2000: 1995-1999; and (ii) post-2000: 2001-2013. The 
post-2000 years are further subdivided into three periods: (i) pre-GR: 2001-2007; (ii) GR: 2008-2009; and (iii) 
post-GR 2010-2013. All measures are 1.00 in 2000.
To see whether it is changes in the top or bottom half of the earnings distribution that are 
driving these trends, we decompose these ratios around the median, as we did using the two worker 
frames from LEHD. Notice that since 2000 the ratio of the top percentiles to the median has 
been gradually increasing for both the all-workers sample and the covered-workers sample (Fig­
ures C.3a and C.3c) . The bottom of the earnings distribution, however, has evolved differently 
across these two samples. In the all-workers sample, there has been a substantial rise in inequality 
(Figure C.3b) . Among the covered workers, the rise has been much more mild (Figures C.3d). In 
fact, the trends in earnings inequality among the covered workers is very similar to those observed 
among the eligible workers in LEHD both in terms of the correlation of the times series and the 
magnitude of the changes. However, one notable difference is the change in earnings inequality 
around the Great Recession. In LEHD, inequality increased dramatically during the Great Re­
cession. In CPS/ACS, inequality actually drops substantially just prior to the onset of the Great 
Recession. However, these gains are lost during the recession years as inequality quickly increases 
back to trend. Thus, while both the household surveys and the administrative data highlight the
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sensitivity of the bottom of the earnings distribution to the Great Recession, the precise cyclical 
patterns are not consistent across these two data sources.
Figure C.3: Selected Inequality Measures 1990-2013 for the Top and Bottom of the Earnings 
Distribution, Relative to 2000 (CPS/ACS)
(a) All Workers - Top (b) All Workers - Bottom
(c) Covered Workers - Top (d) Covered Workers - Bottom
N otes: Subplots (a) and (b) decompose the 99/1 ratio, the 95/5 ratio, the 90/10 ratio, and the 80/20 for all workers 
in CPS/ACS relative to 2000 from 1990-2013 relative to the median. Subplot (a) plots the following ratios for the 
top half o f the earnings distribution: (i) P95 to P50 : the ratio of the 95th to the 50th percentile; (ii) P90 to P50 : 
the ratio of the 90th to the 50th percentile; and (iii) P80 to P50 the ratio of the 80th to the 50th percentile. Subplot 
(b) plots the following ratios for the bottom half of the earnings distribution: (i) P50 to P 5 : the ratio of the 50th to 
the 5th percentile; (ii) P50 to P10 : the ratio of the 50th to the 10th percentile; and (iii) P50 to P20 the ratio of the 
50th to the 20th percentile. Subplots (c) and (d) present the same decomposition for covered workers in CPS/ACS 
relative to 2000 from 1990-2013.
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Figure C.4: Comparison of Percentiles in the ACS and LEHD
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N otes : This figure plots the 10th, 20th, 80th, and 90th percentiles of the earnings distributions from four samples 
of the ACS: (i) individuals with positive UI earnings, but no reported ACS earnings (dotted red line); (ii) 
individuals with positive reported ACS earnings, but no UI earnings (solid red line with diamonds); (iii) individuals 
with positive reported ACS earnings and positive UI earnings using ACS earnings to compute the earnings 
distribution (solid green line); and (iv) individuals with positive reported ACS earnings and positive UI earnings 
using UI earnings to compute the earnings distribution (dotted green line with circles). Subplots (a), (c), (e), and 
(g) are the percentiles for all workers in ACS. Subplots (b), (d), (f), and (h) are the percentiles for the covered 
workers in ACS. These are compared to the same percentiles from the eligible workers frame in LEHD (dotted blue 
line with squares).
C.3 Detailed Analysis of Linked Records
To understand where the discrepancies between the administrative and household survey earnings 
distributions occur, we analyze the individual ACS records from 2005-2013-linking them to LEHD 
UI records from the eligible-workers frame using a crosswalk between the two person identifiers
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developed and maintained by the Census Bureau. This allows us to see how earnings differ among 
workers who do and do not match to the LEHD individual data. We focus on records from 2005 
forward because, for these years, both the ACS and LEHD are fully national.
For an individual in the ACS, there are three types of matches to the eligible-workers frame 
in the LEHD data: (i) reported earnings are positive in ACS, but UI earnings are zero; (ii) no 
reported earnings in ACS, but UI earnings are positive; (iii) both ACS reported earnings and UI 
earnings are positive. We present these match results in Table C.2. The left panel presents the 
statistics for all individuals in ACS and the right panel presents the same statistics for covered 
workers in ACS. When we include all individuals in ACS, about 96% report positive earnings when 
surveyed in ACS. However, 21% have no UI earnings. A very small fraction of the individuals in 
ACS, the remaining 4%, have positive UI earnings but did not report any earnings when surveyed. 
When we consider only covered ACS workers, all these individuals should report positive earnings 
in ACS. Of these covered workers, 85% also have positive UI earnings and 15% do not match to 
any UI records.
Table C.2: ACS/UI Match Comparison
A ll In d iv id u a ls
ACS UI Percent
earn >  0 earn >  0 75%
earn =  0 earn >  0 4%
earn >  0 earn =  0 21%
C o v e re d  W ork ers
ACS UI Percent
earn >  0 earn >  0 85%
earn =  0 earn >  0 0%
earn >  0 earn =  0 15%
N otes : The first row reports the fraction of individuals in ACS that report positive earnings when surveyed and 
match to the eligible-workers frame in the LEHD data, and therefore have positive UI earnings. The second row 
reports the fraction of individuals in ACS that do not report earnings when surveyed, but match to the LEHD data, 
and, therefore, have positive UI earnings. The third row reports the fraction of individuals in ACS who do not 
match to LEHD data. The left-side panel presents the statistics for all individuals in ACS and the right-side panel 
presents the same statistics for covered workers in ACS.
Using these matched records, we compare the earnings distribution of four samples of ACS 
individuals in Figure C.5:
• Individuals with positive UI earnings, but no reported ACS earnings (dotted red line)
• Individuals with positive reported ACS earnings, but no UI earnings (solid red line with 
diamonds)
• Individuals with positive reported ACS earnings and positive UI earnings using ACS earnings 
to compute the earnings distribution (solid green line)
• Individuals with positive reported ACS earnings and positive UI earnings using UI earnings 
to compute the earnings distribution (dotted green line with circles).
We compute these distributions for both all workers and covered workers in the ACS. Note that 
for covered workers, having only UI earnings is vanishingly rare since all covered workers should 
report positive earnings in the ACS. The earnings distributions from these samples are compared 
to the one constructed from the eligible-workers frame in LEHD (dotted blue line with squares). 
Figure C.5 plots the 5th, 50th, and 95th percentiles of these various earnings distributions.56
For workers whose earnings are both reported in the ACS and found in LEHD (matched 
workers), the percentiles computed using the ACS earnings are nearly identical to those computed 
using UI earnings. Specifically, notice that in Figure C.5 the solid green line and the dotted
56For similar comparisons of the 10th, 20th, 80th, and 90th percentiles, see Figure C.4.
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green line with circles are very close to each other in all subplots, and especially at and above the 
median. The differences in the CPS/ACS percentiles and the LEHD percentiles in Figure C.2 are, 
therefore, very unlikely to be due to misreporting in household surveys. Instead, they must be due 
to differences in the workers who are surveyed and report earnings in the ACS and those who are 
found in LEHD. Workers who report positive ACS earnings, but do not match to LEHD (ACS- 
only) tend to have lower earnings than the workers who do match (solid red lines with diamonds in 
Figure C.5) . However, this gap is less pronounced for workers at the top of the earnings distribution 
for both the all-workers and covered-workers samples in ACS.
While the ACS-only workers do not earn as much as the matched workers, they do earn 
significantly more than a large portion of workers in LEHD. This means that the LEHD eligible- 
workers frame captures more workers in the bottom half of the earnings distribution than the ACS. 
To see this, notice in Figure C.5b, the 95th percentiles of both the matched and ACS-only samples 
are nearly identical to the 95th percentile of the eligible-workers earnings distribution in LEHD. 
However, for the median and lower percentiles, the differences are not trivial. The median matched 
worker tends to make about 21.5% more than the median eligible-worker in LEHD (^$4,770), while 
the median ACS-only worker makes about 6.4% less (^$1,417). At the bottom, the differences in 
the 5th percentiles are most stark. A matched worker at the 5th percentile tends to make about 3.22 
times as much as an eligible worker at the 5th percentile in LEHD (^$2,649). Even an ACS-only 
worker at the 5th percentile makes about 2.44 times as much as a corresponding eligible worker 
(^$1,459). Thus, the left tail of the earnings distribution in ACS is much shorter than the one 
for eligible workers in the LEHD data, resulting in the LEHD percentiles being less than those 
computed from household surveys.
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Figure C.5: Comparison of Percentiles in the ACS and LEHD
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N otes: This figure plots the 5th, 50th, and 95th percentiles of the earnings distributions from four samples of the 
ACS: (i) individuals with positive UI earnings, but no reported ACS earnings (dotted red line); (ii) individuals with 
positive reported ACS earnings, but no UI earnings (solid red line with diamonds); (iii) individuals with positive 
reported ACS earnings and positive UI earnings using ACS earnings to compute the earnings distribution (solid 
green line); and (iv) individuals with positive reported ACS earnings and positive UI earnings using UI earnings to 
compute the earnings distribution (dotted green line with circles). Subplots (a), (c), and (e) are the percentiles for 
all workers in ACS. Subplots (b), (d), and (f) are the percentiles for the covered workers in ACS. These are 
compared to the same percentiles from the eligible-workers frame in the LEHD data (dotted blue line with squares).
0
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D Inactive Workers and Inequality
In Section 2.2 we tracked both active and inactive workers in our eligible-workers frame. In Sec­
tion 3.2 we briefly discussed how the treatment of inactivity affects measures of earnings inequality. 
This Appendix presents details supporting those analyses and conclusions.
In Appendix B, we excluded inactive workers from the analysis so that we could focus on 
trends in the ratios of top and bottom percentiles over time. While some inactive workers, given 
the wages and employment terms on offer, choose to be nonparticipants, others are involuntarily 
excluded from the labor market. In this section, we present an analysis of how including inactive 
workers, especially those who were recently employed, affects earnings inequality measures. We 
begin by analyzing how inactivity has changed in recent years considering comparisons with the 
employment to population ratio from the CPS/ACS data. Next, we turn our attention to the 
eligible workers in the LEHD data.
D.1 The Employment-to-Population Ratio
If the U.S. labor market tends to stay relatively close to full employment except for brief periods 
after the start of a recession, the resultant implied rapid employment growth during a recovery 
should generate a quick increase in the employment-to-population ratio and a quick decline in the 
unemployment rate to pre-recession levels. However, our results using annual CPS/ACS survey 
data show a different pattern around the Great Recession.
Figure D.1 shows the estimated employment-to-population ratio by year from 1990-2013 for 
all workers (solid blue line) and covered workers (dashed red line) in the CPS/ACS. The NBER 
identifies three recessions during this period, beginning in the following years: 1990, 2001, and 2008 
(December, 2007). Both CPS/ACS series show a dip in 1993 and then a sustained increase until 
1999, when the covered-worker sample employment-population ratio begins to decline while the 
all-workers sample remains relatively flat. Until 1999, the trends for both series are similar, but 
then the two series diverge, with a decline in the covered workers as a proportion of all workers- 
suggesting a movement of workers into self-employment. At the beginning of the Great Recession, 
all three series show a large sustained drop in the employment to population ratio, bottoming out 
in 2009/2010, with only a mild recovery during the ensuing years. These results suggest that unlike 
previous recessions, substantial numbers of persons employed prior to the Great Recession did not 
return to employment even five or more years after the start of the Great Recession. While previous 
research focused only on employed persons, the large and persistent decrease in the employment-to- 
population ratio for all workers and for covered workers only, during and after the Great Recession, 
argues strongly for an expansion of inequality measures to include at least some inactive but eligible 
workers.
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Figure D.1: Employment to Population Ratio (Household Surveys)
N otes : This figure plots the estimated employment-to-population ratio by year from 1990-2013 for all workers 
(solid blue line) and covered workers (dashed red line) in CPS/ACS. Estimates based on the authors’ calculations 
from the microdata. These are not the official statistics as released by the BLS from the CPS.
D.2 Inactivity-Adjusted Inequality Measures
We estimate three traditional measures of inequality (Gini, Hoover, and Theil), both with and 
without a category for inactive workers. Deciles of the earnings distribution, estimated as discussed 
in section 2.4, were used to compute each statistic, with an additional category added for eligible 
workers with no reported earnings (the inactive category). The earnings value for each person in 
the inactive category was set to $1, a modification necessary to facilitate the consistent calculation 
of all measures (particularly the Theil index, which uses logarithms).57 We create three samples, 
each with a different set of eligible but inactive workers:
1. All eligible workers each year: This sample assumes all eligible workers are at risk to be 
employed. Note that this sample is complete and has no dependence on previous years, but 
the majority of the inactive eligible workers are probably not in the labor force.
2. Active workers and eligible workers most at risk to be employed: This sample includes all 
active workers and workers not active in the current year, but who were active in at least one 
of the past 4 years. For years prior to 2008 we do not have complete data for every state. In 
particular, workers with jobs in MA, DC, AR, NH, and MS will be slightly under-represented 
(see Table A.1). Some of these workers will have earnings in the previous fours year that we do 
not observe. An upper bound of the impact of this exclusion might be 5% of the jobs in 2004, 
but the actual impact is likely much less since the largest state, MA, entered in 2002Q1, and 
is therefore missing only two years of history in 2004Q1. In addition, employment in every 
state is at risk at some point during 2003, the year a worker not employed in 2004 is most 
likely to have previously been employed.
3. Only active workers: This sample includes only active workers, so no modifications are made 
to the standard formulas.
57The results for the Gini and Hoover measures using $0 show very small differences in levels and identical trends 
compared with setting the earnings value to $1.
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Table D.1 shows the results. The first panel is for all eligible workers, while the second panel 
shows results for workers most at risk to be eligible workers. The last panel includes only active 
eligible workers.
All three of the inequality measures increase substantially as the proportion of eligible workers 
included in the calculation increases. Not surprisingly, including a large block of workers with only 
$1 of annual earnings greatly increases measured inequality. Comparing our results with another 
administrative data source, estimates of inequality using SSA data, we find that ours are somewhat 
larger, although the exact source of the difference is unclear due to coverage differences imposed on 
the SSA estimation sample. For example, in 2004 the estimated Gini coefficient using a restricted 
sample of currently eligible SSA recipients is 0.471, while in our data the estimated Gini is 0.510 
(Kopczuk et al., 2010).
Table D.1: Inequality Measures with and without Inactive Workers
Year Persons Gini Hoover Theil
All Eligible Workers
2004 219,763,469 0.696 0.538 2.379
2005 222,160,089 0.697 0.538 2.379
2006 224,721,578 0.698 0.539 2.377
2007 227,553,012 0.699 0.540 2.386
2008 230,355,015 0.702 0.544 2.416
2009 232,813,313 0.714 0.558 2.535
2010 234,304,705 0.720 0.564 2.576
2011 235,429,997 0.720 0.563 2.563
2012 236,484,312 0.719 0.560 2.547
2013 237,816,938 0.716 0.558 2.532
Eligible Workers with Earnings in the Current or at
Least One of the Past 4 Years
2004 164,243,214 0.593 0.437 1.352
2005 165,892,505 0.594 0.438 1.346
2006 167,417,542 0.594 0.438 1.331
2007 168,988,105 0.595 0.439 1.327
2008 170,229,709 0.597 0.441 1.351
2009 170,241,870 0.609 0.452 1.472
2010 170,617,692 0.616 0.458 1.509
2011 171,015,983 0.615 0.457 1.480
2012 170,986,772 0.611 0.454 1.437
2013 170,735,917 0.604 0.448 1.387
Eligible Workers with Earnings in the Current Year
2004 136,562,515 0.510 0.369 0.529
2005 138,340,770 0.513 0.372 0.535
2006 140,363,860 0.516 0.375 0.541
2007 142,034,418 0.519 0.378 0.546
2008 142,109,590 0.517 0.377 0.543
2009 137,948,364 0.517 0.378 0.546
2010 137,345,658 0.522 0.382 0.557
2011 138,810,297 0.525 0.385 0.562
2012 140,415,325 0.527 0.386 0.563
2013 141,665,611 0.523 0.384 0.555
N otes : This table presents traditional measures of inequality (Gini, Hoover, and Theil) for three samples of 
persons: (i) all eligible workers (top panel), (ii) most at-risk eligible workers (middle panel), and (iii) only active 
workers (bottom panel).
Figure D.2 shows the share of eligible workers who are inactive (solid blue line) and the share 
who are most at risk to be active (dashed red line) relative to the base year 2004. The solid blue
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line represents the share of eligible workers not currently working each year-the difference between 
the number of workers in the first panel of Table D.1 and the number of workers in the third panel. 
The dashed red line represents the share of workers most at risk to be active not currently working 
each year-the difference between the number of workers in the second panel of Table D.1 and the 
number of workers in the third panel. The dashed red line is noticeably more responsive to changes 
in labor demand, suggesting that we chose a reasonable group to represent the workers most at 
risk to be active. However, a closer look at the source of the decline in the most at risk group (red 
line) from 2011 forward shows that the decline is due both to the growth in employment during 
the recovery and a lack of growth in the number of workers most at risk to be active. Many of 
the at risk workers who had positive earnings just prior to or at the start of the Great Recession 
have not had positive earnings in the subsequent four years. By 2011, they are dropping out of the 
at risk group. It is difficult to know the labor force status of these workers due to limitations of 
administrative data, it does highlight the benefit of having multiple measures of inactive status for 
the eligible-workers population.
Figure D.2: Inequality Measures
N otes : This figure shows the share of eligible workers who are inactive (solid blue line) and the share who are “at 
risk” (dashed red line) relative to the base year 2004. In a given year, a person is inactive if that person did not 
make positive earnings that year. In a given year, a person is “at risk” if that person did not make positive earnings 
that year, but did make positive earnings sometime in the last four years.
In Section 3 we documented the increase in inequality post-2000 using ratios of various 
percentiles of the earnings distribution. For the eligible-workers frame, the increase in earnings of 
the top 20% relative to the bottom 20% of earners accelerates during the Great Recession, with 
annual earnings increases for workers at the 80th percentile and small declines or no increases for 
at the 20th percentile. The increases for the 99/1 ratio, the 95/5 ratio, and the 90/10 ratio are 
even larger, with the ratios increasing faster the more extreme the comparison (Figure 3) . Here 
we have taken an alternative approach. Instead of comparing two specific points in the earnings 
distribution, the portmanteau inequality measures presented here weight the changes occurring 
across the earnings distribution and combine them to produce a single measure of overall inequality. 
Each measure uses different weights and combining rules, therefore it is useful to compare each 
approach.
The relative changes in the Gini coefficients for each of the three samples are presented in 
Figure D.3. The results for the first two samples are almost identical. The Gini coefficients for
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the third sample, only active workers, grow faster before the Great Recession, but do not show 
the increase in inequality at the start of the Great Recession present for the eligible-workers and 
at-risk-workers samples. Part of the reason for this difference is that the Gini coefficient is very 
sensitive to changes in earnings at the top of the distribution. At the beginning of the recession, 
earnings at the top of the distribution declined or stagnated. In spite of the large number of workers 
moving from active to inactive status at the beginning of the Great Recession, the Gini coefficient 
for the active-only sample shows inequality declining, although it does start to climb as earnings 
growth at the top of the distribution resumes in 2009. In contrast, the Gini coefficients for the 
all-eligible, and most at-risk samples show increasing inequality at the start of the Great Recession, 
similar to the 80/20 ratio (also shown in the figure).
Figure D.3: Inequality Measures -  Gini Coefficient
—  S1: All Eligible Workers —  S2: At Risk —  S3: Active Only —  P80 to P20
N otes: This figure plots the Gini coefficient for three samples of eligible workers: (i) All Eligible Workers: includes 
active and all inactive workers, (ii) At Risk: includes active workers and inactive workers who made positive 
earnings sometime in the last four years, and (iii) Active Only: includes only active workers. The ratio of the 80th 
to the 20th percentile is also plotted for reference.
The results for the Hoover index, shown in Figure D.4, are similar to the Gini coefficient, 
although the relative increase in inequality during the Great Recession is larger when measured 
using the Hoover index. The increase before the Great Recession is also larger when using only 
active workers.
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Figure D.4: Inequality Measures -  Hoover Index
N otes: This figure plots the Hoover index for three samples of eligible workers: (i) All Eligible Workers: includes 
active and all inactive workers, (ii) At Risk: includes active workers and inactive workers who made positive 
earnings sometime in the last four years, and (iii) Active Only: includes only active workers. The ratio of the 80th 
to the 20th percentile is also plotted for reference.
The final measure we consider is the symmetric Theil index. The results using this measure 
are shown in Figure D.5. Over the entire period, the Theil measure is more responsive to earn­
ings distribution changes than either the Gini coefficient or the Hoover index, but it is especially 
responsive to the addition of inactive workers. The relative change in the Theil index computed 
using all eligible workers (sample one) is almost identical to the 80/20 ratio through 2009, with 
greater inequality after that 2009 reflecting the slow decline in inactive workers during the recovery. 
The relative change in the Theil index computed using only the most at-risk workers (sample two) 
could arguably be viewed as an exaggerated version of the 80/20 ratio. The inclusion of inactive 
at-risk workers in sample two introduces additional information into the Theil index calculation, 
magnifying the decline in inequality prior to the Great Recession, the increase during the Great 
Recession, and the decline during the recovery.
D-6
Figure D.5: Inequality Measures -  Theil Index
N otes: This figure plots the Theil index for three samples of eligible workers: (i) All Eligible Workers: includes 
active and all inactive workers, (ii) At Risk: includes active workers and inactive workers who made positive 
earnings sometime in the last four years, and (iii) Active Only: includes only active workers. The ratio of the 80th 
to the 20th percentile is also plotted for reference.
Introducing information about inactive but at-risk workers into the calculation of the Gini 
coefficient and Hoover index changes the trend, but the inequality levels in 2013 are largely the same 
relative to 2004 using either measure. The Theil index changes in similar ways with the addition 
of inactive but at-risk workers; however, the Theil index is much more sensitive to both changes in 
the earnings distribution and the addition of inactive workers. The growth in the Theil index using 
only active workers is larger than either the Gini or Hoover index. Similar to the Gini and the 
Hoover indices, by not including inactive workers the Theil index fails to capture the increase in 
inequality at the start of the Great Recession. Adding inactive workers to the Theil index (sample 
one), results in a measure similar to the 80/20 ratio through 2009; after 2009 the two measures 
diverge due to the slow decline in the number inactive workers during the recovery from the Great 
Recession. The Theil index for the most at-risk workers (sample two) shows the largest changes in 
inequality.
Although it is unclear which of the adjusted inequality measures correctly weights the inactive 
workers, it is worthwhile to consider adjusted measures that count at least some of the zero-earning 
workers as part of any general analysis of changes in earnings inequality.
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E Decomposing Changes in the Earnings Distribution
In Section 4 we presented the evolution of the earnings/inactivity distribution in terms of the year 
to year flows of workers across different parts of the earnings distributions and into and out of 
active status.
E.1 Worker Flows
Starting in 2005, each year we calculate the change in the number of workers between the current 
and the previous year for the four earnings/inactivity categories. The year-to-year change in the 
number of workers in a specific category is driven by changes in the number of workers entering 
(inflows) and the number of workers leaving (outflows). Specifically, to compute the flows between 
two employment states, let A and B be arrays of counts for each category in years t — 1 and t, 
respectively:
year t — 1: A =  [ a0 al a2 a3 a4 ]
year t: B =  [ b0 bl b2 b3 b4 ]
In order to complete the decomposition and capture all possible transitions we must add an 
additional category, zero, representing workers not eligible to work in one of the two periods, but 
who are eligible to work in the other. Let Cab be the transition matrix of counts:
c00 c0l c02 c03 c04
C10 cii ci2 ci3 ci4
c20 c2i c22 c23 c24
C30 c3i c32 c33 c34
c40 c4l c42 c43 c44
The rows of the transition matrix represent the origin state (A) and the columns represent the 
destination state (B ). For example, c2l is the number of workers who were in the bottom 20% 
of the overall-earnings distribution in year t — 1 and transition to the eligible but no reported UI 
earnings category in year t .
To compute the total net inflows into an employment category, we first introduce some 
notation. Let i be a (5 x 1) column vector of ones. Then:
Ca  ^ =  Ca B ■ i =  outflows +  stayers 
C^b =  Ca B ■ i =  inflows +  stayers
Net inflows into each employment state AAB are defined as
a Ab =  B — A
= C.b — Ca^
=  CAb ' 1 — CAB? • i
inflows + stayers outflows + stayers
=  (CAb — Ca b ) ■ *
inflows — outflows = net inflows
(E-1)
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Note the position of the stayers on the main diagonal. When we take the difference between CAB 
and Cab , the resulting matrix will have zeros on the main diagonal, showing that the stayers do not 
directly affect the earnings distribution except through changes in average earnings. It should also 
be noted there is a direct relationship between the number of outflows and the number of stayers. 
If more workers leave a given category then there will be fewer stayers, ceteris paribus.
Table E.1 provides descriptive statistics on the individuals in each earnings category. It is 
expanded in the main text in Table 5, which shows the net change in workers between the previous 
year and the current year from 2005-2013.
The flows of workers affect the earnings distribution, but the average earnings of each category 
and the change in average earnings for stayers also affect the change in the earnings distribution. 
Here we show the complete decomposition of the change in the earnings distribution. Table E.2 
shows the earnings changes we decompose here. Unlike Table 5 in the main text, the decomposition 
for earnings does not include net inflows into the eligible-worker frame or net inflows to inactive 
status. As we show below, these flows have no associated earnings and therefore have a weight of 
zero.
The corresponding earnings transition matrix for a given transition matrix of counts Cab is:
0 0 e02 e03 e04
0 0 e12 e13 e14
e20 e2i e22 e23 e24
e30 e31 e32 e33 e34
e40 e41 e42 e43 e44
Unlike the transition matrix of counts, each element of the transition matrix of earnings has 
two associated total earnings values, the total earnings for the workers in period A and the total 
earnings for those same workers in period B. Each element of the earnings transition matrix is an 
ordered pair of elements. For example, e23 = {eA^e^} represents the earnings of workers moving 
from the bottom 20% to the middle 60% of the earnings distribution. The first element is the total 
earnings in the previous period (when each worker is in the bottom 20%) and the second element 
is the total earnings in the current period (when each worker is in the middle 60%. Elements with 
an ordered pair of two zeros are shown as zeros in the earnings transition matrix.
Applying the net inflow formulas for the counts to the earnings transition matrix,
^ ab = (EAb — e ab) ■ * (E-2)
net inflows
and choosing the appropriate earnings value from each tuple, using an A or B superscript to indicate 
the first or second element chosen, respectively, we have:
101 _ 0) (0 1 o (e20 -  e0A2) (eBo -  e023) (e
(0 - 0) (0 -  0) (eBi -  e12) (eBi -  e13) (e
AE _
a ab  _ (e02 —e20) (eB2 -  eAi) (e22 -  e22) (eB2
eA3) (e
(e0B3 - e30) (eB3 -  eAi ) (eB3 -  e32) (eB3 -  e33) (e
(e0B4 - e4A0) (eB4 -  eAi) (eB4 -  e422) (eB4 eA3) (e
B40 B41 B42 B43 B44
e04)
e14)
e24)
e34)
e44)
• i.
The sum of each row in the matrix is the net inflow for each category of the earnings/inactivity
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Table E.1: Descriptive Statistics by Earnings Categories
1: Eligible, 
No Earn
2: Bottom 
20%
3: Middle 
60%
4: Top 
20% Total
Year Number of Eligible Workers
2004 83,200,954 27,062,314 82,821,341 26,678,860 219,763,469
2005 83,819,319 27,376,301 84,079,363 26,885,106 222,160,089
2006 84,357,718 27,598,826 84,946,369 27,818,665 224,721,578
2007 85,518,594 27,800,774 85,576,064 28,657,580 227,553,012
2008 88,245,425 28,120,283 85,548,690 28,440,617 230,355,015
2009 94,864,949 28,119,169 81,894,162 27,935,033 232,813,313
2010 96,959,047 28,154,014 81,314,722 27,876,922 234,304,705
2011 96,619,700 28,498,111 82,538,961 27,773,225 235,429,997
2012 96,068,987 28,269,636 83,930,862 28,214,827 236,484,312
2013 96,151,327 28,119,381 84,707,469 28,838,761 237,816,938
Year Total Earnings (Millions of Real (2000) Dollars)
2004 — 76,178 1,959,201 2,351,882 4,387,260
2005 — 77,118 1,984,925 2,407,259 4,469,302
2006 — 77,653 2,006,111 2,529,269 4,613,033
2007 — 78,142 2,021,497 2,636,516 4,736,155
2008 — 78,716 2,012,397 2,576,185 4,667,298
2009 — 77,793 1,923,326 2,488,291 4,489,410
2010 — 77,788 1,901,588 2,524,307 4,503,683
2011 — 79,000 1,918,544 2,542,238 4,539,782
2012 — 78,880 1,947,808 2,625,836 4,652,524
2013 — 78,850 1,969,953 2,657,238 4,706,041
Year Average Earnings per Worker (eit > 0)
2004 — 2,815 23,656 88,155 32,126
2005 — 2,817 23,608 89,539 32,306
2006 — 2,814 23,616 90,920 32,865
2007 — 2,811 23,622 92,001 33,345
2008 — 2,799 23,523 90,581 32,843
2009 — 2,767 23,486 89,074 32,544
2010 — 2,763 23,386 90,552 32,791
2011 — 2,772 23,244 91,536 32,705
2012 — 2,790 23,207 93,066 33,134
2013 — 2,804 23,256 92,141 33,219
Variable Cumulative Change (2004-2013)
Number of 12,950,373 1,057,067 1,886,128 2,159,901 18,053,469
Workers 14.4% 3.8% 2.3% 7.8% 7.9%
Total — 2,671 10,752 305,357 318,780
Earnings — 3.4% 0.5% 12.2% 7.0%
Average — -11 -400 3,986 -175
Earnings — -0.4% -1.7% 4.4% -0.9%
N otes: The cumulative change in average earnings includes workers with eit =  0 (column 1) in the denominator. 
The overall change for the entire period for workers with eit >  0 is 3.3%.
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Table E.2: Earnings Associated with Exit from and Entry to Each Earnings Category
Year
Earn
t -  1
Earn
t
Net
Change Stayers Outflows Inflows
Inflows-
Outflows
Net
Change
Bottom 20% of the Overall UI Earnings Distribution
2005 76,178 77,118 939 1,625 41,849 41,164 -685 939
2006 77,118 77,653 535 1,752 42,340 41,123 -1,217 535
2007 77,653 78,142 489 1,553 42,415 41,351 -1,065 489
2008 78,142 78,716 575 337 41,662 41,900 237 575
2009 78,716 77,793 -923 -1,193 41,681 41,951 270 -923
2010 77,793 77,788 -5 1,401 42,571 41,165 -1,406 -5
2011 77,788 79,000 1,212 1,948 42,359 41,622 -736 1,212
2012 79,000 78,880 -120 2,680 43,350 40,550 -2,800 -120
2013 78,880 78,850 -30 2,637 42,914 40,246 -2,668 -30
Middle 60% of the Overall UI Earnings Distribution
2005 1,959,201 1,984,925 25,725 37,258 278,555 267,021 -11,534 25,725
2006 1,984,925 2,006,111 21,186 55,382 292,830 258,634 -34,196 21,186
2007 2,006,111 2,021,497 15,386 53,012 296,600 258,975 -37,626 15,386
2008 2,021,497 2,012,397 -9,101 15,411 288,018 263,506 -24,512 -9,101
2009 2,012,397 1,923,326 -89,071 4,842 331,453 237,541 -93,912 -89,071
2010 1,923,326 1,901,588 -21,738 23,095 289,271 244,438 -44,833 -21,738
2011 1,901,588 1,918,544 16,956 22,643 263,326 257,639 -5,687 16,956
2012 1,918,544 1,947,808 29,264 47,349 266,666 248,581 -18,085 29,264
2013 1,947,808 1,969,953 22,144 58,469 273,520 237,196 -36,324 22,144
Top 20% of the Overall UI Earnings Distribution
2005 2,351,882 2,407,259 55,377 64,813 245,494 236,058 -9,436 55,377
2006 2,407,259 2,529,269 122,010 88,284 227,727 261,453 33,726 122,010
2007 2,529,269 2,636,516 107,247 86,390 240,848 261,705 20,857 107,247
2008 2,636,516 2,576,185 -60,330 -15,291 271,995 226,955 -45,040 -60,330
2009 2,576,185 2,488,291 -87,894 -22,790 291,186 226,082 -65,104 -87,894
2010 2,488,291 2,524,307 36,016 67,434 246,006 214,587 -31,418 36,016
2011 2,524,307 2,542,238 17,931 44,185 230,451 204,197 -26,254 17,931
2012 2,542,238 2,625,836 83,598 78,243 214,172 219,527 5,355 83,598
2013 2,625,836 2,657,238 31,403 28,123 217,801 221,081 3,280 31,403
N otes : The estimates are based on the authors’ calculations using transitions into and out of the eligible-workers 
frame and between categories of the earnings distributions, including inactive workers.
distribution. The sum of the first two rows is zero; each element of the first two rows is zero, there 
are no earning when not eligible or eligible but inactive. Multiplying each element of the next three 
rows by a conformable vector of ones we can separate each total earnings value into the product 
of average earnings and the counts for that value. For example, the net inflows between period A 
and period B for earnings category two is:
A f|  =  (e^j ■ C02 -  e^ Q ■ C20) +  (ef?, ■ C12 -  ■ C21)
+  (ef2 -  e j )  ■ C22 +  (e|2 ■ C32 -  ef 3 ■ C23)
+  (e|2 ■ C42 -  ef4 ■ C24) (E-3)
The year-to-year change in the earnings associated with a given part of the earnings dis­
tribution is a linear function (weighted sum) of the average earnings and the transition counts. 
Table E.2 shows the results, after first grouping the stayers, inflows, and outflows together for the 
bottom 20%, middle 60%, and top 20% categories.
The change in earnings reduces to a simple (signed) sum of the counts if the average earnings
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is the same for each flow, i.e. (e£ =  =  e^  =  ef2 =  e2i =  e22 =  e122 =  eS  =  e123 =  e42 =  e^)
A AAB =  e2 ■ (C02 +  C12 +  C32 +  C42) — (C20 +  C21 +  C23 +  C24) (E-4)
inflows outflows
Although the simple formula will rarely hold in practice, it is useful as the earnings change for 
each category is now a scaled function of the counts. For the data in this paper a different constant 
average earnings value for each category does a reasonable job approximating the gross outflows 
and inflows. However, when using a constant the individual flows are not always scaled correctly 
since the weights (average earnings) differ substantially in some cases. Even though there are level 
differences across flows, the average earnings values are for the most part stable over time, allowing 
the counts to proxy for the change in the earnings distribution over time, once the appropriate 
scale factor is known for a given flow. The table below shows the average earnings and measures 
of variability for each of the flows.
Table E.3: Average Earnings and Variability by Transition Type
Flows from Bottom 20% Flows to Bottom 20%
et_2_2_A et_2_0 et_2_1 et_2_3 et_2_4 et_2_2_B et_0_2 et_1_2 et_3_2 et_4_2
Mean 2,706 2,620 2 ,053 3,631 3,377 2,814 2,427 2,202 3 ,474 2,963
IQR 22 17 30 48 15 24 244 14 20 67
Minimum 2 ,657 2,600 2,015 3,571 3,362 2,712 2,267 2,150 3,365 2,804
Maximum 2,802 2,678 2 ,087 3,747 3,399 2,873 2,569 2,227 3 ,518 3,041
Flows from Middle 60% Flows to Middle 60%
et_3_3_A et_3_0 et_3_1 et_3_2 et_3_4 et_3_3_B et_0_3 et_1_3 et_2_3 et_4_3
Mean 23,940 18,680 16,720 14,220 37,430 24,450 11,672 15,240 12,980 35,340
IQR 160 442 166 181 228 297 1,685 429 277 507
Minimum 23,540 18,110 16,560 13,850 36,910 24,220 10,370 14,950 12,540 34,260
Maximum 24,160 19,391 16,910 14,950 38,200 24,720 12,290 15,510 13,210 35,970
Flows from Top 20% Flows to Top 20%
et_4_4_A. et_4_0 et_4_1 et_4_2 et_4_3 et_4_4_B et_0_4 et_1_4 et_2_4 et_3_4
Mean 94,160 113,200 107,220 80,970 60,900 96,080 96,160 94,320 73,770 57,510
IQR 1,922 3,219 8,788 2,596 1 ,117 2,086 6,893 1,409 3,017 152
Minimum 91,810 107,440 97,650 78,800 59,930 93,720 78,540 91,320 69,450 56,820
Maximum 96,100 118,500 117,400 82,800 61,790 98,010 108,200 98,800 81,490 57,780
N otes : Dominant flows are in bold. The estimates are the weighted annual mean, inter-quartile Range (IQR), 
minimum, and maximum of the mean annual earnings in each category. Statistics are over nine pairs of years from 
2004-2005 to 2012-2013.
Appendix Figures E.1-fig:TE4 repeat the analysis shown in the main text in Figures 10-12.
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Figure E.1: Earnings Flows out from and in to the Bottom 20%
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
N otes : The estimates are based on the authors’ calculations using transitions into and out of categories of the 
earnings distribution, including inactivity.
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Figure E.2: Earnings Flows out from and in to the Middle 60%
N otes : The estimates based on the authors’ calculations using transitions into and out of categories of the earnings 
distribution, including inactivity.
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Figure E.3: Earnings Flows out from and in to the Top 20%
300.000.  000.000
225.000.  000.000
150.000.  000.000 
75,000 , 000,000
0
—  et_0_4
—  et_1_4
—  et_2_4
—  et_3_4
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N otes : The estimates are based on the authors’ calculations using transitions into and out of categories of the 
earnings distribution, including inactivity.
E.2 A K M  Decomposition
We estimate the following AKM model:
ln yijt =  XuP +  di +  ^ j  +  £ijt (E-5)
where yijt is log real annual earnings of person i, employed at firm j  in year t; di is individual 
i ’s person effect; ^ j is firm j ’s fixed effect; and x it includes controls for experience, labor force 
attachment, and aggregate labor market conditions detailed in Table E.4. Estimates of all these 
controls are in Table E.5.
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Table E.4: AKM Model Specification
A c tu a l L a b o r -F o rc e  E x p e r ie n ce
[exp, exp2/10, exp3/ 100, exp4/ 1000]
{female} * [exp,exp2/ 10,exp3/ 100,exp4/ 1000]
1 {black} * [exp,exp2/ 10,exp3/ 100,exp4/ 1000] 
l{Hispanic} * [exp,exp2/ 10,exp3/ 100,exp4/ 1000]
1 {foreign born} * [exp,exp2/ 10,exp3/ 100,exp4/ 1000]
1 {foreign born} * 1 {female} * [exp,exp2/ 10,exp3/ 100,exp4/ 1000]
1 {foreign born} * 1 {black} * [exp,exp2/ 10,exp3/ 100,exp4/ 1000]
1 {foreign born} * 1 {Hispanic} * [exp,exp2/ 10,exp3/ 100,exp4/ 1000]
L a b o r -F o rc e  A tta ch m e n t
weeks by hours categories (41 total, 40 hours by 50-52 weeks excluded)
sixq dummies (9 total: sixq2-sixq6, sixq_4th, sixq_left, sixq_right, sixq_inter) 
1 {female} * [sixq dummies]
1 {black} * [sixq dummies]
1 {Hispanic} * [sixq dummies]
1 {foreign born} * [sixq dummies]
1 {foreign born} * 1 {female} * [sixq dummies]
1 {foreign born} * 1 {black} * [sixq dummies]
1 {foreign born} * 1 {Hispanic} * [sixq dummies]
A g g r e g a te  L a b o r -M a rk e t  C o n d it io n s
[ut, 1 { ut > Ut-1 }  * Ut\ 
l { female}  * [ut, 1 { ut > Ut—1 }  * Ut] 
l { black}  * [ut, 1 { ut > ut—1 }  * ut] 
l { Hispanic}  * [ut, 1 { ut > ut—1 }  * ut]
l { foreign born}  * [ut, 1 { ut > ut—1 }  * ut] 
l { foreign born}  * 1 { female}  * [ut, 1 { ut > ut—1 }  * ut] 
l { foreign born}  * 1 { black}  * [ut, 1 { ut > ut—1 }  * ut] 
l { foreign born}  * 1 { Hispanic}  * [ut, 1 { ut > ut—1 }  * ut]
In co m p le te  2014Q 1 D a ta  C o n tro ls
[right: indicator for incomplete data in 2014Q1 in one state and DC]
1 {female}* [right]
1 {black}* [right]
1 {Hispanic}* [right]
1 {foreign born}*[right]
1 {foreign born} * 1 {female}*[right]
1 {foreign born} * 1 {black}*[right] 
l{foreign born} * l{Hispanic}*[right]
N otes : The specification also includes a fixed worker effect for each individual in the eligible-workers frame and a 
fixed firm effect for each employer in that frame. The AKM estimation occurs only during date regime 4, which is 
the complete population; however, our labor-force attachment variables require an additional quarter to calculate 
(2014Q1), which is missing for one state and DC. The “right” variable controls for the case where a sixq variable is 
set to zero due to data availability instead of actual labor-force attachment.
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Table E.5: AKM Model Estimates
1 experience 0.0973 86 female_sixq5 0.0474
2 experience_2 -0.0379 87 female_sixq6 0.0545
3 experience_3 0.0070 88 female_sixq_4th -0.0149
4 experience_4 -0.0006 89 female_sixq_left -0.0028
5 female_experience -0.0122 90 female_sixq .right 0.0333
6 female_experience_2 0.0044 91 female_sixq_inter 0.0265
7 female_experience_3 -0.0005 92 black_sixq2 0.0896
8 female_experience_4 0.0000 93 black_sixq3 0.1388
9 black_experience -0.0470 94 black_sixq4 0.1584
10 black_experience_2 0.0211 95 black_sixq5 0.1445
11 black_experience_3 -0.0046 96 black_sixq6 0.2161
12 black_experience_4 0.0004 97 black_sixq_4th 0.0250
13 hispanic_experience -0.0372 98 black_sixq_left -0.1004
14 hispanic_experience_2 0.0201 99 black _sixq_right -0.0761
15 hispanic_experience_3 -0.0049 100 black_sixq_inter -0.0829
16 hispanic_experience_4 0.0005 101 hispanic_sixq2 0.0962
17 fbstat_experience -0.0424 102 hispanic_sixq3 0.1280
18 fbstat_experience_2 0.0238 103 hispanic_sixq4 0.1386
19 fbstat_experience_3 -0.0058 104 hispanic_sixq5 0.1101
20 fbstat_experience_4 0.0005 105 hispanic_sixq6 0.1990
21 female_fbstat_experience 0.0007 106 hispanic_sixq_4th 0.0269
22 female_fbstat_experience_2 0.0008 107 hispanic_sixq_left -0.0927
23 female_fbstat_experience_3 -0.0004 108 hispanic_sixq_right -0.0933
24 female_fbstat_experience_4 0.0000 109 hispanic_sixq_inter -0.1123
25 black_fbstat_experience 0.0179 110 fbstat_sixq2 -0.0108
26 black_fbstat_experience_2 -0.0086 111 fbstat_sixq3 -0.0361
27 black_fbstat_experience_3 0.0021 112 fbstat_sixq4 -0.0602
28 black_fbstat_experience_4 -0.0002 113 fbstat_sixq5 -0.1155
29 hispanic_fbstat .experience 0.0146 114 fbstat_sixq6 -0.1533
30 hispanic_fbstat_experience_2 -0.0140 115 fbstat_sixq_4th 0.0377
31 hispanic_fbstat_experience_3 0.0044 116 fbstat _sixq .left 0.0292
32 hispanic_fbstat_experience_4 -0.0005 117 fbstat _sixq_right 0.0079
33 WKSHRS1 -0.3017 118 fbstat _sixq_inter 0.0724
34 WKSHRS2 -0.2561 119 female_fbstat_sixq2 -0.0245
35 WKSHRS3 -0.2044 120 female_fbstat_sixq3 -0.0390
36 WKSHRS4 -0.1260 121 female_fbstat_sixq4 -0.0308
37 WKSHRS5 -0.0625 122 female_fbstat_sixq5 -0.0262
38 WKSHRS6 0.0782 123 female_fbstat_sixq6 -0.0374
39 WKSHRS7 0.1381 124 female_fbstat_sixq_4th 0.0067
40 WKSHRS8 -0.2907 125 female_fbstat_sixq_left 0.0100
41 WKSHRS9 -0.1951 126 female_fbstat_sixq_right -0.0028
42 WKSHRS10 -0.1122 127 female_fbstat_sixq_inter 0.0041
43 WKSHRS11 -0.0100 128 black_fbstat_sixq2 0.0007
44 WKSHRS12 0.0831 129 black_fbstat_sixq3 0.0243
45 WKSHRS13 0.1570 130 black_fbstat_sixq4 0.0403
46 WKSHRS14 0.1734 131 black_fbstat_sixq5 0.0770
47 WKSHRS15 -0.3176 132 black_fbstat_sixq6 0.0787
48 WKSHRS16 -0.1633 133 black_fbstat_sixq_4th -0.0270
49 WKSHRS17 -0.0929 134 black_fbstat_sixq_left 0.0341
50 WKSHRS18 -0.0090 135 black_fbstat_sixq_right 0.0483
51 WKSHRS19 0.0628 136 black_fbstat_sixq_inter 0.0437
52 WKSHRS20 0.1167 137 hispanic_fbstat_sixq2 0.0099
53 WKSHRS21 0.1404 138 hispanic_fbstat_sixq3 -0.0025
54 WKSHRS22 -0.3661 139 hispanic_fbstat_sixq4 0.0027
55 WKSHRS23 -0.2028 140 hispanic_fbstat_sixq5 0.0529
56 WKSHRS24 -0.1196 141 hispanic_fbstat_sixq6 0.0141
57 WKSHRS25 -0.0685 142 hispanic_fbstat_sixq_4th -0.0252
58 WKSHRS26 -0.0223 143 hispanic_fbstat_sixq_left 0.0414
59 WKSHRS27 0.0011 144 hispanic_fbstat_sixq_right 0.0278
60 WKSHRS28 0.0161 145 hispanic_fbstat_sixq_inter 0.0434
61 WKSHRS29 -0.3451 146 urate -0.0095
62 WKSHRS30 -0.1839 147 urate.up 0.0017
63 WKSHRS31 -0.0999 148 female.urate 0.0034
64 WKSHRS32 -0.0550 149 female.urate.up 0.0006
65 WKSHRS33 -0.0145 150 black_urate 0.0045
66 WKSHRS34 0.0028 151 black.urate.up -0.0001
67 WKSHRS35 0.0183 152 hispanic.urate 0.0015
68 WKSHRS36 -0.3237 153 hispanic.urate.up 0.0005
69 WKSHRS37 -0.1716 154 fbstat .urate -0.0000
70 WKSHRS38 -0.0929 155 fbstat _urate_up 0.0003
71 WKSHRS39 -0.0361 156 female_fbstat_urate -0.0004
72 WKSHRS41 0.0223 157 female_fbstat_urate_up -0.0001
73 WKSHRS42 0.0320 158 black_fbstat_urate -0.0059
74 sixq2 1.1170 159 black_fbstat_urate_up 0.0009
75 sixq3 2.2170 160 hispanic_fbstat_urate -0.0032
76 sixq4 2.7750 161 hispanic.fbstat .urate.up -0.0003
77 sixq5 3.2910 162 right 0.2083
78 sixq6 3.6920 163 female_right 0.0319
79 sixq_4th 0.0323 164 black_right -0.0181
80 sixq_left -0.2940 165 hispanic_right -0.0051
81 sixq_right -0.1401 166 fbstat .right 0.0060
82 sixq_inter -0.7029 167 female_fbstat .right -0.0273
83 female_sixq2 0.0250 168 black .fbstat .right 0.0545
84 female_sixq3 0.0563 169 hispanic.fbstat .right -0.0139
85 female_sixq4 0.0544
N otes : The table presents the coefficient estimates of all the controls listed in Table E.4. N = 2, 014, 000, 000,
Jobs = 825, 900, 000, Persons = 200, 700, 000, Firms = 14, 650, 000. Intercept = 6.098, calculated after estimation. 
The equation includes one person effect for each person and firm effects for all firms, save one. Estimation and 
identification performed as described in Abowd et al. ( E^O10 All observations in the complete frame, which has 
universal coverage over the period 2004-2013, were used. Finite population standard errors are zero. The estimates 
and their associated standard errors have not been corrected for edit, imputation, and post-processing uncertainty.
E.3 Analyzing Earnings Inequality Changes Using Only Firm-Type and Non­
Firm-Type
In the main text Section 5, we use the AKM decomposition to create firm, non-firm, and skill 
components of earnings. These components are used to create firm-type, non-firm-type and skill- 
type bins that we subsequently employ to characterize the worker and firm contributions to changes 
in earnings inequality.
An earlier version of this paper used the non-firm-type bins in a manner similar to the use of 
the skill-type bins in the main text. We discuss these results here for each non-firm-type separately. 
We remind the reader that the non-firm-component contains the effects of changes in the labor-force 
attachment, macroeconomic conditions, date regime boundaries, and the residual, all of which are 
excluded from the skill-type in the main text.
Table E.6 presents outcomes for workers in the bottom bin of the non-firm component. 
Table E.7 presents outcomes for workers in the middle bin of the non-firm component distribution. 
Table E.8 presents outcomes for workers in the top bin of the non-firm component distribution.
The tables were created as follows. They are based on classifying workers in the previous 
year, i.e., year t — 1. Beginning in 2004 and ending in 2012, for every year that an eligible worker 
has positive earnings a single observation is added to one of the three tables. The appropriate table 
classification for each observation is determined by the non-firm type for that year, which can vary 
over time as workers accumulate experience, work more/less hours during the quarter, receive a 
positive or negative aggregate demand shock, or have a large positive or negative residual. Within 
each non-firm type, the earnings record is further classified based on the firm type, resulting in each 
earnings observation being classified into one of nine possible cells.58 Within each of the non-firm- 
type x firm-type cells, we break down the results by the three possible overall-earnings outcomes 
(bottom, middle and top). There are, thus, twenty-seven cells for which we present information on 
the number of workers, average earnings for the previous year (t — 1), and average earnings for the 
current year (t) by flow type.59
To fix ideas, we will take a detailed look at two rows in Table E.6. To be recorded in this table, 
the person must have been in the bottom bin (lowest bin) of the non-firm-component distribution 
in the “Previous Year,” i.e., t — 1.
Consider the first row of the table. This row is in the panel labeled “Bottom Firm,” indicating 
that this person is employed at a firm in the bottom bin of the firm component distribution in t — 1. 
Persons in this row are also in the bottom bin of the overall-earnings distribution in year t — 1, and 
the share of such persons (relative to those in the middle or top of the overall-earnings distribution) 
is 1.000, indicating that no person in the bottom of the non-firm component distribution and the 
bottom of the firm component distribution is employed outside of the bottom bin of the overall­
earnings distribution. The flow labeled “2_0” is the movement from the bottom of the overall­
earnings distribution (bin 2) to ineligible; that is, this is the flow out of the frame for persons 
at the bottom of the overall-earnings distribution. There were, on average, 59,554 such persons 
each “previous year” (t — 1). They represent 0.7% of the flows from bin 2 of the overall-earnings 
distribution. Average earnings in t — 1 were $1,381 of which —$1,463 are attributed to the firm 
component of our decomposition and $2,844 are attributed to the non-firm component of our 
decomposition. There were no earnings in the current year (t), because the person has moved out 
of the frame in t.
Next, consider the row labeled “Middle” in the “All Earnings” column in the “Middle Firm” 
panel with a “3_3” flow. All persons in this row were, once again, at the bottom of the non­
58The estimated AKM firm effects do not vary during the period, but workers can and do change employers.
59The earnings observation we used for classification are labeled “previous year” in the tables.
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firm component distribution in year t — 1. Of all such persons, 56% are employed by a firm in the 
middle of the firm component distribution. Of all persons at the bottom of the non-firm component 
distribution and in the middle of the firm component distribution in year t — 1, the proportion 0.159 
were in the middle of the overall-earnings distribution. Among such persons, the “3_3” row shows 
those who remain in the middle of the overall-earnings distribution in the current year, t, of which 
there were, on average, 1,470,659 in the 9 pairs of years for which the table was constructed. Those 
who stayed in the middle of the overall-earnings distribution represented 58.9% of all persons who 
were in the middle of the overall-earnings distribution in year t — 1, on average. In year t — 1, their 
earnings averaged $8,498 of which $2,180 is attributed to the firm component in our decomposition 
and $6,318 is attributed to the non-firm component. In the current year, year t, average earnings 
were $15,688 of which $3,555 is associated with the firm component and $12,132 is associated with 
the non-firm component.
We use these tables to investigate worker sorting directly by looking at the interaction of 
the non-firm and firm type for each worker-year-earnings observation. If there were no sorting, 
the distribution of earnings observations across firm types would be similar for all three tables, 
because outcomes would be unaffected by which part of the non-firm component distribution an 
individual occupied, given his place in the overall-earnings distribution. This hypothesis is clearly 
not supported by the data. For example, again using Table E.6 showing the bottom of the non-firm- 
type distribution, about 33% of the earnings observations are in firms at the bottom of the firm-type 
distribution, 56% are in firms of the middle type, and only 11% are in top firms. In comparison, 
Tables E.7 and E.8 show that persons in the middle and top of the non-firm type distributions are 
much less likely to be employed at firms in the bottom type (14% and 24% respectively), and much 
more likely to be employed at top firms (23% and 20% respectively). Interestingly, the relationship 
is not monotonic; workers in the middle are more likely to work at both middle and top firms 
relative to top workers.
Next, we focus on each non-firm-type in turn, starting with the earnings observations for 
workers in the bottom of the non-firm component distribution in Table E.6. For workers at the 
bottom of the non-firm-component distribution, working at a high-paying firm has two advantages: 
higher earnings than otherwise and a greater chance of moving to a higher bin in the overall-earnings 
distribution. For example, a worker at the bottom of the non-firm-component and overall-earnings 
distributions has a probability of moving to the middle of the overall-earnings distribution of 18% 
at a low paying firm, 29.5% at a middle paying firm, and 27.5% at a high paying firm. Prior to the 
transition the average worker with a low non-firm component at a low-, middle- and high-paying 
firm earns $2,084, $3,556, and $3,806, respectively.60 After the transition the average worker at a 
low-, middle- and high-paying firm earns $11,640, $13,752, and $18,017, respectively. Most of the 
additional increase in earnings for workers employed at a top-paying employer in the previous year 
is due to working at a top-paying employer in the next year.
60Notice that the non-firm component of earnings declines as we move up the firm type distribution. Although it is 
unclear exactly which covariate is primarily responsible for this decline (fewer hours worked during the year perhaps), 
the impact of working at a higher paying firm would be much greater if the non-firm component of earnings were the 
same across firm types.
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Table E.6: Earnings Associated with Flows by Firm Bin for Persons in the Bottom-Type Non-Firm
Category)
All
Earnings Share Flow
Average
Count Pct
Previous Year Current Year
Total Firm
Non­
Firm Total Firm
Non­
Firm
Bottom Firm (33%)
2_0 59,554 0.7% 1,381 -1,463 2,844 — — —
2_1 2,441,375 26.8% 1,102 -1,099 2,201 — — —
Bottom 1.000 2_2 4,962,828 54.5% 1,635 -1,588 3,223 2,466 -1,981 4,447
2_3 1,641,446 18.0% 2,084 -1,738 3,823 11,640 -4,017 15,657
2_4 8,640 0.1% 1,513 -1,558 3,071 78,157 8,958 69,199
3_0 0 0.0% — — — — — —
3_1 0 0.0% — — — — — —
Middle 0.000 3_2 0 0.0% — — — — — —
3_3 0 0.0% — — — — — —
3_4 0 0.0% — — — — — —
4_0 0 0.0% — — — — — —
4_1 0 0.0% — — — — — —
Top 0.000 4_2 0 0.0% — — — — — —
4_3 0 0.0% — — — — — —
4_4 0 0.0% — — — — — —
Middle Firm (56%)
2_0 116,724 0.9% 2,660 72 2,588 — — —
2_1 3,613,606 27.3% 2,289 42 2,247 — — —
Bottom 0.841 2_2 5,565,538 42.0% 2,784 -145 2,929 2,799 -594 3,392
2_3 3,911,555 29.5% 3,556 -27 3,583 13,752 561 13,191
2_4 36,073 0.3% 3,392 469 2,923 69,402 19,672 49,730
3_0 21,191 0.8% 8,381 2,189 6,193 — — —
3_1 428,729 17.2% 8,384 2,249 6,135 — — —
Middle 0.159 3_2 554,068 22.2% 8,153 1,893 6,260 3,321 -14 3,336
3_3 1,470,659 58.9% 8,498 2,180 6,318 15,688 3,555 12,132
3_4 21,549 0.9% 8,955 2,823 6,132 64,566 22,919 41,647
4_0 0 0.0% — — — — — —
4_1 0 0.0% — — — — — —
Top 0.000 4_2 0 0.0% — — — — — —
4_3 0 0.0% — — — — — —
4_4 0 0.0% — — — — — —
Top Firm (11%)
2_0 17,420 1.4% 2,913 1,598 1,314 — — —
2_1 469,324 38.3% 2,758 1,515 1,243 — — —
Bottom 0.396 2_2 377,303 30.8% 3,174 1,740 1,433 2,905 806 2,099
2_3 337,787 27.5% 3,806 2,034 1,771 18,017 7,482 10,535
2_4 24,607 2.0% 3,701 2,058 1,642 76,278 41,316 34,962
3_0 16,910 0.9% 12,121 7,299 4,822 — — —
3_1 375,155 20.3% 12,082 7,280 4,802 — — —
Middle 0.596 3_2 243,668 13.2% 11,573 6,756 4,817 3,134 774 2,360
3_3 1,108,356 60.0% 13,551 8,484 5,067 20,030 10,749 9,281
3_4 102,240 5.5% 15,785 10,529 5,255 70,117 42,636 27,481
4_0 172 0.7% 97,790 93,786 4,005 — — —
4_1 1,924 7.6% 96,408 92,599 3,809 — — —
Top 0.008 4_2 498 2.0% 93,690 89,588 4,103 2,376 -53 2,430
4_3 4,217 16.7% 65,091 60,669 4,422 32,200 28,313 3,887
4_4 18,478 73.1% 108,698 104,482 4,216 117,522 110,839 6,683
N otes : The estimates are based on the authors’ calculations using the nine paired years from 2004-2005 to 
2012-2013. The first year in the pair is the “previous year” in the table, and the second year in the pair is the 
“current year.” Bins associated with the flows are “0” inflow/outflow from the eligible-workers frame, “1” inactive 
but eligible, “2” bottom of the overall-earnings distribution, “3” middle of the overall-earnings distribution, and “4” 
top of the overall-earnings distribution. “Average count” is the average number of persons in the row during the 
year labeled “previous year” (t — 1). Pct is the percent-.distribution of transitions for all persons who started the 
year in the same overall-earnings distribution bin. For “Previous Year” and “Current Year,” “Total” is the average 
real earnings in 2000 dollars, “Firm” is the average real earnings associated with the firm component in our 
decomposition, and “Non-Firm” is the average real earnings associated with the non-firm component in our 
decomposition.
The vast majority (63%) of workers in the middle of the non-firm component distribution are 
employed at middle-paying firms, as Table E.7 shows. The next most prevalent outcomes for such 
workers are employment at top- and bottom-paying firms, 23% and 14% respectively. Similar to 
workers at the bottom of the non-firm type distribution, who also generally appear at the bottom 
of the overall-earnings distribution (84%) when employed by middle-paying firms, the majority of 
workers in the middle of the non-firm type distribution, no matter the firm type, are in the middle 
of the overall-earnings distribution. However, in spite of the majority of earnings observations being 
in the middle of the overall-earnings distribution, average earnings differ substantially across firm 
types. A  middle-type worker in bin 3 of the overall-earnings distribution who stays in bin 3 of the 
overall distribution (a “3_3” flow) at a bottom-type firm has t — 1 earnings of $12,356, a middle-type 
worker in a middle-type firm has t — 1 earnings of $22,978, and a middle-type worker at a top firm 
has earnings of $32,321. Most of the difference is due to a larger firm effect, although the non-firm 
component declines somewhat as a middle-type person is found in increasing firm types, giving 
back some of the gains. Similar to bottom-type workers, one of the additional benefits of finding 
employment at a high-paying firm is a greater probability of moving to the top of the earnings 
distribution (0.2% vs. 2.7% vs. 11.9% in rows 5, 25, and 40, respectively).
Similar to bottom and middle non-firm-type workers, Table E.8 shows that about 64% of 
top non-firm type workers are also in the top of the overall-earnings distribution, but there is also 
a substantial minority in the middle. The differences between working at a middle- compared to 
a bottom-type firm are relatively small, but the gains from working at a top-type firm are very 
large. Somewhat surprisingly perhaps, there are a relatively large number of top-type workers at 
bottom- and middle-type firms. On average, these workers, especially in the middle, are employed 
at worse-paying firms than middle non-firm type workers.
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Table E.7: Earnings Associated with Flows by Firm Bin for Persons in the Middle-Type Non-Firm
Category
All
Earnings Share Flow
Average
Count Pct
Previous Year Current Year
Total Firm
Non­
Firm Total Firm
Non­
Firm
Bottom Firm (14%)
2.0 26,241 0.7% 4,596 -7,583 12,179 — — —
2.1 352,516 9.4% 4,627 -6,141 10,768 — — —
Bottom 0.313 2.2 2,005,303 53.6% 4,676 -6,627 11,303 3,590 -4,861 8,452
2.3 1,352,780 36.2% 5,199 -5,937 11,137 11,278 -7,815 19,093
2.4 4,255 0.1% 4,649 -7,524 12,173 79,652 -16,894 96,546
3.0 39,797 0.5% 11,198 -9,855 21,053 — — —
3.1 312,400 3.8% 10,551 -8,857 19,408 — — —
Middle 0.687 3.2 1,331,161 16.2% 9,726 -8,550 18,275 3,798 -3,326 7,124
3.3 6,493,717 79.2% 12,356 -9,762 22,118 14,200 -9,400 23,600
3.4 18,706 0.2% 14,081 -10,636 24,717 70,391 -30,622 101,013
4.0 0 0.0% — — — — — —
4.1 0 0.0% — — — — — —
Top 0.000 4.2 0 0.0% — — — — — —
4.3 0 0.0% — — — — — —
4.4 0 0.0% — — — — — —
Middle Firm (63%)
2.0 3,160 0.6% 6,108 -2,046 8,154 — — —
2_1 56,529 10.7% 6,093 -2,039 8,132 — — —
Bottom 0.010 2.2 211,504 39.9% 6,079 -2,081 8,160 3,753 -1,489 5,242
2.3 257,664 48.7% 6,122 -2,062 8,185 12,008 -2,577 14,585
2.4 730 0.1% 6,121 -2,031 8,152 68,020 5,440 62,580
3.0 170,775 0.3% 18,829 1,971 16,858 — — —
3_1 1,789,911 3.6% 16,909 2,210 14,699 — — —
Middle 0.958 3.2 3,467,732 6.9% 15,078 884 14,194 3,439 -520 3,958
3.3 43,259,502 86.4% 22,978 3,475 19,503 23,517 3,506 20,012
3.4 1,370,036 2.7% 35,902 10,130 25,772 57,122 16,550 40,572
4.0 2,532 0.2% 51,159 18,825 32,335 — — —
4_1 17,159 1.0% 51,191 19,006 32,185 — — —
Top 0.031 4.2 13,212 0.8% 50,902 18,745 32,156 3,202 569 2,632
4.3 437,317 26.6% 49,933 17,999 31,934 37,792 13,081 24,711
4.4 1,174,019 71.4% 51,694 19,249 32,445 55,357 20,583 34,775
Top Firm (23%)
2.0 0 0.0% — — — — — —
2.1 0 0.0% — — — — — —
Bottom 0.000 2.2 0 0.0% — — — — — —
2.3 0 0.0% — — — — — —
2.4 0 0.0% — — — — — —
3.0 30,130 0.3% 29,438 15,459 13,980 — — —
3.1 445,548 4.0% 27,758 14,834 12,923 — — —
Middle 0.569 3.2 343,349 3.1% 27,352 14,186 13,166 3,111 789 2,322
3.3 8,891,952 80.7% 32,321 16,549 15,772 31,657 15,654 16,003
3.4 1,306,028 11.9% 38,938 20,918 18,021 58,297 31,112 27,185
4.0 12,388 0.1% 64,410 38,198 26,213 — — —
4.1 129,141 1.5% 64,268 39,009 25,258 — — —
Top 0.431 4.2 69,540 0.8% 61,384 35,782 25,602 2,939 974 1,965
4.3 1,055,443 12.6% 56,162 31,142 25,020 34,895 17,929 16,965
4.4 7,085,455 84.8% 64,675 37,688 26,987 68,632 39,649 28,983
N otes : The estimates are based on the authors’ calculations using the nine paired years from 2004-2005 to 
2012-2013. The first year in the pair is the “previous year” in the table, and the second year in the pair is the 
“current year.” Bins associated with the flows are “0” inflow/outflow from the eligible-workers frame, “1” inactive 
but eligible, “2” bottom of the overall-earnings distribution, “3” middle of the overall-earnings distribution, and “4” 
top of the overall-earnings distribution. “Average count” is the average number of persons in the row during the 
year labeled “previous year” (t — 1). Pct is the percent-.distribution of transitions for all persons who started the 
year in the same overall-earnings distribution bin. For “Previous Year” and “Current Year,” “Total” is the average 
real earnings in 2000 dollars, “Firm” is the average real earnings associated with the firm component in our 
decomposition, and “Non-Firm” is the average real earnings associated with the non-firm component in our 
decomposition.
Table E.8: Earnings Associated with Flows by Firm Bin for Persons in the High-Type Non-Firm
Category
A ll
E arn ings Share F low
A v e ra g e
C ou n t P c t
P re v io u s  Y ear C u rre n t Y ear
Total Firm
Non­
Firm Total Firm
Non­
Firm
Bottom Firm (24%)
2_0 679 2.0% 4,353 -62,991 67,344 — — —
2_1 2,485 7.2% 4,316 -64,774 69,090 — — —
Bottom 0.005 2_2 23,108 67.2% 4,275 -64,476 68,750 3,484 -51,189 54,673
2_3 7,784 22.7% 5,099 -60,143 65,241 12,205 -94,469 106,674
2_4 307 0.9% 3,928 -91,664 95,592 193,962 -307,444 501,406
3_0 16,791 0.3% 24,421 -41,367 65,788 — — —
3_1 93,523 1.8% 25,157 -38,303 63,460 — — —
Middle 0.768 3_2 162,321 3.2% 21,323 -37,554 58,877 3,476 -8,143 11,619
3_3 4,657,816 90.6% 28,233 -34,400 62,633 27,573 -31,979 59,552
3_4 211,635 4.1% 39,258 -46,667 85,925 56,165 -60,567 116,732
4_0 4,499 0.3% 92,980 -133,477 226,457 — — —
4_1 15,036 1.0% 93,061 -171,801 264,862 — — —
Top 0.227 4_2 9,282 0.6% 80,095 -133,162 213,257 3,008 -6,393 9,401
4_3 192,250 12.6% 58,951 -75,598 134,549 36,197 -41,533 77,730
4_4 1,299,404 85.5% 79,502 -109,491 188,992 80,704 -107,069 187,773
Middle Firm (56%)
2_0 0 0.0% — — — — — —
2_1 0 0.0% — — — — — —
Bottom 0.000 2_2 0 0.0% — — — — — —
2_3 0 0.0% — — — — — —
2_4 0 0.0% — — — — — —
3_0 9,579 0.2% 37,680 -5,362 43,042 — — —
3_1 58,065 1.2% 37,365 -5,593 42,957 — — —
Middle 0.310 3_2 61,221 1.3% 36,524 -5,940 42,464 3,195 -1,035 4,230
3_3 4,173,530 85.7% 37,519 -5,487 43,005 35,402 -5,028 40,430
3_4 570,086 11.7% 42,684 -2,446 45,130 54,161 -1,779 55,940
4_0 25,565 0.2% 111,359 17,448 93,911 — — —
4_1 103,830 1.0% 96,076 16,375 79,701 — — —
Top 0.690 4_2 60,924 0.6% 76,673 11,055 65,618 3,037 -346 3,383
4_3 1,192,613 11.0% 61,122 7,031 54,091 35,535 2,971 32,564
4_4 9,463,943 87.3% 88,559 15,037 73,522 89,570 15,434 74,136
Top Firm (20%)
2_0 0 0.0% — — — — — —
2_1 0 0.0% — — — — — —
Bottom 0.000 2_2 0 0.0% — — — — — —
2_3 0 0.0% — — — — — —
2_4 0 0.0% — — — — — —
3_0 0 0.0% — — — — — —
3_1 0 0.0% — — — — — —
Middle 0.000 3_2 0 0.0% — — — — — —
3_3 0 0.0% — — — — — —
3_4 0 0.0% — — — — — —
4_0 9,962 0.2% 203,735 115,510 88,225 — — —
4_1 73,693 1.4% 214,392 127,870 86,521 — — —
Top 1.000 4_2 27,036 0.5% 155,772 88,384 67,388 2,733 610 2,123
4_3 163,477 3.0% 121,408 66,733 54,675 29,337 13,458 15,879
4_4 5,145,974 94.9% 158,370 90,525 67,845 158,948 90,228 68,720
N otes : The estimates are based on the authors’ calculations using the nine paired years from 2004-2005 to 
2012-2013. The first year in the pair is the “previous year” in the table, and the second year in the pair is the 
“current year.” Bins associated with the flows are “0” inflow/outflow from the eligible-workers frame, “1” inactive 
but eligible, “2” bottom of the overall-earnings distribution, “3” middle of the overall-earnings distribution, and “4” 
top of the overall-earnings distribution. “Average count” is the average number of persons in the row during the 
year labeled “previous year” (t — 1). Pct is the percent distribution of transitions for all persons who started the 
year in the same overall-earnings distribution bin. For “Previous Year” and “Current Year,” “Total” is the average 
real earnings in 2000 dollars, “Firm” is the average real earnings associated with the firm component in our 
decomposition, and “Non-Firm” is the average real earnings associated with the non-firm component in our 
decomposition.
